Manuel v. Red Hill Community Unit School

• Decision Date: 09 August 2001
• Docket Number: No. 5-00-0121.,5-00-0121.
• Citation: 324 Ill. App.3d 279,754 N.E.2d 448,257 Ill.Dec. 790
• Parties: Carrie S. MANUEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RED HILL COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 10 BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

754 N.E.2d 448

324 Ill. App.3d 279

257 Ill.Dec. 790

Carrie S. MANUEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.RED HILL COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 10 BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 5-00-0121.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

August 9, 2001.

Robert L. Douglas, Law Offices of Robert L. Douglas, Robinson, for Appellant.

Douglas A. Enloe, of Gosnell, Borden Enloe & Sloss, Ltd., Lawrenceville, for Appellee.

Justice GOLDENHERSHdelivered the opinion of the court:

Carrie S. Manuel(plaintiff) filed a four-count complaint in the circuit court of Lawrence County.Red Hill Community Unit School District # 10 was named as a defendant in counts I and III.Red Hill Community Unit School District # 10 Board of Education(defendant) was named in counts II and IV.Defendant moved to dismiss.Counts I and III were dismissed for the failure to name a proper party.See105 ILCS 5/10-2(West 1998).The court denied the motion in regard to counts II and IV.Defendant filed a motion to reconsider.On reconsideration, the court entered an order granting defendant's motion and dismissed counts II and IV.Plaintiff appeals the order dismissing counts II and IV.The appeal raises several issues.We reverse and remand.

I.FACTS

In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that on the evening of January 5, 1996, she was asked by Hank Ginder, a teacher employed by defendant, to serve soft drinks and work in a concession stand during a basketball game at Red Hill High School.Plaintiff, a student of the district at the time, was at least 18 years of age, suffered from cerebral palsy, and walked with a limp.Plaintiff alleged that while she was working at the concession stand, Ginder asked her to see if other employees of defendant who were working at the basketball game, such as coaches, wanted soft drinks.

Plaintiff alleged that a heavy, wet snow had fallen and that the stairs and tile flooring of Red Hill High School were "soppy wet."Plaintiff alleged that in order to complete the task given by Ginder she had to "walk up a set of stairs, over a landing, and then down another set of stairs to the auditorium."On the return trip, plaintiff slipped and fell down the stairs, causing personal injury.Plaintiff made the same allegations in counts II and IV, alleging that the conduct was negligent in count II and willful and wanton in count IV.

Defendant filed a combined motion to dismiss asking for a dismissal under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure(Code)(735 ILCS 5/2-619(West 1998)) or, in the alternative, under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615(West 1998)).Defendant made several arguments in the motion, including claiming that it was immune from negligence claims under several sections of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act)(745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq.(West 1998)).Plaintiff filed a reply arguing that plaintiff's claim should be excepted from the Act by the "special duty doctrine" and that she pled willful and wanton conduct.Both parties filed subsequent pleadings on the motion.

After hearing arguments, the court entered an order denying the motion in regard to counts II and IV.In its order, the court pointed out that plaintiff had alleged that she was hired by defendant to work at a concession stand, that she was physically handicapped, and that she was ordered to use wet stairs.The court found that plaintiff had stated a cause of action in light of the Act.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider.Due to the retirement of the judge who issued the original order, the motion to reconsider was heard by a different judge.The court granted the motion to reconsider and, in a written opinion, dismissed counts II and IV of plaintiff's complaint.With regard to count II, the court ruled that the special-duty doctrine did not apply, and the court held that defendant was afforded immunity from claims of negligence pursuant to section 3-106 of the Act(745 ILCS 10/3-106(West 1998)).With respect to count IV, the court ruled that plaintiff did not sufficiently allege facts which would support a finding of willful and wanton conduct, and the court dismissed count IV pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code.

II.ANALYSIS

Although plaintiff's appeal focuses on the issue of whether the Act applies to actions by employees, the resolution of this matter involves several other issues.The viability of plaintiff's complaint depends on whether section 3-106 of the Act applies, whether plaintiff pled willful and wanton conduct, and whether the natural accumulation rule applies.

A.Section 3-106

Defendant contends that it is immune from negligence pursuant to section 3-106 of the Act.Section 3-106 reads:

"Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury where the liability is based on the existence of a condition of any public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes, including but not limited to parks, playgrounds, open areas, buildings[,] or other enclosed recreational facilities, unless such local entity or public employee is guilty of willful and wanton conduct proximately causing such injury."745 ILCS 10/3-106(West 1998).

Plaintiff contends that the site of the alleged incident was not property intended to be used for recreational purposes and that, therefore, the Act does not apply.In Capps v. Belleville School District No. 201,313 Ill.App.3d 710, 714, 246 Ill.Dec. 401, 730 N.E.2d 81, 85(2000), this court stated that the plain language of section 3-106 contemplates immunity for bounded public property used for recreational purposes.In Capps,we found that a ramp leading to a gymnasium was outside the recreational public property addressed by the Act.Capps,313 Ill.App.3d at 714, 246 Ill.Dec. 401, 730 N.E.2d at 85.In this case, the question of whether the location of plaintiff's alleged fall was within the bounded public property protected by the Act was never addressed at the trial court level, and the record is unclear regarding the issue.This is understandable, as our opinion in Capps was published after the trial court's order and after plaintiff filed her notice of appeal.We decline to further address whether the property is covered, as we find that plaintiff has alleged conduct on the part of defendant that would not be provided immunity by the Act.Given the development of law on this issue, and the fact that we remand this cause on other grounds, the trial court should reconsider this issue.

In her brief, plaintiff focuses on whether the Act applies to injuries to employees.Upon a review of plaintiff's appeal, we decline to address whether the Act is inapplicable in all suits by employees, because we find that under at least one set of allegations in plaintiff's complaint, defendant's potential liability is not based on the condition of the premises.Defendant's alleged liability is, therefore, outside the immunity provided by section 3-106.

Whether defendant is provided immunity by section 3-106 is a question of statutory construction, and as such, the standard of review is de novo.In re Tax Deed,311 Ill.App.3d 440, 443, 243 Ill.Dec. 585, 723 N.E.2d 1186, 1189(2000).The goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.Zekman v. Direct American Marketers, Inc.,182 Ill.2d 359, 368, 231 Ill.Dec. 80, 695 N.E.2d 853, 858(1998).When faced with a question of statutory construction, the courts should first look to the language of the statute to determine the intent of the drafters.Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America,186 Ill.2d 181, 184, 237 Ill.Dec. 769, 710 N.E.2d 399, 401(1999).The plain and ordinary language of the statute is the best indication of the legislative intent.King v. Industrial Comm'n,189 Ill.2d 167, 171, 244 Ill.Dec. 8, 724 N.E.2d 896, 898(2000).Additionally, the interpretation given to the statute should correspond with the reason for the law, the evil to be remedied, and the object to be obtained by the statute.Stern v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc.,179 Ill.2d 160, 164, 227 Ill.Dec. 762, 688 N.E.2d 99, 102(1997).

The Act is an attempt to create uniform rules of immunity as exceptions to the general rule of liability.Aikens v. Morris,145 Ill.2d 273, 278, 164 Ill.Dec. 571, 583 N.E.2d 487, 490(1991).Because the Act is in derogation of common law, it should be strictly construed to limit immunity.Aikens v. Morris,145 Ill.2d 273, 278, 164 Ill.Dec. 571583 N.E.2d 487, 490(1991);Snyder v. Curran Township,167 Ill.2d 466, 477, 212 Ill.Dec. 643, 657 N.E.2d 988, 994(1995).

The plain and ordinary meaning of the statute is that the theory of recovery must derive from the public entity's control of the property.The immunity is directed at the location of the incident.Defendant is correct in asserting that plaintiff's being an employee would not change the nature of property so that it would no longer be "`property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes.' "Hanover Insurance Co. v. Board of Education,240 Ill.App.3d 173, 176, 181 Ill.Dec. 110, 608 N.E.2d 183, 185(1992)(quotingIll.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 85, par. 3-106).Illinois courts have held that the status of property for purposes of 3-106 is determined by the nature of the property and its past use.Bubb v. Springfield School District 186,167 Ill.2d 372, 379, 212 Ill.Dec. 542, 657 N.E.2d 887, 891(1995).The essential question is whether "liability is based on"(745 ILCS 10/3-106(West 1998)) the condition of property if a plaintiff claims that a defendant's negligent use of order and control over her led to injuries, even though the injury would not have occurred but for the condition of the property.

Section 3-106 provides immunity only when "liability is based on" the condition of the property.745 ILCS 10/3-106(West 1998).The plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase "liability is based on" is that the entity's duty must be derived from...