Manuel Zeno Gandia v. Pettingill

• Citation: 32 S.Ct. 127,56 L.Ed. 267,222 U.S. 452
• Decision Date: 09 January 1912
• Docket Number: No. 97,97
• Parties: MANUEL ZENO GANDIA, Plff. in Err., v. N. B. K. PETTINGILL
• Court: United States Supreme Court

222 U.S. 452

32 S.Ct. 127

56 L.Ed. 267

MANUEL ZENO GANDIA, Plff. in Err.,

v N. B. K. PETTINGILL.

No. 97.

Argued December 14, 1911.

Decided January 9, 1912.

Messrs. Frederick D. McKenney, John Spalding Flannery, William Hitz, and H. H. Scoville for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 453-455 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Willis Sweet and George H. Lamar for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 455 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action for libels and comes here upon a bill of exceptions after a verdict for the plaintiff. The alleged libels consist of a series of articles in a Porto Rican news- paper, La Correspondencia. These articles stated that the plaintiff, Pettingill, while United States Attorney for Porto Rico, carried on a private practice also, and even acted as a lawyer on behalf of persons bringing suit against the government of Porto Rico. It seems that, if the plaintiff had been an officer of the local government, he would have been forbidden the practice by the local law, and the articles convey the idea that if the practice is not prohibited also by the law for United States officials, it ought to be, especially as the island is charged with a salary for the attorney. The conduct of Mr. Pettingill in the above particulars is described as a monstrous immorality, a scandal, etc., etc. In the view that we take it is not necessary to state the charges here in detail, but it should be observed that in the declaration the plaintiff alleged that while United States Attorney he had a large private practice, and implied, as in his evidence he stated, that a part of this practice consisted of suits against the local government. So there was no issue on the matter of fact.

So far as the facts were concerned, the publication of them alone was not libelous. For, apart from the question whether attributing to the plaintiff conduct that was lawful, as the plaintiff says, could be a libel (Homer v. Engelhardt, 117 Mass. 539), he was a public officer in whose course of action connected with his office the citizens of Porto Rico had a serious interest, and anything bearing on such action was a legitimate subject of statement and comment. It was so, at least, in the absence of express malice,—a phrase needing further analysis, although not for the purposes of this case. Therefore the only questions open for consideration were the motives of the publication and whether the comment went beyond reasonable limits, which, of course, the defendant denied. But so far as we see from reading the charge, the judge did not approach the case from this point of view. For after saying to the jury that fair comment upon the actions of public officials was privileged, he went on: 'But you are instructed that in this case . . . [the articles] are what is known in law as libelous per se. . . . Therefore, in any event you must find for the plaintiff upon that issue, and give him such damages as you may believe, from all the facts and circumstances in the case, he is entitled to;' and after that proceeded to direct them...