Mansfield v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1894
• Citation: 63 Conn. 579,29 A. 137
• Parties: MANSFIELD, Insurance Commissioner, v. MUTUAL BENEFIT LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

29 A. 137

63 Conn. 579

MANSFIELD, Insurance Commissioner,

v. MUTUAL BENEFIT LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

The insurance commissioner's petition, under Gen. St. § 2869, for annulment of the charter of an insolvent insurance company, and for a receiver, to be brought to the superior court of the county of defendant's location, "if in session," and, if not, to a judge of the supreme court of errors, cannot be brought to such judge during a regular term of the superior court, in the interval of a day to day adjournment.

Petition of Burton Mansfield, insurance commissioner, against the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, for annulment of its charter, and for a receiver. Plea in abatement sustained.

John R. Buck and Henry Stoddard, for plaintiff. Charles E. Perkins and George G. Sill, for defendant.

BALDWIN, J. This proceeding was brought before me, as a judge of the supreme court of errors, under Gen. St § 2869, which requires the insurance commissioner, if such a state of facts exists as is alleged in the complaint, to bring such an action to the superior court of the county in which the defendant company is located, if in session, and, if not, to a judge of the supreme court of errors. The defendant has filed a plea to the jurisdiction, upon which it has been found that the complaint was brought before me, at New Haven, in the evening of June 8, 1893, and that the regular March session of the superior court for Hartford county, in which county the defendant is located, had not then been terminated, the court having been adjourned at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of June 8th to 10 o'clock on the following morning.

The constitution (article 5) declares that "the judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court of errors, superior court, and such inferior courts as the general assembly shall from time to time ordain and establish." By giving jurisdiction of proceedings like the present, under certain circumstances, to a judge of the supreme court of errors, he is constituted a special tribunal, but not a court, within the meaning of the constitution. Clapp v. City of Hartford, 35 Conn. 73, 222. There are obvious reasons why judicial power should ordinarily be administered by courts, rather than by judges out of court The superior court is a court of record, established at a certain place, and provided with everything necessary to facilitate the trial of causes and the enforcement of judgments. Had this proceeding been instituted in that court, it must have been brought to the court sitting in Hartford county; the general assembly manifestly making this provision for the benefit of the defendant company, and so as to have the investigation of its condition, if necessary, conducted within easy reach of its books and office. On the other hand, if this proceeding is well brought, the hearings upon it might be had wherever best suited the convenience of the trior, and it would be subject at any moment to termination by the accident of death. Under certain circumstances, it was thought proper to give jurisdiction to a judge of the supreme court of errors, but in my opinion this grant was meant to be limited by the necessity which occasioned it. It is only when the superior court is not "in session" that such a proceeding as this can be brought before a judge. By Gen. St. § 791, it is enacted that sessions of the superior court for the trial of civil causes shall be held in each county at the beginning of each stated term, and by section 792 the judges are empowered to provide for and fix the time of such additional sessions as may be necessary. Under section 797 the superior court, "at any session," may order pleas to be filed "at any time during vacation." By section 800, any session may be adjourned "from time to time," when the state of the business requires it By section 801 a trial unfinished at the expiration of a "term or session" may be continued, provided it be finished "before the close of the next succeeding term or session." The word "session," as used in these sections, appears to me to refer, not to the time during any particular day during which the court may be sitting, but to a session continued by adjournment from day to day in the ordinary course of judicial business. Prior to the Revision of 1875, temporary injunctions could be granted by a judge in all cases within the jurisdiction of the superior court, "when such court shall not be in session." Revision 1866, p. 391, c. 2, § 12. Section 16 of the same chapter provided that, "whenever an injunction shall have been granted by a judge in vacation," he might hear a motion for...