Manson v. Dixon

• Decision Date: 06 May 2022
• Docket Number: 4:20cv333-TKW/MAF
• Parties: DAVID MANSON, Petitioner, v. RICKY D. DIXON, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, [1] Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

DAVID MANSON, Petitioner, v. RICKY D. DIXON, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, ^[1] Respondent.

No. 4:20cv333-TKW/MAF

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division

May 6, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

On June 24, 2020, Petitioner David Manson, a state inmate proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. On April 22, 2021 Respondent filed an answer, with exhibits. ECF No. 17. Petitioner filed a reply on June 2, 2021. ECF No. 18.

The matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Northern District of Florida Local Rule 72.2(B). After careful consideration, the undersigned has determined no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter. See Rule 8(a), R. Gov § 2254 Cases. For the reasons stated herein, the pleadings and attachments before the Court show Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief, and this § 2254 petition should be denied.

Procedural Background

By amended information filed in open court on March 3, 2016, in Leon County Circuit Court Case 2013-CF-1517, the State of Florida charged Petitioner David Manson with sexual battery of a child less than twelve years old by a person eighteen years of age or older, a capital felony, in violation of section 794.011(2)(a), Florida Statutes, involving victim A.B., Petitioner's stepdaughter, and occurring between April 2002 and June 2002. Ex. A at 12; see id. at 11 (initial information, filed October 1, 2013).^[2] Manson proceeded to a jury trial on March 3, 2016, with Judge Terry P. Lewis presiding. Exs. C-D (trial transcript). Manson testified in his defense. Ex. C at 99-139. The jury found him guilty as charged. Ex. A at 49; Ex. D at 20809. That same day, Judge Lewis adjudicated Manson guilty and sentenced him to life in prison. Ex. A at 50-58; Ex. D at 209-10 (sentencing transcript).

Manson appealed his judgment and sentence to the First District Court of Appeal (DCA), assigned case number 1D16-1168, and his counsel filed an Initial Brief. Ex. A at 62; Ex. E Manson raised two points:

I. The trial court erred reversibly in permitting the impeachment of [Manson] by prior convictions because 1) on direct examination, he correctly stated the number of convictions and did not attempt to mislead the jury, and 2) the State was not permitted to question him about the nature of his prior convictions.

II. The trial court erred reversibly in overruling [Manson]'s objection to admitting a photo of a scar on the alleged victim on the ground it was unrelated to the crime being tried and could become a feature of the trial.

Ex. E at i. The State filed an Answer Brief. Ex. F. Manson's counsel filed a Reply Brief. Ex. G. On May 25, 2017, the First DCA panel, Judges Ray, Makar, and Winsor, affirmed the case without a written opinion. Ex. H; Manson v. State, 226 So.3d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). The mandate issued June 12, 2017. Ex. H.

On October 4, 2017, Manson filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First DCA. Ex. I. On November 9, 2017, the First DCA panel, Judges Winokur, Jay, and Winsor, denied relief on the merits, without discussion. Ex. J. The First DCA denied Manson's motions for rehearing by order on January 9, 2018. Ex. K.

On May 15, 2018, Manson filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Ex. L at 3-36. On November 8, 2018, the state post-conviction trial court, Judge James C. Hankinson, held an evidentiary hearing on the Rule 3.850 motion, during which Manson and his trial counsel, Justin Ward, testified. Id. at 397-442. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Hankinson denied the Rule 3.850 motion, stating reasons on the record. Id. at 435-40. The judge rendered a written order denying post-conviction relief that same day. Id. at 355.

Manson appealed to the First DCA, assigned case number 1D18-5077, and he filed a pro se Initial Brief. Ex. M. The State filed an answer brief. Ex. N. Manson filed a reply. Ex. O. On March 26, 2020, the First DCA panel, Judges Wolf, Roberts, and Rowe, per curiam affirmed the case without a written opinion. Ex. Q; Manson v. State, 294 So.3d 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (table). The mandate issued on May 29, 2020, following the court's denial of Manson's motion for rehearing. Exs. P, Q. Manson sought discretionary review in the Florida Supreme Court, but that court dismissed the case on July 1, 2020, explaining it lacks jurisdiction to review an unelaborated decision issued without an opinion or explanation. Ex. R.

As indicated above, Manson filed a § 2254 petition in this Court on June 24, 2020. ECF No. 1. He raises eleven grounds, all alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC):

(1) IAC - Speedy Trial: Trial counsel “failed to give notice that Manson's speedy trial period had expired and [he] was prejudiced because the State could not have brought him to trial within the recapture period.” Id. at 9.

(2) IAC - Defective Information: Trial counsel did not file a motion to dismiss based on the “fundamentally flawed information by Manson's name being ‘omitted' from charging body.” Id. at 10.

(3) IAC - Defective Information: Trial counsel did not file a motion to dismiss based the “fundamentally flawed information where the county and state are ‘omitted' from charging body.” Id.

(4) IAC - Amended Information: Trial counsel did not “object to amended information” and did not move “for bill of particulars to which amended date broadens instead of narrowing.” Id. at 11.

(5) IAC - Jury Composition: Trial counsel did not object to “an improper jury composition, ” thereby denying “Manson's constitutional rights.” Id. at 12.

(6) IAC - Similar Fact Evidence: Trial counsel did not “object to similar fact evidence for which there were no factual findings and allow[ed] similar fact evidence to become [a] feature of the trial.” Id. at 13.

(7) IAC - Brady Violation: Trial counsel failed to “recognize a ‘Brady Violation, ” specifically “[a] photograph that was taken a day before trial [that] was introduced as evidence creating a ‘structural defect,' depriving Manson of a fair trial.” Id. at 14.

(8) IAC - Impeachment: Trial counsel failed “to properly impeach [the] State's star witness” by “exploit[ing] all inconsistencies” in the witness's testimony, “depriving Manson [of] a fair trial.” Id. at 15.

(9) IAC - Judgment of Acquittal: Trial counsel failed “to motion for judgment of acquittal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, ” thereby violating “Manson's constitutional right to a fair trial by conceding to the State that failed to prove a sexual battery occurred because the essential element of ‘injures the sexual organ' was never alleged.” Id. at 15-16.

(10) IAC - Jury Instruction: Trial counsel failed “to object to the trial court's instruction, ” because when “[t]he judge erroneously instructs a jury that it may not request to have testimony read back, ” this “is ‘error' that constitutes a ‘structural defect' that prejudiced Manson by not being able to determine the effect without speculation.” Id. at 16.

(11) IAC - Giglio Violation: Trial counsel failed “to object to perjured testimony also known as ‘Giglio Violation, ” and “[p]rejudice is found where [the] prosecution leads [the] star witness throughout testimony of farfetched fabrication of alleged acts that are not possible.” Id. at 17.

Respondent filed an answer, with exhibits. ECF No. 17. Manson has filed a reply. ECF No. 18.

Analysis

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts may grant habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody. Section 2254(d) provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-83 (2011); Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2011). “This is a ‘difficult to meet' and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011), and Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). This Court's review “is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Id.

For IAC claims, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To demonstrate ineffectiveness, a “defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. To demonstrate pre...