Mansfield v. Lynch

• Decision Date: 10 July 1890
• Parties: MANSFIELD v. LYNCH et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

22 A. 313

59 Conn. 320

MANSFIELD

v. LYNCH et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 10, 1890.

Appeal from city court of New Haven; Pickett, Judge.

Action by Burton Mansfield, as administrator de bonis non of the estate of Dennis McLaughlin, against Lawrence and Ann Lynch, his wife, to recover money paid to defendant Ann Lynch under mistake by the original administrator. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant Ann ."lynch appeals.

J. B. Morse, for appellant.

S. A. York and A. D. Penney, for appellee.

TORRANCE, J. The record in this case discloses the following facts: On the 1st of May, 1888, one McLaughlin died intestate, and in fact insolvent, owing the defendant Ann Lynch $400 upon a promissory note. On May 14th of that year one Bradley was appointed administrator upon McLaughlin's estate. The court of probate limited a time for the presentation of claims, and within the time all the claims finally allowed against the estate, amounting to $1,696.44, were presented to said Bradley. Of the claims so presented Bradley allowed some and disallowed others. Among the claims of general creditors so allowed (amounting in all to $705.14) was that of the defendant upon said note, amounting, with interest, to $424.87. The claims disallowed, amounting to $991.30, were in fact valid claims against the estate, but none of them were evidenced by any writing signed by the deceased, and Bradley believed they were not valid claims on that account. Healso honestly, but erroneously, believed that he had been advised by the judge of probate to disallow all claims presented against the estate not evidenced by a writing signed by the deceased, and supposed that one of the claims was barred by the statute of limitations. On these grounds he disallowed these claims, and gave the parties notice of the disallowance. After the time limited for presenting claims had expired, Bradley, acting under the belief that the disallowed claims were no longer claims that could be collected out of the estate, and believing that, this being so, the estate was solvent, paid the defendant's claim in full, and took the note into his possession, on the 19th of December, 1888. In so believing and acting he was honestly mistaken, as the court finds, both as to the matters of fact and as to the matters of law. Afterwards, in May, 1889, certain creditors whose claims had been so disallowed brought suit, against Bradley, and thereupon, by the advice of counsel, he represented to the court of probate that, the estate was insolvent, and asked that commissioners be appointed to receive and examine all the claims presented. Thereupon, in May, 1889, the court adjudged the estate to be insolvent, and appointed commissioners, to whom Bradley in due time presented all the claims against the estate, including those allowed and paid as well as those disallowed by him; all of which the commissioners allowed, and reported their doings to the court on the 28th of July, 1889, which report was duly accepted, and no appeal has been taken therefrom. In the mean time, on July 1, 1889, Bradley died, and on August 2, 1889, the plaintiff was duly appointed and qualified as administrator de bonis non of the McLaughlin estate. The estate could at no time in fact pay to the general creditors more than 31.7 per cent on the dollar, which was the percentage finally found due and ordered to be paid by the court. Before the present suit was brought the plaintiff demanded of the defendant $290.18, which was the amount paid to her by Bradley over and above the allowed percentage. This she refused to pay, and thereupon this suit was brought. The defendant received the amount paid to her by Bradley in good faith, believing the same to be justly due, and she had no actual knowledge of the mistakes on the part of Bradley, or of any of the doings of the commissioners or of the court of probate before the date of this suit, although public notice thereof was given according to law. The money so paid to her was by her forthwith deposited in her own name in a savings bank, where it has ever since remained, and is a part of the money attached in this suit. On these facts the court below rendered judgment that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the $290.18, with interest from December 18, 1888, when it was paid to her. Whether, upon the facts found, the court erred in so deciding, is the general question presented for our consideration.

From the record it is evident that, in fact and in law, it was the duty of the administrator to pay, and the right of the defendant to receive, only $134.69; that the administrator by mistake paid her $290.18 more than she was entitled to receive; and that the loss, if the overpayment cannot he recovered from the defendant, must fall, either upon Bradley's estate or upon the creditors of the McLaughlin estate. Now, whatever view may be taken of Bradley's action in making the over-payment, it seems unjust that the loss should fall upon the creditors, and if Bradley acted in good faith in making it, and did it under a mistaken view of the law or of the facts, or both, it seems hard that the loss should fall on his estate or upon his bondsman. On the other hand, if the defendant is compelled to repay this amount, she is no worse off than she would have been if no mistake had been made. She retains her pro rata share of the assets, and is not legally harmed, for she thus gets all the law would in any event allow her out of the then known assets of the McLaughlin estate, and she still holds a valid claim against the estate for the balance due her. Viewed in this light, it would seem as if the general result arrived at in the judgment of the court below is fair and equitable, and ought not to be disturbed, unless the attainment of such a result in a case like the present is forbidden by some stubborn rule or rules of law.

The defendant claims that the judgment below is erroneous on two grounds: First, because, on the facts found, Bradley himself in his life-time had no cause of action against the defendant; and, second, if he had, still the present plaintiff, as administrator de bonis non, cannot recover, as he now seeks to do, upon that cause of action. We will examine these points in their order.

It is claimed that Bradley had no cause of action because his mistake was one of law and not of fact, and because he was guilty of such negligence and laches towards the defendant that no court, either of law or of equity, would have aided him to recover the overpayment. Bradley paid the defendant's claim in the honest belief that the estate was solvent. But for this belief he would not have paid it in full. It would seem from the rinding that this belief arose partly from ignorance of law, and partly from what he mistakenly supposed to be the advice given him by the probate judge, as to the validity of certain claims presented against the estate. He also supposed that one of the claims disallowed was barred by the statute of limitations. It is perhaps not clear from the finding whether the court below regarded the mistake which Bradley made in supposing the estate to be solvent as the result of a mistaken view of law or of fact, or of both combined, nor is the settlement of this question very material. If we concede what the defendant claims, that the over-payment was the result of a mistake of law with full knowledge of all the facts, still we think, even then, that Bradley, upon the facts found, would, if living, have a right to recover the overpayment, upon the principles settled by this court in the case of Northrop v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548. In that case the husband of a legatee, as the result of a mistaken view of the law as applied to the construction of a will by the executors, was paid a sum of money to which by law he was not entitled. In the case at bar the defendant, as the result of a mistaken view of the law as applied in the disallowance of claims against an estate by the administrator, has been paid a sum of money to which she was not by law entitled out of the known assets of McLaughlin's estate. It is true that in Northrop v. Graves the defendant, at the time the money...