Manthey v. Adams Cnty. Sheriff Doug Darr

• Decision Date: 08 August 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10-cv-01755-WYD
• Parties: STEVEN A. MANTHEY, Applicant, v. ADAMS COUNTY SHERIFF DOUG DARR, and THE HONORABLE JOHN SUTHERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

STEVEN A. MANTHEY, Applicant, v. ADAMS COUNTY SHERIFF DOUG DARR, and THE HONORABLE JOHN SUTHERS ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 10-cv-01755-WYD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Dated: August 8, 2011

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

WILEY Y. DANIEL, Chief Judge.

Applicant, Steven A. Manthey, is a prisoner on probation under the supervision of the Adams County Sheriff. He has filed a pro se Amended Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Colorado state conviction in Adams County District Court Case No. 06CR0254. The Amended Application has been fully briefed by the parties.

I must construe the Amended Application and other papers filed by Mr. Manthey liberally because he is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21(1972); Hall v. Bellman, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). However, I should not be an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons stated below, the Amended Application will be denied, and the action will be dismissed.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Colorado Court of Appeals summarized the facts of Applicant's conviction as follows:

Defendant, Steven Allen Manthey, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of two counts of stalking pursuant to section 18-9-111(4)(b)(III), C.R.S. 2008. We affirm.

Evidence was presented at trial that one of the victims, J.S., communicated with other men through internet chat rooms, and eventually communicated with defendant and met him in person. After J.S. and his wife separated, J.S. and defendant continued to communicate regularly. During that time, defendant was seen outside J.S.'s workplace and home, and frequently left gifts or notes at J.S.'s workplace and home. During the same time period, anonymous letters were sent to J.S.'s employers alleging that J.S. used the internet during company time to access chat rooms and engaged in sexual encounters with men. These letters resulted in the termination of J.S.'s employment at two separate companies. Although J.S. asked defendant to cease contact with him, and J.S. and his wife moved to new townhomes and switched cars to avoid defendant, defendant was still frequently observed in the neighborhood, including near J.S.'s son's elementary school, and continued to attempt to contact J.S. by email.

People v. Manthey, No. 07CA0863 at 1-2 (Colo. App. March 26, 2009) (unpublished opinion) (Pre-Answer Resp. Ex. E).

The jury convicted Applicant of stalking J.S. and his wife, K.S. The trial court later sentenced Applicant to five years of probation. After the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, Applicant petitioned for certiorari review, which the Colorado Supreme Court denied on September 21, 2009.

On July 23, 2010, Applicant filed an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. He filed an Amended Application on October 8, 2010.

On November 4, 2010, Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland ordered Respondents to file a Pre-Answer Response limited to addressing the affirmative defenses of timeliness under 28 U.S.C. §2244(d) and/or exhaustion of state court remedies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Respondents filed their Pre-Answer Response on November 24, 2010, conceding that the Amended Application was timely, but arguing that several of the claims were unexhausted in the state courts and should be dismissed as procedurally defaulted. After receiving two extensions of time, Applicant filed a Reply to the Pre-Answer Response on March 3, 2011.

On March 18, 2011, Magistrate Judge Boland entered an order drawing the case to a district judge and a magistrate judge. The case was assigned to my chambers on March 25, 2011. On March 30, 2011, I issued an order dismissing Claim Five as procedurally defaulted. However, finding that Applicant's remaining claims (One, Two, Three and Four) were exhausted in the state courts, I directed Respondents to file an answer fully addressing those claims.

Respondents filed an Answer on April 27, 2011. On April 25, 2011, the state court record was filed in this action. Applicant filed a Reply on May 27, 2011.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON MERITS

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that a writ of habeas corpus may not be issued with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless the state court adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonabledetermination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claims of legal error and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2003). The threshold question pursuant to § 2254(d)(1) is whether Applicant seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time his conviction became final. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Clearly established federal law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. Furthermore,

clearly established law consists of Supreme Court holdings in cases where the facts are at least closely-related or similar to the case sub judice. Although the legal rule at issue need not have had its genesis in the closely-related or similar factual context, the Supreme Court must have expressly extended the legal rule to that context.

House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 2008).

If there is no clearly established federal law, that is the end of my inquiry pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). See id. at 1018. If a clearly established rule of federal law is implicated, I must determine whether the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that clearly established rule of federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05.

A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if: (a) "the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases"; or (b) "the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent." Maynard [v. Boone], 468 F.3d [665,] 669 [ (10th Cir. 2006) ] (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405). "The word 'contrary' is commonly understood to mean 'diametricallydifferent,' 'opposite in character or nature,' or 'mutually opposed.'" Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 (citation omitted).

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when it identifies the correct governing legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but unreasonably applies it to the facts. Id. at 407-08. Additionally, we have recognized that an unreasonable application may occur if the state court either unreasonably extends, or unreasonably refuses to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should apply.

House, 527 F.3d at 1018.

My inquiry pursuant to the "unreasonable application" clause is an objective one. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. "[A] decision is 'objectively unreasonable' when most reasonable jurists exercising their independent judgment would conclude the state court misapplied Supreme Court law." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671. "[O]nly the most serious misapplications of Supreme Court precedent will be a basis for relief under § 2254." Id.

Claims of factual error are reviewed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Romano v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1145, 1154 n. 4 (10th Cir. 2002). Section 2254(d)(2) allows a court to grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Pursuant to § 2254(e)(1), I must presume that the state court's factual determinations are correct and Mr. Manthey bears the burden of rebutting thepresumption by clear and convincing evidence.

Additionally, I "owe deference to the state court's result, even if its reasoning is not expressly stated." Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999). Therefore, I "must uphold the state court's summary decision unless [my] independent review of the record and pertinent federal law persuades [me] that [the] result contravenes or unreasonably applies clearly established federal law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." Id. at 1178. "[T]his 'independent review' should be distinguished from a full de novo review of the petitioner's claims." Id. Also, pursuant to Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), I grant deference to state-court decisions that applied a legal standard either identical to the federal standard or more favorable to the habeas applicant than the federal standard. Patton v. Mullin, 425 F.3d 788, 795 (10th Cir. 2005).

III. MERITS OF THE CLAIMS

Claims One, Two, Three and Four are the claims remaining at issue in this action.

A. Claims One and Three

In his first and third claims, Applicant asserts Fourth Amendment violations arising out of evidence he alleges was unlawfully seized from his home. Because these claims are related, I find that they properly are addressed together. In his first claim, Applicant...