Manson v. Berkman

• Citation: 356 Ill. 20,190 N.E. 77
• Decision Date: 10 April 1934
• Docket Number: No. 22182.,22182.
• Parties: MANSON v. BERKMAN. TEUTHORNE et al. v. VILLAGE OF WINNETKA.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

356 Ill. 20

190 N.E. 77

MANSON

v.BERKMAN.

TEUTHORNE et al.

v.VILLAGE OF WINNETKA.

No. 22182.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 23, 1934.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 10, 1934.

Bill for partition of real estate by Helen B. Manson (later Helen C. Teuthorne) against Gunhild Berkman, the Village of Winnetka, and others, in which the Village of Winnetka filed a cross-bill. From a decree dismissing the original bill and granting the relief prayed by cross-bill, Helen C. Teuthorne and Gunhild Berkman appeal.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Hugo M. Friend, Judge.

Enoch J. Price, Jacob J. Becker, and Owen N. Price, all of Chicago, for appellants.

Tolman, Chandler & Dickinson, of Chicago (Frederick Dickinson, and Walter v. Schaefer, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

JONES, Justice.

Helen C. Manson (now Helen C. Teuthorne) filed a bill in the circuit court of Cook county for partition of certain real estate in the village of Winnetka, against Gunhild Berkman, the village of Winnetka, the Winnetka Park district, and other defendants designated as unknown owners. From a decree dismissing the original bill for want of equity and granting the relief prayed by an amended cross-bill filed by the village of Winnetka, Helen C. Teuthorne and Gunhild Berkman have prosecuted an appeal to this court.

The property in controversy is a triangular piece of land containing about one-half acre located in the village of Winnetka. At the time the bill was filed, November 24, 1926, the land was being used as a park by the Winnetka Park district. The bill alleges that the complainant and Berkman are tenants in common of the property, each owning an undivided one-half thereof, and that the village of Winnetka claims an interest in the property under a certain quitclaim deed from Sarah H. Lieb to the village, but that said deed is void and should be set aside as a cloud on the title.

The village filed a cross-bill, which sets up two claims of title. One is based on the quitclaim deed from Sarah H. Lieb, grantee of Robert E. Jenkins, assignee in bankruptcy of Simeon Mears and E. Ashley Mears. The other is based on twenty years' adverse possession prior to the filing of the original bill. The amended answers of the village and the park district set up the same matters as the cross-bill, and also the defense of laches. It was stipulated that none of the tax deeds mentioned in the pleadings were sufficient to convey title, and the successful litigant will reimburse the other party for all moneys expended in purchasing such tax titles, with penalties, interest, and costs.

It is conceded that the evidence failed to establish title by twenty years' adverse possession prior to the filing of the original bill, but the court found that, when the cross-bill was filed, January 27, 1930, appellee was in a position to successfully assert title by reason of twenty years' adverse possession. The beginning of the suit for partition arrested the running of the statute as to all of the defendants, and a lapse of time during the pendency of the suit could not perfect a title in cross-complainants. Woods v. Glos, 257 Ill. 125, 100 N. E. 516. The finding of the decree that a limitation had matured subsequently to the filing of the bill but prior to the filing of the amended bill is erroneous. The issues are narrowed to a consideration of the record titles of the respective parties and the question of laches.

It was stipulated by the parties that both appellants and appellee claim title by virtue of a warranty deed from Edgar F. Brown to Artemas Carter dated October 2, 1868, recorded October 19, 1971. Appellants' chain of title is as follows: Warranty deed from Carter to Simeon Mears and E. Ashley Mears dated September 11, 1873; quitclaim deed from Simeon Mears to E. Ashley Mears dated September 23, 1876, recorded October 10, 1876; warranty deed from E. Ashley Mears, Margaret B. Mears, his wife, and Dothee C. Mears, wife of Simeon Mears, to Lizzie D. Mears, dated December 19, 1876, recorded December 20, 1876; quitclaim deed from Eliza (Lizzie) Mears to Margaret B. Mears dated and acknowledged December 23, 1879, recorded June 21, 1882; quitclaim deed from the heirs at law of Margaret B. Mears to Daniel Cummings dated February 15, 1921, recorded April 22, 1921, and mesne conveyances from Cummings to appellants, the deed to appellants being dated November 18, 1926. Simeon Mears was the father of E. Ashley Mears and Lizzie D. Mears. Margaret B. Mears was the wife of E. Ashley Mears.

On November 7, 1877, Simeon Mears and E. Ashley Mears were copartners, and, being largely indebted, they filed voluntary petitions in bankruptcy. The property in controversy was not scheduled as an asset. Amended schedules were filed on January 20, 1878, which stated that Margaret B. Mears held title to such real estate under an unrecorded deed from Lizzie D. Mears and that the failure to schedule the land was through a mistake, and that Margaret B. Mears stands ready to convey all interests of the bankrupts to the assignee or his order upon the direction of the court. The deed from Lizzie D. Mears to Margaret B. Mears was not executed until December 23, 1879, subsequent in time to the filing of the amended schedules. Robert E. Jenkins, assignee in bankruptcy, sold several tracts of land, including the real estate here involved, at public sale on April 28, 1881, to Sarah H. Lieb, for a consideration of $2.75. She conveyed to appellee by quitclaim deed dated August 20, 1915, recorded September 8, 1915.

Appellee urges that all the deeds among the members of the Mears family were fraudulent and void because they were made to hinder and delay creditors. The deed from Simeon Mears to E. Ashley Mears, and the deed from him to his sister, were made approximately a year prior to the filing of the petitions in bankruptcy. Neither the creditors nor the assignee ever requested Margaret B. Mears to make a deed for the benefit of the bankrupt estates.

Appellee insists that Margaret B. Mears had no adverse interest to...