Al-mansour v. Shraim

Decision Date02 February 2011
Docket NumberCivil No. CCB-10-1729
PartiesLAYALI AL-MANSOUR v. MUHAMMAD ALI SHRAIM
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland
MEMORANDUM

Layali Al-Mansour has sued Muhammad Ali Shraim for financial support pursuant to a Form I-864 Affidavit of Support that the defendant signed to sponsor his wife's application for permanent residency. Now pending before the court is the defendant's motion to dismiss and cross-motions for summary judgment. The issues in these motions have been fully briefed and no oral argument is necessary. For the reasons stated below, the defendant's motion to dismiss will be denied and his motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment will be granted.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Al-Mansour, a citizen of Jordan, married Mr. Shraim, a United States citizen, in 2007. During the first two years of their marriage, the couple lived in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, where Mr. Shraim worked as a systems engineer for Cisco, International. In March 2009, the couple visited the United States, in part, to enable Ms. Al-Mansour to complete the process of obtaining her green card. As part of this process, Mr. Shraim signed a Form I-864 Affidavit of Support, agreeing to sponsor Ms. Al-Mansour and provide her with the necessarysupport to maintain her at an income of at least 125 percent of the federal poverty guideline. The couple stayed in Maryland for approximately forty days during this trip, but never established a permanent residence together in the country.

On November 7, 2009, Mr. Shraim left their marital home in Dubai and returned to the United States with the couple's child, allegedly without Ms. Al-Mansour's knowledge or consent. Mr. Shraim took up residence in Germantown, Maryland. On November 15, 2009, Ms. Al-Mansour followed Mr. Shraim to the United States and filed for divorce and custody of the couple's child in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. In June 2010, the Circuit Court granted Mr. Shraim custody of the couple's child.1 Ms. Al-Mansour has appealed the decision to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. The couple's divorce is still pending in state court.

On June 28, 2010, Ms. Al-Mansour filed this claim to enforce Mr. Shraim's financial obligations under the affidavit. Mr. Shraim filed a motion to dismiss on August 30, 2010. On September 8, 2010, Ms. Al-Mansour opposed the motion to dismiss and filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. In response, Mr. Shraim filed a motion for summary judgment on October 2, 2010, which Ms. Al-Monsour has opposed.

ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss

"[T]he purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). When ruling on such a motion, the court must "accept the well-pled allegations of the complaint as true, " and "construe the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir.1997). "Even though the requirements for pleading a proper complaint are substantially aimed at assuring that the defendant be given adequate notice of the nature of a claim being made against him, they also provide criteria for defining issues for trial and for early disposition of inappropriate complaints." Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).

To survive a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and alterations omitted). Thus, the plaintiffs obligation is to set forth sufficiently the "grounds of his entitlement to relief, " offering more than "labels and conclusions." Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -U.S.--, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

Mr. Shraim contends that the plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed for three reasons: (1) the Form I-864 Affidavit of Support is a contract of adhesion and therefore unenforceable; (2) the plaintiff failed to plead a sufficient factual basis for her claim; and (3) the couple's ongoing divorce proceeding in state court deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

1. Contract of Adhesion

Under federal law, immigrants who are likely to become a public charge are ineligible for admission into the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4), unless their applications for admission are accompanied by an I-864 Affidavit of Support Form ("affidavit"), see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(4)(B)(ii); 1183a(a)1. A person petitioning for the admission of a family-sponsored immigrant must also sign a Form I-864 Affidavit of Support. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii). This affidavit is considered a legally enforceable contract between the sponsor and the sponsored immigrant. Shumye v. Felleke, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2008). The signing sponsor submits himself to the personal jurisdiction of any federal or state court in which a civil lawsuit to enforce the affidavit has been brought. See 8 U.S.C. 1183a(a)(1)(C). The sponsor's obligation under the affidavit does not terminate in the event of divorce. See Shumye, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1024.

Mr. Shraim contends that the Form I-864 Affidavit of Support is unconscionable because it is a "take it or leave it" contract that provided him with no meaningful choice. (See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 2.)2 Under Maryland law, an unconscionable contract "is made evident by '(1) one party's lack of meaningful choice, and (2) contractual terms that unreasonably favor the other party.'" Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 743 (Md. 2005) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1560 (8th ed. 2004)).3 A contract of adhesion is "usually prepared in printed form, 'drafted unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented on a 'take-it-or-leave-it' basis to the weaker party who has no real opportunity to bargain about its terms.'" Holloman v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 894 A.2d 547, 560 (Md. 2006) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1971)). Not every contract of adhesion, however, is unconscionable. Walther, 872 A.2d at 746 ("The fact that a contract is one of adhesion does not mean that either it or any of its terms are invalid or unenforceable."). A contract of adhesion merely forces a court to look at the contract with special care. Id.

While the Form I-864 may be a contract of adhesion under Maryland law, it is not unconscionable. In compliance with federal law, the Form I-864 unambiguously states that by signing the affidavit, the "sponsor agrees to provide support to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line during the period in which the affidavit is enforceable." 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(A). The affidavit also explicitly informs the sponsor that he or she "cannot be made to sign a Form I-864 if [he or she] does not want to do so... [but] the intending immigrant may not be able to become a permanent resident in the United States." (See Form I-864 Affidavit of Support at 6.) Although this is a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer, the sponsor receives a substantial benefit by signing the affidavit. Here, Mr. Shraim gained Ms. Al-Mansour's permanent residence status in the United States. Thus, the Form I-864 is not an unconscionable contract.4

2. Insufficiently Pled Complaint

Mr. Shraim also contends that Ms. Al-Mansour complaint fails to state facts sufficient to support a claim under the Form I-864. (See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 7-9.) Mr. Shraim argues that Ms. Al-Mansour "has failed to adequately plead [that Mr. Shraim's] obligation to provide support to her pursuant to the Form I-864 is due." (Id. at 7.) Under the Form I-864 affidavit, Ms. Shraim is legally obligated to provide Ms. Al-Mansour with an annual income that is not less than 125% of the federal poverty line. In her complaint, Ms. Al-Mansour avers that Mr. Shraim executed a Form I-864 Affidavit of Support on her behalf and that she is currently unemployed and has no income of her own. (See Compl. ¶¶ 8, 18.) Ms. Al-Mansour has therefore stated a claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1183a.

3. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Finally, Mr. Shraim contends that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Al-Mansour's claim because of the parties' pending divorce action in state court. (See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 9.) This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case because Ms. Al-Mansour's claim involves a federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The couple's divorce action in state court does not deprive the court of its jurisdiction. Although the result of the couple's divorce proceedings may be relevant to the determination of damages in this case, see Younis v. Farooqi, 597 F. Supp. 2d 552, 555 (D. Md. 2009), it is not relevant to the determination of Mr. Shraim's liability under 8 U.S.C. § 1183a. If Ms. Al-Mansour is awarded alimony pursuant to the couple's divorce judgment, then this court can adjust any damages she might receive through this action. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will be denied.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be...

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