Manson v. State, 79-131-CR

• Decision Date: 20 September 1979
• Docket Number: No. 79-131-CR,79-131-CR
• Citation: 284 N.W.2d 703,92 Wis.2d 40
• Parties: Eugene Michael MANSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Page 703

284 N.W.2d 703

92 Wis.2d 40

Eugene Michael MANSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error.

No. 79-131-CR.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs Aug. 20, 1979.

Opinion Released Sept. 20, 1979.

Opinion Filed Sept. 20, 1979.

Review Granted.

Richard L. Cates, State Public Defender, and Mark Lukoff, First Asst. State Public Defender, for plaintiff in error.

Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., and Chris C. Heikenen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

Before DECKER, C. J., MOSER, P. J. and CANNON, J.

DECKER, Chief Judge.

Defendant Manson seeks review of the trial court's judgment of conviction and its order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the charge of armed robbery. The issue raised is whether the instruction to the jury that conviction for armed robbery may be based on a finding of force Or threat of force denied defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict under sections 5 and 7 of Article I of the Wisconsin Constitution.

On the reasoning set forth in Holland v. State, 91 Wis.2d 134, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979), ¹ we hold that it does not.

Testimony established that on December 16, 1977, defendant entered the Rexnord Credit Union. Assistant Manager Gregory Price was standing at a counter near the teller windows. Manson approached Price, held a gun to his face, and ordered him to fill a bag which Manson had placed on the counter. As Price reached for the cash drawer, Manson said, "I mean business," and then shot Price in the leg. After entering the manager's office, Manson returned to the teller area. He ordered bank employee Terri Sponholtz and another employee to empty the money drawers from all four windows into the bag. They complied. During this time, Manson pointed the gun at Sponholtz several times.

Manson fled with the money. Police, responding to an activated alarm, arrived and exchanged gunfire with Manson. Manson drove to 54th Street where he entered a home and ordered the occupant to call him a cab. Police arrested Manson in the cab where they also found the bag and gun.

Manson testified that he was in the area of the credit union at the time of the robbery, but denied complicity. He stated that he was walking past the credit union when he was shot. Manson said he saw a parked car with the engine running, ran to the car for cover, left in the car, and entered the home on 54th Street. He testified that he found the bag and gun in the car.

The judge instructed the jury that the third element of armed robbery was "that the defendant used force . . . or threatened the imminent use of force." The jury was also advised that "if you find that Terri Sponholtz and Gregory Price had possession of the money" and "that the defendant either used force against the persons in possession . . . or that the defendant threatened the imminent use of force against the person in possession . . . then you should find the defendant guilty of armed robbery." The defendant did not object to this instruction at the time it was given.

Defendant argues that he was denied his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict when the court defined armed robbery to the jury in the disjunctive.

As a preliminary objection, the state argues that the defendant waived this objection by failure to object prior to submission to the jury. We don't disagree, we simply exercise our right to consider it on appeal. This court has recognized that a court may review an instruction for error when the defendant charges that the instruction misstates the law. Wray, supra note 1, at 373, 275 N.W.2d at 734. Also, a court may consider a constitutional issue for the first time on appeal where it is in the interest of justice. State v. Dreske, 88 Wis.2d 60, 73-4, 276 N.W.2d 324, 331 (Ct.App.1979). Accord, Ramaker v. State, 73 Wis.2d 563, 570, 243 N.W.2d 534, 538 (1976). Defendant's constitutional claim merits attention as the supreme court has only recently considered a similar issue. Holland v. State, supra.

In Holland, the court held that the right to a unanimous jury trial as guaranteed by sections 5 and 7 of Article I of the Wisconsin Constitution is not violated where the trial court instructs the jury as to the accomplice and principal liability as a party to a crime disjunctively without requiring the jurors to agree on the specific manner in which the defendant was a party to the crime. The court reasoned that the unanimity rule does not require jury unanimity on the manner or theory of participation in a crime. Rather, the essence of the unanimity rule is that the jury be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt on Each essential element of the offense.

The determination in the present case rests on construction of the elements of robbery as set out in sec. 943.32(1), Stats. We agree with the trial court that force for the purpose of overcoming the resistance of the victim is one element of the crime which can be established in multiple or alternative ways through evidence of its use or evidence of the threat of its imminent use. The words of the statute require a taking of property from the person or presence of the owner with intent to steal "by force." The statute speaks of two alternative "means" by which "force" may be utilized the use of force and the threat of the imminent use of force. The common feature, or element, is force.

Defendant contends that this conclusion contradicts two prior Wisconsin cases: State v. Williamson, 84 Wis.2d 370, 396, 267 N.W.2d 337, 349 (1978) and Schleiss v. State, 71 Wis.2d 733, 239 N.W.2d 68 (1976). Both cases are quoted for the proposition that robbery by use of force is a crime distinct and separate from robbery by threat of force. We disagree. Concededly, statements to this effect can be found, but these statements are not persuasive because they were not necessary to the holding of the cases, and therefore, were not carefully considered.

The court in ...