Mansfield v. Weinberger

Citation398 F. Supp. 965
Decision Date30 July 1975
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 75-365.
PartiesJuanita MANSFIELD et al., Plaintiffs, v. Caspar W. WEINBERGER, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Dorothy T. Lang, Los Angeles, Cal., Arlene T. Shadoan, Washington, D. C., Philip L. Goar, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs.

Peter C. Schaumber, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CORCORAN, District Judge.

In this action plaintiffs complain that a six-month duration-of-separation Social Security eligibility requirement for individuals separated from their spouses violates the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.1

The Court's jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361; the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S.C. §§ 701-706; and 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), (h), 1383(c)(3).

The matter is now before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.2

The Court concludes that plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief are moot. Further, finding a rational justification for the challenged statute, we hold that plaintiffs' claims for retroactive benefits are without merit.

I

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a public assistance program for needy blind, aged and disabled persons administered by the Social Security Administration of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. The program is generally divided into two segments: (1) a federal payment and, in some instances, (2) a state supplement. 42 U.S.C. § 1382e.3 For purposes of determining eligibility and the amount of the payment under SSI, "eligible individuals" who have "eligible spouses" (hereinafter "a couple") are treated differently than other "eligible individuals." Thus, a couple, each of whom is eligible for SSI benefits in his or her own right, receives a combined payment that is less than the sum of what each would receive if single and living alone. When a couple receiving SSI benefits separate, however, under the statutory classification of 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(b),4 the statute at issue here, the couple continue to be treated as a couple for SSI benefits until they have lived apart for more than six months. As a practical matter, this means that each spouse will receive only half of a couple's payment rather than each receiving a full individual payment until six months after their separation. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1001(a), 39 Fed.Reg. 23258 (1974).

The exceptions to this "six-month rule" are the termination of the marriage by death, or by a divorce or annulment decree, or when one spouse begins living with another party and they hold themselves out to the community as husband and wife. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1040, 39 Fed.Reg. 23260 (1974).

II

In the present case, because of the statutory prohibition of the "six-month rule," the Social Security Administration denied to each of the named plaintiffs5 a full individual's payment after that plaintiff separated from her husband.

Plaintiffs complain that the "six-month rule" is a conclusive presumption that does not allow either spouse to make a factual showing of the genuine termination of their marriage relationship prior to the elapsing of statutorily-imposed six months unless one of the exceptions exists. This results, according to them, in a denial of due process and equal protection of the law.

III

As the Supreme Court has consistently held, the federal courts are limited by Article III of the Constitution to the resolution of actual cases or controversies. See, e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, ___ U.S. ___, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975). There must be "concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions." Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108, 89 S.Ct. 956, 959, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969). Similarly, "pleadings must be something more than an ingenious exercise in the conceivable." United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 2416, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973). As the Supreme Court noted in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1705, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974), "that federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of the litigants . . . before them." (Citations omitted.)

Turning to the facts of the case at bar, the Court reaches the conclusion that plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief are moot, and that no case or controversy exists as to prospective benefits. Plaintiffs Juanita Mansfield and Elsie Mae Sisson are currently eligible to receive SSI benefits as individuals since each has been separated from her husband for over six months.6 With regard to plaintiff Dorothy Doyle, it is uncontroverted that she has returned to her husband.7 Viewed in this light, then, and since "(m)ootness is a jurisdictional question," North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971), plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief must be dismissed.8

IV

Plaintiffs' claims for retroactive relief stand on firmer footing. Plaintiffs assert that they are still entitled to the higher SSI benefits that were withheld from them due to the "six-month rule." The outstanding sum of money is, of course, the difference between payment as an eligible individual and payment as an eligible spouse for the period during which the rule was applied to each of them. Plaintiffs contend, and the Court agrees, were they successful on the merits, i. e., were this Court to declare the "six-month rule" unconstitutional, that they would then be entitled to an award of such a sum.9 Thus, there is a continuing controversy between the parties over plaintiffs' entitlement to be paid the benefits withheld from them by the operation of the six-month rule, but for which each plaintiff would have received a full individual's payment of SSI benefits from the date of her separation. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 495-500, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). Thus, since the case is not moot for all purposes, the Court now turns to an examination of the merits of plaintiffs' claims.

V

Subsequent to the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and oral argument thereon, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Weinberger v. Salfi, supra. This Court then called for a further round of briefing by the parties to determine the effect, if any, of Salfi on this case. Upon receipt of those briefs, and after a careful consideration of the Salfi opinion, the Court concludes that Salfi is adversely dispositive of plaintiffs' claims on the merits.10

In Salfi the Court held that the nine-month duration-of-relationship requirements of 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c)(5) and (e)(2) had a rational basis and were free from invidious discrimination and thus not unconstitutional. Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, 95 S.Ct. 2457. The duration-of-relationship requirements at issue in Salfi completely and permanently excluded from receiving Social Security benefits the surviving wives and step-children who had their respective relationship to the deceased wage earner for less than nine months prior to his death. The Supreme Court held that such requirements were not invalid conclusive presumptions, thereby distinguishing Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L. Ed.2d 52 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), the very cases relied upon by plaintiff in the case at bar.

As Salfi points out, since SSI is social welfare legislation, it is noncontractual in nature and thus "enjoys no constitutionally protected status." Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, ___ U.S. ___, 95 S.Ct. at 2470. (citation omitted). The standard, then, by which such federal statute must be measured is whether "the goals sought by it are legitimate, and the classification adopted is rationally related to the achievement of those goals . . .." Id. at 2468, quoting Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 92 S.Ct. 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971). When the statute at issue meets that test, it is "perforce consistent with the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment." Id.

The legislative history of the "six-month rule" indicates that Congress intended, in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(b), to avoid encouraging couples to separate in order to receive the higher total benefits available to individuals. H.R.Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1971). That report, in pertinent part, provides:

In determining marital status, State law will apply, except that a couple has been determined married for purposes of receiving social security benefits or if they hold themselves out as married in the community in which they live, they will be considered married for purposes of the new program. In the absence of such a provision in the assistance program there would be a strong incentive for married couples to allege that they were not married (in order to get higher payments) and there would be a difficult, if not impossible, administrative burden of determining whether a marriage existed between two individuals alleging to be single (but who hold themselves out to be married). Also, to avoid encouraging couples to live separately in order to get the higher total benefit, your committee's bill provides that an eligible individual and spouse will receive a couple's benefit even though they live apart. Id.

Thus, it is clear that the statutory classification here, in seeking to avoid an incentive to separation to secure higher SSI benefits is strikingly similar to the congressional intent upheld in Salfi to prevent the use of "sham marriages" to secure Social Security benefits. Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, ___ U. S. ___, 95 S.Ct. 2457. Indeed, the rule involved in Salfi and the legislative policy decisions which led to its adoption are hardly distinguishable from the duration-of-separation rule and its policy decisions as enunciated by Congress...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Medical Center of Independence v. Califano, 76CV525-W-4.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri
    • 28 Julio 1977
    ...allegation of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. See Morris v. Weinberger, 401 F.Supp. 1071 (D.Md.1975); Mansfield v. Weinberger, 398 F.Supp. 965 (D.D.C.1975).1 The preclusion set forth in § 205(h) of the Social Security Act applies equally to actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. See t......
  • Herweg v. Ray
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 22 Abril 1980
    ...as long as they live together in the same household or until they have been living apart for six months. E. g., Mansfield v. Weinberger, 398 F.Supp. 965, 968-69 (D.D.C.1975). (Because of the definition of "eligible spouse," a spouse is no longer an "eligible spouse" after a separation of si......
  • Patterson v. Mathews
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • 26 Abril 1976
    ...District Court was without jurisdiction. (422 U.S. at 763-765, 95 S.Ct. at 2466, 45 L.Ed.2d at 537-538). The Court in Mansfield v. Weinberger, 398 F.Supp. 965 (D.D.C.1975), quoted this same language as it denied a motion for class certification in another Social Security case (at p. "Also b......
  • Letourneau v. Mathews
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 13 Diciembre 1976
    ...by reason of Section 405(h). See Ellison v. Mathews, No. C75-497A (N.D.Ga. Nov. 7, 1975) (three-judge court); Mansfield v. Weinberger, 398 F.Supp. 965, 968 n. 10 (D.D.C.1975); Sturgill v. Weinberger, No. 75-283 (E.D.Ky. July 15, 1975); Drope v. Weinberger, No. 74-185 (D.Vt. Sept. 3, 1975) (......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT