Manska v. Fabian, No. A08-0025 (Minn. App. 12/16/2008)
| Decision Date | 16 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. A08-0025.,A08-0025. |
| Parties | Christopher Lee Manska, petitioner, Appellant, v. Joan Fabian, Commissioner of Corrections, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Rice County, File No. 66-CV-07-3586.
Christopher Lee Manska, Chisholm, MN (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Kelly S. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN (for respondents)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
The commissioner of corrections extended Christopher Lee Manska's incarceration by 30 days because Manska refused to participate in a prison-based chemical-dependency-treatment program. The district court denied Manska's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that the commissioner acted within her statutory authority, that Manska's petition does not state a claim of disability discrimination, and that Manska was not denied due process of law. Therefore, we affirm.
In October 2006, Manska was serving a 69-month sentence that was imposed following his conviction of refusal to submit to a chemical test in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2002). Department of Corrections officials at the Faribault correctional facility ordered Manska to participate in a chemical-dependency-treatment program. Manska refused. The department issued Manska a notice of violation of Offender Disciplinary Regulation (ODR) 510, which states, in relevant part: "No offender shall refuse an order from staff to enter into treatment or refuse to participate in the pre-treatment interview after having been directed to participate by a Program Review Team." Manska admitted his guilt to the violation and waived his right to a hearing by signing a document entitled "Waiver of Hearing — Plea of Guilty." Consequently, the department extended Manska's release date by 30 days.
In September 2007, Manska filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Rice County District Court. He alleged that he is disabled because of a stress disorder, which, he contends, caused him to decide not to participate in the chemical-dependency-treatment program. He claimed that the commissioner engaged in disability discrimination by extending his release date because of his non-participation in the program. The district court denied the petition. Manska appeals.
This court deemed Manska's appeal to be submitted and ready for disposition as of September 3, 2008. The district court record and the parties' appellate briefs noted, however, that Manska's release from the Faribault correctional facility was scheduled for June 24, 2008. This information required us to determine whether the appeal is moot. See In re Application of Minnegasco, 565 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 1997). Thus, we asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs to supply information concerning Manska's status and to address the issue of mootness.
Appellate courts "decide only actual controversies and avoid advisory opinions." In re McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn. 1999). A case is moot if there is no justiciable controversy for a court to decide. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2005); State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Minn. App. 2007). A justiciable controversy is one that "involves definite and concrete assertions of right," In re Risk Level Determination of J.V., 741 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2008), and "allows for specific relief by a decree or judgment of a specific character as distinguished from an advisory opinion predicated on hypothetical facts," Sviggum, 732 N.W.2d at 321 (citing Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Minneapolis, 271 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Minn. 1978)). When there is "no injury that a court can redress, the case must be dismissed for lack of justiciability," except in certain "narrowly-defined circumstances." Sviggum, 732 N.W.2d at 321. There are two recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine: first, if an issue is capable of repetition yet evading review and, second, if collateral consequences may attach to the otherwise moot ruling. McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d at 327.
In her supplemental brief, the commissioner informed the court that Manska had been released from custody on August 21, 2008, and presently is on supervised release. The commissioner acknowledged that Manska's refusal to participate in a chemical-dependency-treatment program "could be considered in hypothetical future [supervised released] revocation proceedings." In addition, the commissioner acknowledged that the department of corrections may consider Manska's prison disciplinary record if Manska ever were incarcerated again. The commissioner has broad authority over the conditions of supervised release, see Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 8(b) (2006), and the revocation of a person's supervised release, see Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 2 (2006). Given these facts, we conclude that the collateral-consequences exception to mootness applies. In light of this conclusion, we need not analyze whether the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception also applies.
A writ of habeas corpus is a statutory remedy that allows a prison inmate to seek "relief from imprisonment or restraint." Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2006). This court gives great weight to the district court's findings when considering a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and "will uphold the findings if they are reasonably supported by the evidence." Northwest v. LaFleur, 583 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1998). Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. State ex. rel. McMaster v. Benson, 495 N.W.2d 613, 614 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Mar. 11, 1993).
Manska first argues that the commissioner does not have the authority to extend his incarceration for failing to participate in the chemical-dependency-treatment program. The legislature has granted broad statutory authority to the commissioner to "prescribe reasonable conditions and rules for [an inmate's] employment, conduct, instruction, and discipline within or outside the facility." Minn. Stat. § 241.01, subd. 3a(b) (2006); see also Minn. Stat. § 244.04, subd. 2 (2006) (). The commissioner's authority includes the authority to administer rehabilitative programs and to discipline inmates who refuse to participate:
The commissioner shall provide appropriate mental health programs and vocational and educational programs with employment-related goals for inmates. The selection, design and implementation of programs under this section shall be the sole responsibility of the commissioner, acting within the limitations imposed by the funds appropriated for such programs.
. . . .
The commissioner may impose disciplinary sanctions upon any inmate who refuses to participate in rehabilitative programs.
Minn. Stat. § 244.03 (2006). Furthermore, the discipline that may be imposed by the commissioner includes the extension of an inmate's period of incarceration. Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 1b(a) (2006).
In this case, the commissioner found that Manska violated ODR 510, which prohibits inmates from refusing an order to enter treatment. In this situation, the commissioner has express statutory authority to extend Manska's length of confinement.
Manska next argues that the commissioner discriminated against him on the basis of a disability by disciplining him for refusing to participate in the treatment program. The district court concluded that Manska had failed to state a claim for relief.
Manska relies on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), and the federal Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act). Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). The United States Supreme Court has held that the ADA applies to state prisons. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1954 (1998). Similarly, section 504 of the Rehab Act states in relevant part that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). Likewise, the MHRA provides that "[i]t is an unfair discriminatory practice to discriminate against any person in . . . full utilization of or benefit from any public service because of . . . disability . . . unless the public service can demonstrate that providing the access would impose an undue hardship on its operation." Minn. Stat. § 363A.12, subd. 1 (2006). The ADA and the Rehab Act are "similar in substance," and, thus, "cases interpreting either are applicable and interchangeable." Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). Furthermore, because the purposes of the MHRA and ADA are similar, caselaw under the ADA may be used to interpret the MHRA. Kolton v. County of Anoka, 645 N.W.2d 403, 408, 410 (Minn. 2002).
"To state a prima facie claim under [title II of] the ADA, a plaintiff must show: 1) he is a person with a disability as defined by statute; 2) he is otherwise qualified for the benefit in question; and 3) he was excluded from the benefit due to discrimination based upon...
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