Mansfield v. American Tel. & Tel. Corp.

• Decision Date: 11 October 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 90-2045.
• Citation: Mansfield v. American Tel. & Tel. Corp., 747 F. Supp. 1329 (W.D. Ark. 1990)
• Parties: Martha S. MANSFIELD, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CORPORATION and Robert Harper, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas

747 F. Supp. 1329

Martha S. MANSFIELD, Plaintiff, v.AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CORPORATION and Robert Harper, Defendants.

Civ. No. 90-2045.

United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fort Smith Division.

October 11, 1990.

Robert E. Yoes, Yoes Law Firm, Fort Smith, Ark., for plaintiff.

Kathlyn Graves, Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Little Rock, Ark., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, District Judge.

In June, 1989, Martha Mansfield was fired from her job as a national accounts manager for AT & T.She sues her former supervisor and AT & T, alleging wrongful discharge, breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, outrage, slander, and discrimination on account of age, gender, and political views.

The defendants now move for summary judgment as to the claims for wrongful discharge, breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and outrage.The motion will be granted as to the claims for wrongful discharge and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing and denied as to all other issues raised.

I.

The defendants first argue that Ms. Mansfield was an employee at will and therefore, as a matter of law, has no claim for wrongful discharge unless her firing was in violation of a well established public policy of the state.See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford,294 Ark. 239, 249, 743 S.W.2d 380(1988).Public policies that have been recognized in Arkansas cases as sheltering an employee at will include the encouragement of citizen reporting of violations of state or federal law, id. at 250, 743 S.W.2d 380, the protection of the exercise of a statutory right, Webb v. HCA Health Services,300 Ark. 613, 618, 780 S.W.2d 571(1989), the protection of the performance of a duty required by law, id., and the protection of the refusal to perform an illegal act, id. at 619, 780 S.W.2d 571.See alsoSterling Drug,294 Ark. at 245, 743 S.W.2d 380, andScholtes v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc.,548 F.Supp. 487, 494(W.D.Ark.1982).

Although Ms. Mansfield's complaint alludes to her refusal to "conduct her job duties in a manner contrary to ... public policy"(see complaint, paras. 10, 11), the complaint is not specific as to details.According to her response to the defendants' motion, however, that allusion is to Ms. Mansfield's refusal to cooperate with AT & T in its alleged commission of a felony, i.e., the hiring through transfer of Beverly Burns as a political favor to B.G. Hendrix, a state legislator, and Ms. Mansfield's continued opposition to the employment of Ms. Burns.Seepp. 2, 7, plaintiff's brief in response to defendants' motion;see alsoMansfieldTr. 39-43, 165-68, 173-75, 198-99.The defendants apparently acknowledge that those allegations by Ms. Mansfield are the basis for her wrongful discharge claim.Seepp. 5-6, defendants' brief on motion for summary judgment.They argue, nonetheless, that such conduct does not fall within any of the categories recognized by the Arkansas courts as protecting an at-will employee.The court agrees.

Ms. Mansfield cites as authority for her allegations of commission of a felony the provision of the stateconstitution defining as a crime the direct or indirect offer, gift, or promise of anything of value to any state legislator in order to influence that legislator's action in the performance of public or official duty.SeeArk. Const. art. V, § 35.She contends that AT & T gave Ms. Burns a position in order to influence Mr. Hendrix's actions relative to AT & T in the legislature.SeeMansfieldTr. 39-41, 175, 198-99.

It is not clear to the court what Ms. Mansfield means when she states that she"refused to cooperate"(seep. 2, plaintiff's brief in response to defendants' motion) in the hiring and continued employment of Ms. Burns.It is obvious that Ms. Mansfield opposed the idea.SeeMansfieldTr. 41-42, 165-67, 173-74.It also appears, however, that the actual decision to hire Ms. Burns was made not by Ms. Mansfield but by her supervisors and other corporate officials, specifically, her immediate superior, James Upchurch; an area vice-president, a Mr. Keith; "someone from Atlanta"; and Ed Moore, an employee in the AT & T regulatory services department.SeeMansfieldTr. 39-41.Indeed, she states that she related to Mr. Moore that she had no authority in that regard and that he would need to talk with her supervisor to effect that hiring, seeMansfieldTr. 40-41, and she describes what occurred as her having been "forced to take Ms. Burns there,"seeMansfieldTr. 42;see alsoMansfieldTr. 38, 165, 175, 199.It also appears that Ms. Mansfield was not even Ms. Burns's supervisor in the corporate hierarchy.SeeMansfieldTr. 37, 166-68, 199.

Ms. Mansfield does not allege that her firing was in retaliation for reporting to some law enforcement agency this action on AT & T's part, seeSterling Drug,294 Ark. at 250, 743 S.W.2d 380, or for herself refusing to hire Ms. Burns, see Webb, 300 Ark. at 619, 780 S.W.2d 571.Rather, Ms. Mansfield alleges that her firing was in retaliation for her repeatedly stated opposition to a decision made by others.SeeMansfieldTr. 165-66, 174.Under these particular circumstances, this court does not believe that the Arkansas courts would find Ms. Mansfield's firing to have been in violation of a well established public policy of the state.¹The defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Ms. Mansfield's wrongful discharge claim is therefore granted.²

II.

The defendants next argue that no contract of employment existed between AT & T and Ms. Mansfield and therefore that she has no claim for breach of contract.The court agrees in part and disagrees in part.

Ms. Mansfield concedes that no written contract of employment exists.SeeMansfieldTr. 164.She offers two arguments to support her breach-of-contract claim, however — first, that representatives of AT & T made express oral promises of continued employment to her, and, second, that the defendants are estopped to deny a contract of employment because their conduct led her to rely to her detriment on the prospect of continued employment.The court turns first to the question of a contract of employment based on oral promises.

In the employment context, the Arkansas courts have consistently refused to declare the existence of a contract for continued employment in the absence of an explicit representation that an employee will not be discharged except for cause.See, e.g., Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hospital,292 Ark. 130, 135-36, 728 S.W.2d 501(1987);see alsoSterling Drug,294 Ark. at 245, 743 S.W.2d 380.An "implied provision against the right to discharge is not enough."Gladden,292 Ark. at 136, 728 S.W.2d 501;see alsoHarris v. Arkansas Book Co.,287 Ark. 353, 357, 700 S.W.2d 41(1985).

Ms. Mansfield testifies that promises "have always been made by her supervisors ... that as long as you do your job and make the sales, and meet your quota, you will have employment here."SeeMansfieldTr. 165;see alsoMansfieldTr. 169, 173.This is the only evidence presented relating to alleged oral promises referenced by Ms. Mansfield or found by the court.

These representations, taken as true and even most generously interpreted, cannot possibly be construed as anything more than an implied promise not to fire Ms. Mansfield except for cause.That being the case, the court holds that no contract of employment was created by virtue of the assurances of the defendants relating to the certainty of future employment as long as Ms. Mansfield continued to do her job satisfactorily.

The court must, then, address a more troublesome issue — whether Ms. Mansfield was induced by the statements of the defendants to rely to her detriment on continued employment to such an extent that the defendants are estopped to deny a contract of employment.See, e.g., Scholtes,548 F.Supp. at 492;see alsoRestatement (Second) of Contracts§ 90(1) comment b (1981).

Ms. Mansfield testifies that in reliance upon her supervisors' assurances of continued employment, she moved from city to city and declined several invitations to work at other corporations.SeeMansfieldTr. 11, 177-78.Such claims have been cited by other courts applying Arkansas law to justify a denial of summary judgment in a breach-of-contract suit involving an alleged employment agreement.See, e.g., Scholtes,548 F.Supp. at 492, 496-97.This court therefore denies the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Ms. Mansfield's claim for breach of contract.

III.

The defendants argue in passing that Ms. Mansfield may not assert a claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing.Ms. Mansfield has not responded to this contention.The court agrees with the defendants.

It is true that in Scholtes,548 F.Supp. at 494, the court was "convinced that Arkansas law recognizes ... a term requiring good faith and fair dealing in decisions to fire implied in fact in employment contracts, where, although omitted from the agreement, such is the intention of the parties as inferred from their words and conduct"(emphasis in original).It is also true that in Jackson v. Kinark,282 Ark. 548, 550, 669 S.W.2d 898(1984), the Arkansas Supreme Court alluded to the ways in which other states had "softened the harshness of the common-law rule that employment contracts for an indefinite term amount to employment at will, either by finding an express or implied agreement for a specified period of employment or by imposing on the employer a duty not to discharge the employee arbitrarily or in bad faith."

Given, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court's later discussion of Jackson in Gladden,292 Ark. at 136, 728 S.W.2d 501, and the explicit statement that "an implied provision against the right to discharge is not enough,"id.,this court does not believe that the Arkansas courts would recognize as actionable a claim for breach of covenant of good...