Mansfield v. Jones-Pfaff
| Decision Date | 15 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. C14-0948JLR |
| Parties | PAMELA MANSFIELD, Plaintiff, v. DAWN JONES-PFAFF, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Before the court are five motions from the parties: (1) Defendant Barbara Brooks-Worrell's motion to strike claims pursuant to Washington's anti-SLAPP statute1 and the University Defendants'2 motion for partial summary judgment (Mot. (Dkt. # 40)); (2) Defendants Jessica Reichow and Dawn Jones-Pfaff's joinder in the anti-SLAPP motionand Ms. Reichow's joinder in the motion for partial summary judgment (Joinder (Dkt. # 43); (3) Plaintiff Pamela Mansfield's motion to dismiss Ms. Brooks-Worrell and certain claims against Defendant Dr. Jerry Palmer (Not. of Dis. (Dkt. # 46)); (4) Ms. Mansfield's motion for leave to file a third amended complaint (Mot. to Am. (Dkt. # 48)); and (5) Ms. Mansfield's motion for a continuance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) (Mot. to Cont. (Dkt. # 49)).3
The principle issues about which the parties argue in these motions are whether Washington's anti-SLAPP statute bars some of Ms. Mansfield's claims, and whether sheshould be allowed to dismiss some of her claims and amend others in order to avoid the impact of the anti-SLAPP statute. As relevant here, Washington's anti-SLAPP statute affords a person who communicates with a government agency on a matter reasonably of concern to that agency absolute immunity against claims based on such communications. RCW 4.24.510. Defendants assert that Ms. Mansfield's state law claims come under this statute because those claims are based on Defendants' communications to law enforcement for the United States Department of Veterans' Affairs ("VA"). (See generally Mot.; Joinder.) Rather than oppose this argument on its merits, Ms. Mansfield attempts to dismiss some of her claims and amend others to remove all reference to Defendants' communications to the VA police. (See generally Not. of Dis.; Mot. to Am.) Ms. Mansfield contends that Defendants' arguments are moot in light of her motions to dismiss and amend. (See generally Resp.) Alternatively, she urges the court to postpone ruling on Defendants' motion until she has a chance to conduct further discovery. (Id.) The University Defendants, joined by Ms. Reichow, also seek partial summary judgment on the ground that some of Ms. Mansfield's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (See Mot. at 13-18; Joinder at 3.)
The parties' arguments on the anti-SLAPP issues are irrelevant, however, due to an issue that no party addresses in the briefing—the effect of the United States' substitution under the Westfall Act on the court's ability to adjudicate the anti-SLAPP motion. Only Ms. Brooks-Worrell, Ms. Jones-Pfaff, and Ms. Reichow seek anti-SLAPP relief (see Mot.; Joinder), yet substitution has displaced them as defendants in this suit and replaced them with the United States (see Not. of Sub. & Cert. 1 (Dkt. # 3); Not. ofSub. & Cert. 2 (Dkt. # 13)). As a result, no current party moves for anti-SLAPP relief, and the court must deny the joint anti-SLAPP motion without reaching its merits.
Having considered the submissions of the parties, the balance of the record, and the governing law, and being fully advised, the court DENIES the joint anti-SLAPP motion; GRANTS Ms. Mansfield's motion to dismiss; GRANTS Ms. Mansfield's motion for leave to file a third amended complaint; GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion for partial summary judgment; and DENIES as moot Ms. Mansfield's motion for a continuance.
This case began as a dispute between co-workers but has now blossomed into a federal court lawsuit. Plaintiff Ms. Mansfield is a nurse who was employed by the University of Washington ("UW"). She began working for UW in 1994 and eventually advanced to the position of Research-Nurse-2. (Id. ¶ 10.) In 2007, she was appointed to a lead position assisting Dr. Jerry Palmer with several grant-funded diabetes prevention and treatment studies. (Id.) Dr. Palmer and his research team conducted those studies at the Seattle office of the VA. (Id.) As such, Ms. Mansfield was required to hold an uncompensated VA appointment. (Mot. at 3.)
In addition to Ms. Mansfield, Dr. Palmer's research team included an administrative aid, a lab technician, and a lab supervisor. All of them are now defendants in this lawsuit. (See generally 2d Am. Compl.) The administrative aid, Dawn Jones-Pfaff, was an employee of the Seattle Institute for Biomedical and Clinical Research("SIBCR") who was assigned to the team. (Id. ¶ 4.) She was supervised by both Dr. Palmer and Ms. Mansfield. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 10.) The lab technician, Jessica Reichow, was a UW employee assigned to work with Dr. Palmer. (Id. ¶ 6.) The lab supervisor, Barbara Brooks-Worrell, was Ms. Mansfield's supervisor with respect to lab work. (Id. ¶ 7.) Ms. Brooks-Worrell had design and implementation authority over Dr. Palmer's team in connection with research studies funded by grants from the National Institutes of Health. (Id.) Together, these five team members ("the Palmer team")4 worked at the VA to research and treat diabetes patients. (See id. ¶ 10.)
Over time, certain relationships within the Palmer team soured. In particular, and most relevant to this lawsuit, Ms. Mansfield and Ms. Jones-Pfaff grew to dislike one another. It is unclear to the court exactly what sparked this mutual dislike, but it is evident that with time it became rather pronounced. To begin, Ms. Mansfield took exception to a number of Ms. Jones-Pfaffs clinical practices. (Id. ¶ 12.) For example, Ms. Mansfield alleges that Ms. Jones-Pfaff publicized patients' private medical histories (id. ¶¶ 12B-C), prepared doses of prescription medicine without a health care license (id. ¶ 12E), and scheduled a child for an appointment at an adults-only clinic (id. ¶ 12I). Ms. Mansfield makes similar allegations against other members of the team, and claims that she publicized those allegations at various times. (Id. ¶ 12.)
The dispute between Ms. Mansfield and Ms. Jones-Pfaff took on a personal dimension as well. (See id. ¶¶ 15-22.) Ms. Mansfield alleges that Ms. Jones-Pfaffphysically attacked Ms. Mansfield in 2011, repeatedly slamming her head into her desk and then fleeing down a stairwell "as a good Samaritan tried to stop [Ms. Jones-Pfaff] for questioning." (Id. ¶ 19.) She further alleges that Ms. Jones-Pfaff attempted to cover up this attack by orchestrating an effort by the Palmer team to "furnish coordinated round-table testimony." (Id.) She alleges that through this testimony the other Palmer team members not only attempted to absolve Ms. Jones-Pfaff of any blame for the attack, but also tried to portray Ms. Mansfield as mentally unstable, an illegal drug distributor, and a violent threat. (Id.)
As a result of these incidents, Ms. Mansfield lost her job. VA officials concluded that Ms. Mansfield could not be trusted with access to a federal facility in light of her falsified assault report. (Id. ¶ 20.) The VA's decision to bar Ms. Mansfield from its facility, in turn, caused UW to terminate Ms. Mansfield's employment. (Id.) A UW employee named Mara Fletcher reviewed Ms. Mansfield's file, including her reports of abuses by the Palmer research team, and "executed UW's authorization" to terminate Ms. Mansfield's UW employment. (Id. ¶ 8, 21.) Ms. Fletcher is now a defendant in this lawsuit as well. (Id. ¶ 8.)
Several years after Ms. Mansfield's termination, the dispute migrated from the halls of the VA office to the court system. On March 10, 2013, Ms. Mansfield filed a complaint in King County Superior Court. (State Ct. Rec. (Dkt. # 2-1) at 5.) Her original complaint alleged only a single cause of action for wrongful interference with contractagainst Ms. Pfaff. (Id. at 5, 7.) However, she amended her original complaint in state court, adding the rest of the Palmer team as defendants as well as SIBCR and UW.5 (See generally id. at 17-27 ("1st Am. Compl.").) In addition, she introduced new causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision and retention, civil conspiracy, and First Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27-37.)
On June 27, 2014, the United States of America removed the case to federal court and substituted itself for Ms. Reichow and Ms. Jones-Pfaff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). As required for removal and substitution under § 2679(d)(2), the United States certified that Ms. Reichow and Ms. Jones-Pfaff were acting within the scope of their federal employment at all times relevant to Ms. Mansfield's tort claims. Shortly thereafter, the United States substituted itself for Ms. Brooks-Worrell, certifying that she too was acting within the scope of her federal employment at all times relevant to Ms. Mansfield's tort claims. (Not. of Sub. & Cert. 2.)
On July 17, 2014, newly-substituted Defendant the United States filed a motion to dismiss, and Ms. Mansfield moved to amend her complaint. In amending, Ms. Mansfield sought to remove her claim for negligent supervision and retention and allege that much of the conduct that forms the basis of her claims took place outside the scope of Defendants' employmentwith the VA. (See generally 7/17/14 Mot. to Am.) The latter amendment would allow Ms. Mansfield to resist the United States' motion to dismiss. (See Resp. to 7/17/14 Mot. to Am. (Dkt. # 18) at 5.) The court granted her leave to amend on August 1, 2014 (Order (Dkt. # 22)); however, Ms. Mansfield did not file her second amended complaint until September 17, 2014 .
On August 18, 2013, after the court granted leave to amend but before Ms. Mansfield filed her second amended complaint, Ms. Brooks-Worrell...
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