Mansfield v. Circle K. Corp.

• Decision Date: 05 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 82577,82577
• Citation: 877 P.2d 1130
• Parties: Eric MANSFIELD, Plaintiff, v. The CIRCLE K. CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1130

877 P.2d 1130

1994 OK 80

Eric MANSFIELD, Plaintiff, v. The CIRCLE K. CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 82577.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

July 5, 1994.

Certified Question of Law from the United States District Court, Western District of Oklahoma; Robin J. Cauthron, Judge.

Pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S.1991 § 1601 et seq., the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma certified the following question:

May a twenty-year-old person who purchases 3.2% alcoholic beer from a beer vendor for off-the-premises consumption state a cause of action against the vendor for the purchaser's subsequent alcohol-related injuries, when both the vendor and purchaser have violated provisions of state law prohibiting the sale or purchase of beer by or to persons under 21 years of age?

QUESTION ANSWERED.

We find that a commercial vendor is prohibited by statute from selling beer to minors. A commercial vendor's statutory duty not to sell beer to a minor is not limited to on-the-premises consumption. If the minor is injured after consuming beer purchased from the vendor, the minor may have a cause of action against the vendor.

Michael M. Blue, John M. Merritt, Michael T. Rooney, James M. Hays, III, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff.

Jeff R. Beeler, Tracy L. Pierce, Oklahoma City, for defendant.

KAUGER, Justice.

The issue presented by the question certified is whether a cause of action exists against a commercial vendor who sells beer to a minor ¹ if the minor suffers alcohol-related injuries after drinking the beer off-the-premises of the vendor. We find that a commercial vendor is prohibited by statute from selling beer to minors. The statutory proscription against the sale of beer to a minor is not limited to on-the-premises consumption. If the minor is injured after consuming beer purchased from the vendor, the minor may have a cause of action against the vendor.

FACTS

On April 21, 1989, Eric Mansfield, (Mansfield/minor), a twenty-year-old Wisconsin resident, purchased 3.2% beer from the Circle K Corporation (Circle K/convenience store) in Norman, Oklahoma, in violation of 37 O.S.Supp.1989 § 246. ² The convenience store neither inquired as to the age of the minor nor asked for any proof of identification, and it sold the beer to Mansfield in violation of 37 O.S.Supp.1989 § 241. ³ Mansfield was accompanied by another minor at the time of the purchase. The two minors left the store in a car with a group of minors and drove to a fraternity house.

Mansfield, after drinking the beer which he had purchased from the convenience store, dove into the fraternity's above-ground, makeshift swimming pool and broke his neck. On May 12, 1989, he filed a complaint against the fraternity. After settling with the fraternity, Mansfield filed a complaint against the convenience store on December 31, 1991, in the United States District Court of the Western District of Oklahoma. Mansfield alleged that Circle K negligently sold beer to him which resulted in his injuries. He further alleged that Circle K was negligent per se because it violated local ordinances and state law which prohibit selling beer to a minor.

The convenience store filed a motion for summary judgment requesting that the trial court find that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because: 1) Mansfield failed to state a cause of action because Oklahoma law does not recognize a civil cause of action against a commercial vendor who sells beer to a minor who consumes the beverage off-the-premises; 2) the injuries were not caused by Circle K; 3) Mansfield was equally criminally at fault; and 4) the convenience store was not negligent per se. Finding no Oklahoma precedent to resolve the questions of law, the trial court certified the question to this Court pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S.1991 § 1601 et seq.

A COMMERCIAL VENDOR IS PROHIBITED BY STATUTE FROM SELLING BEER TO MINORS. A COMMERCIAL VENDOR'S STATUTORY DUTY NOT TO SELL BEER TO A MINOR IS NOT LIMITED TO ON-THE-PREMISES CONSUMPTION. IF A MINOR IS INJURED AFTER CONSUMING BEER PURCHASED FROM THE VENDOR, THE MINOR MAY HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE VENDOR.

Mansfield argues that an injured minor has a cause of action against a commercial vendor who wrongfully sells beer to a minor. Circle K contends that the minor's voluntary consumption relieves the convenience store from any liability.

Courts may recognize a cause of action if they conclude that a defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff. In such cases, the standard of conduct is that of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances. ⁴ If, however, there are criminal or regulatory statutes which delineate the defendant's conduct, courts may adopt the conduct required by the statutes as that which would be expected of a reasonably prudent person--providing courts believe the statutorily required conduct is appropriate for establishing civil liability. ⁵ When courts adopt the statutory standard for a cause of action for negligence, the violation of the statute is said to be negligence per se. ⁶ The violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se if the other elements of negligence are present. To establish negligence per se on the basis of a statutory violation the party must establish that: 1) the injury was caused by the violation; 2) the injury was of a type intended to be prevented by the statute; and 3) the injured party was of the class meant to be protected by the statute. ⁷

In Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 304 (Okla.1986), we held that a vendor who sold intoxicating beverages to a minor for on-the-premises consumption was under a duty to exercise reasonable care not to sell liquor to a noticeably intoxicated person who later injured a third person. ⁸ In Brigance, a restaurant owner sold alcohol for on premises consumption to a group of noticeably intoxicated minor consumers. After leaving the restaurant, one of the minors drove his car while drunk and wrecked it, injuring a minor passenger. We recognized, in such a situation, that it was not unreasonable to expect a commercial vendor to foresee that there would be an unreasonable risk of harm to others who might be injured by an intoxicated person's impaired ability to operate an automobile. We held that even if a breach of duty occurred, a plaintiff was required to show that the illegal sale of alcohol led to the impairment of the ability of the driver and that the impairment was a proximate cause of the injury.

Last year, we addressed the issue of whether Brigance extended to off-the-premises consumption when a commercial vendor sold beer to minors in Tomlinson v. Love's Country Stores, Inc., 854 P.2d 910 (Okla.1993). In Tomlinson, a convenience store owner, who apparently knew that the minors intended to drink while driving, sold beer to three minors. The vehicle crashed and one of the minors, a passenger, was killed. Citing cases which support the holding of Brigance, we found that commercial vendors have a duty not to sell beer to a person under the age of twenty-one. A vendor who illegally sold beer to minors could be found liable regardless of whether consumption was on- or off-the-premises of the vendor.

In Busby v. Quail Creek Golf & Country Club, (1994) 65 O.B.J. 1945, --- P.2d ---- (Okla.1994), we held that a consumer-inebriate would have a cause of action against a commercial vendor if that consumer is a minor and is injured as a result of the minor's intoxication. The question presented in the present case is whether liability for a commercial vendor who illegally sells beer to minors extends off-the-premises of the vendor.

The same reasoning that led this Court to allow a negligence action for injury in Busby and Tomlinson, supports an action here. In Tomlinson, we cited several jurisdictions which extended liability for the illegal sale of alcoholic beverages by vendors to minors for consumption off-the-premises. ⁹ Tomlinson involved a minor passenger who was injured. However, in Busby, we recognized that jurisdictions which allow a cause of action against commercial vendors on behalf of minors who voluntarily drink to the point of intoxication and are thereby injured, do not distinguish between injured minor passengers and minors who purchase alcohol or who are served alcohol and later injure themselves. ¹⁰

The public policy is consistent where minors are involved. A statutory duty is imposed on commercial vendors because legislatures, when enacting statutes prohibiting the sale of beer to minors and prohibiting minors from purchasing or possessing beer seek to protect, in part, the minor from the effects of alcohol. The fact that minors violate statutes when purchasing or consuming beer does not preclude a cause of action--because as between the seller and the minor--it is the seller who is the responsible party in the action. The vendor can facilitate the protection of minors by attempting to determine the age of the consumer and by refusing to sell to minors.

Here, and in Tomlinson, alcohol was sold illegally to a minor for consumption off-the-premises. In both cases, the minor became intoxicated from the alcohol illegally sold by the vendor. The distinction between Tomlinson and the present case is that Mansfield injured himself by diving into a makeshift swimming pool rather than incurring injury as passenger in an automobile accident caused by the intoxicated condition of a minor driver. Both here and in Busby, alcohol was illegally sold to a minor; and the minor was injured after becoming intoxicated from the alcohol illegally sold by the vendor. The only distinction between Busby and the present case is that Mansfield purchased the beer and then left the premises in an automobile to drink it, rather than remaining on the vendor's premises. This distinction does not insulate the vendor from the liability of...