Manuel v. Maine
| Decision Date | 02 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | 1:18-cv-00300-LEW |
| Parties | GARY MANUEL, Plaintiff v. STATE OF MAINE, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
In this action, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief against the State of Maine (the State), and the City of Bangor, certain Bangor police officers, and the Bangor police and fire departments (collectively, the Bangor Defendants) for an alleged conspiracy against Plaintiff and his family. Plaintiff alleges Defendants' conduct resulted in the death of his adult son, Peter Manuel. (Complaint, ECF No. 1.)
The matter is before the Court on Defendants' motions to dismiss. (Motions, ECF Nos. 5, 6.) The State of Maine contends Plaintiff has failed to assert an actionable claim against the State. The State also contends Plaintiff's claim is barred by the immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Bangor Defendants challenge Plaintiff's ability to assert a claim on behalf of his deceased son, and argue Plaintiff's allegations are too vague to state an actionable claim.
Following a review of the complaint and the parties' written arguments, I recommend the Court grant the motions to dismiss.
The following facts are derived from Plaintiff's complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of evaluating the pending motions to dismiss. McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff and Eunice Manuel, are the parents of Athea, Maverick, and Peter Manuel. Plaintiff alleges Defendants have retaliated against him and his family members because Plaintiff previously filed several lawsuits against Defendants.1 Plaintiff contends Defendants deprived Plaintiff and his family of certain benefits, opportunities and property.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants unfairly treated his son, Peter, and as a result, are responsible for Peter's death. Plaintiff asserts that in the early morning hours of March 2, 2018, near a nightclub in Bangor, members of the Bangor Police Department, without probable cause, chased Peter into the Kenduskeag Stream, where he lost his life by drowning or exposure to the elements. (Complaint, ECF No. 1, at 17.) Plaintiff alleges the incident is the culmination of a long history of oppression directed at his family. (Id.)
Plaintiff cites numerous statutes and constitutional amendments as the bases for his claim. (Complaint at 12 - 13.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may seek dismissal of "a claim for relief in any pleading" if that party believes that the pleading fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In its assessment of the motion, a court must "assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff[] the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom." Blanco v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 802 F. Supp. 2d 215, 221 (D. Me. 2011) (quoting Genzyme Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 622 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2010)). To overcome the motion, a plaintiff must establish that the allegations raise a plausible basis for a fact finder to conclude that the defendant is legally responsible for the claim at issue. Id.
Although a pro se plaintiff's complaint is subject to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), this is "not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a claim, Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980). To allege a civil action in federal court, it is not enough for a plaintiff merely to allege that a defendant acted unlawfully; a plaintiff must affirmatively allege facts that identify the manner by which the defendant subjected the plaintiff to a harm for which the law affords a remedy. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The State and the Bangor Defendants contend Plaintiff has failed to state an actionable claim. In response to Defendants' motions, Plaintiff argues he has asserted a claim that Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of constitutional rights, specifically, rights under the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment, made actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 8, at 4.) Plaintiff also argues that the City of Bangor is liable under the Maine Tort Claims Act because the harms inflicted by the police department occurred pursuant to negligent operation of vehicles, machinery, and equipment. (Id.)
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. ...
Section 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To maintain a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must establish: "1) that the conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and 2) that this conduct worked a denial of rightssecured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1999).
The State of Maine is not a person for purposes of section 1983 and, consequently, Plaintiff has failed to state a section 1983 claim against the State. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71 (1989); see also Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 124 (1st Cir. 2003) ().
The remaining defendants would be proper defendants to a section 1983 claim. As explained below, however, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to state a claim for deprivation of a federal right.
The First Amendment prohibits a government actor from retaliating against a citizen based on the citizen's exercise of rights protected under the First Amendment. Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2014). "In a section 1983 claim of retaliatory ... activity, a plaintiff must prove that [his] conduct was constitutionally protected and was a substantial or motivating factor for the retaliatory decision ...." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Evidently, Plaintiff maintains that the events of March 2, 2018, were the product of animus arising from Plaintiff's litigation activity on behalf of the Manuel family. Plaintiff's allegations, however, are conclusory and are insufficient to support an actionable claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ()
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and provides that no warrant shall issue except on a showing of "probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Plaintiff apparently contends that Peter Manuel was subjected to false arrest or excessive force. To allege a civil action in federal court, it is not enough for a plaintiff merely to allege that a defendant acted unlawfully; a plaintiff must affirmatively allege facts that identify the manner by which the defendant subjected the plaintiff to a harm for which the law affords a remedy. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Here, Plaintiff has not asserted any facts that would support a false arrest or excessive force claim.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits municipalities and municipal officials from "treating similarly situated persons differently because of their classification in a particular group." Mulero-Carrillo v. Roman-Hernandez, 790 F.3d 99, 105 - 106 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 808 (2016). Generally, to state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that support a plausible inference that "compared with others similarly situated, the plaintiff was selectively treated based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." Id. at 106 (quoting Barrington Cove Ltd. P'ship v. R.I. Hous. & Mortg. Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1,7 (1st Cir. 2001)). Plaintiff's complaint lacks any facts that would support a claim of bias on any basis.
In support of his conspiracy claim, Plaintiff cites 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 in his complaint. (Complaint at 4.) Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 prohibit conspiracies to deprive one or more persons of the equal protection of the laws. The statutes also authorize civil rights actions against the conspirators and persons with knowledge of and power to prevent or aid in preventing such a conspiracy who fail to act. "In order to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy under § 1985, a plaintiff must prove that the conspiracy was motivated by some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus," and "that the conspiracy was aimed at interfering with protected rights." Maymi v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth.,...
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