Manufacturers’ Furnishing Co. v. Kremer

• Decision Date: 01 October 1895
• Citation: 7 S.D. 463,64 N.W. 528
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
• Parties: MANUFACTURERS’ FURNISHING CO., Plaintiff and appellant, v. KREMER et al. Defendants and respondents.

7 S.D. 463

64 N.W. 528

MANUFACTURERS’ FURNISHING CO., Plaintiff and appellant,

v.

KREMER et al. Defendants and respondents. South Dakota Supreme Court Appeal from Circuit Court, Minnehaha County, SD Hon. Joseph W. Jones, Judge Affirmed Joe Kirby, Sioux Falls, SD Attorneys for appellants. E. H. Wilson Attorneys for respondents. Opinion filed, Oct. 1, 1895

FULLER, J.

Plaintiff’s object in bringing this suit was to obtain a judgment for $187.50 against the defendants, who are school officers, and its claim therefore is based upon a written order signed by defendants for certain school apparatus, containing a stipulation that, if the goods are not taken and paid for within 30 days after their shipment, each of the defendants (provided a majority of the board sign the order) will become personally responsible for the purchase price, and it was further stipulated that no condition of the order could be changed or modified by any verbal agreement. There was a trial to a jury, and a verdict for the defendants. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for costs, and from an order overruling a motion for a new trial. Defendants admitted that they constituted a majority of the school board, that they signed the order, and that the goods were shipped to the station designated therein more than 30 days prior to the commencement of the action. In support of the defense upon which respondents relied, uncontroverted testimony was offered, over plaintiff’s objection, which conclusively shows that defendant’s signatures were obtained by the agents of plaintiff, and that the instrument was executed by the defendant Wingen in the absence of his codefendant, and the possession thereof was secured by said agents upon an express condition that the same should be of no effect, and would be returned to him or destroyed, in case the other members of the board did not sign the order and agree to purchase the goods. Nicholaus Krebs, a director who refused to and never did sign the order, testified that the agents of plaintiff who attempted to procure his signature admitted that Mr. Wingen signed and let them take the order for the sole purpose of obtaining the signature of the witness, and upon the condition that the same should amount to nothing in case such signature was not obtained. From the testimony of each of the defendants it clearly appears that the order was signed and delivered to the agents of plaintiff upon a condition that never was complied...