Manuwal v. BMW of N. Am., LLC
Decision Date | 08 September 2020 |
Docket Number | CV 20-2331 DSF (RAOx) |
Citation | 484 F.Supp.3d 862 |
Parties | Robert Isadore MANUWAL, Plaintiff, v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Michael H. Rosenstein, Sepehr Daghighian, California Consumer Attorneys PC, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.
Brian Ming Hom, Lisa R. Weddle, Morgan Lewis and Bockius LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Molly Moriarty Lane, Garrick Y. Chan, Morgan Lewis and Bockius LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.
Order DENYING Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay All Proceedings (Dkt. 23)
Defendant BMW of North America, LLC, moves to compel arbitration of claims brought by Plaintiff Robert Isadore Manuwal and to stay these proceedings pending completion of the arbitration. Dkt. 23 (Mot.). Plaintiff opposes. Dkt. 26 (Opp'n). The Court deems this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 ; Local Rule 7-15. For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED.
On May 31, 2019, Plaintiff purchased a motorcycle from nonparty BMW Motorcycles of Ventura County. Dkt. 1-2 (Compl.) ¶ 8; Dkt. 23-1, Ex. A (Sale Contract).1 Plaintiff and BMW Motorcycles executed the Sale Contract, which defined Plaintiff as "[y]ou, the Buyer," and BMW Motorcycles as "the Seller-Creditor (sometimes ‘we’ or ‘us’ in this contract)." Sale Contract at 1. The Sale Contract contained an arbitration provision, which states in pertinent part:
Plaintiff alleges the motorcycle had a defect with its Bluetooth audio system. Compl. ¶ 9. Defendant, which provided express and implied warranties accompanying the sale of the motorcycle, was unable to repair the motorcycle in a timely manner and did not replace the motorcycle or make restitution. Id. ¶¶ 8, 24–25, 32.
Plaintiff filed an action against Defendant in the Los Angeles County Superior Court for various violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Compl. ¶¶ 16–70. Defendant answered in state court and subsequently removed the action to federal court. Dkt. 1; Dkt. 1-3.
"[T]he Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) makes agreements to arbitrate ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ " AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 ). "By its terms, the [FAA] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985) ; see also Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004) ( ). "[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Ferguson v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) ).
Generally, a court's role under the FAA is limited to determining "two ‘gateway’ issues: (1) whether there is an agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the agreement covers the dispute." Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84, 123 S.Ct. 588, 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002) ). But even these gateway issues can be submitted to an arbitrator where there is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended that result. See id. (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) ). "When the parties’ contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the courts must respect the parties’ decision as embodied in the contract." Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 524, 528, 202 L.Ed.2d 480 (2019).
Defendant moves to compel arbitration based on the Sale Contract's arbitration provision. Plaintiff does not contest the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement between him and BMW Motorcycles.2 Instead, the parties dispute whether Defendant can enforce the provision given that Defendant is not a signatory to the Sale Contract. Defendant asserts that the arbitrator should decide that question. The Court resolves the second issue first.
Defendant argues that the arbitration provision delegates questions of arbitrability, including whether Defendant may invoke the Sale Contract's arbitration provision, to the arbitrator. Mot. at 8–10. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff and BMW Motorcycles agreed to arbitrate arbitrability as to disputes "between you [Plaintiff] and us [BMW Motorcycles] or our employees, agents, successors or assigns"—and no other nonsignatory. Sale Contract at 2. Defendant, the manufacturer of Plaintiff's motorcycle, does not argue that it is an employee, agent, successor, or assign of BMW Motorcycles. "Given the absence of clear and unmistakable evidence that Plaintiff[ ] agreed to arbitrate arbitrability with nonsignatories" such as Defendant, this Court may decide whether the dispute is arbitrable. Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp., 705 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).
The Court declines Defendant's invitation to follow Arab v. BMW of North America, LLC, No. SA CV 19-1303-DOC (JDEx), 2019 WL 8011713 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2019). Mot. at 9–10. Examining a similar arbitration provision extending between "you [the plaintiff] and us [the dealership] or our employees, agents, successors or assigns," that court referred the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, reasoning that the provision "specifically contemplates disputes arising between plaintiff and third parties." Id. at *3 (emphasis removed). But the provision here contemplates arbitrating arbitrability as to claims against only a limited number of third parties: the "employees, agents, successors, or assigns" of BMW Motorcycles. Sale Contract at 2. The Arab court did not consider whether the provision clearly and unmistakably demonstrated the plaintiff's intent to arbitrate arbitrability as to disputes against the particular third party seeking to enforce the provision, the manufacturer. See Arab, 2019 WL 8011713, at *3 ; see also Schulz v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 5:20-cv-01697-NC, 472 F.Supp.3d 632, 637–39 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020) ( ); cf. Kramer, 705 F.3d at 1127 n.3 ( ).
"[A] litigant who is not a party to an arbitration agreement may invoke arbitration under the FAA if the relevant state contract law allows the litigant to enforce the agreement." Kramer, 705 F.3d at 1128 (citing Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 632, 129 S.Ct. 1896, 173 L.Ed.2d 832 (2009) ); see also Mundi v. Union Sec. Life Ins. Co., 555 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009) ().
Defendant argues that it may enforce the arbitration provision either under the doctrine of equitable estoppel or as a third-party beneficiary of the Sale Contract. Mot. at 10–17. Neither theory has merit.
"Equitable estoppel precludes a party from claiming the benefits of a contract while simultaneously attempting to avoid the burdens that contract imposes." Kramer, 705 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006) ). In Kramer, the Ninth Circuit articulated the standard for determining whether a nonsignatory may compel arbitration under California law:
[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel applies in two circumstances: (1) when a signatory must rely on the terms of the written agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory or the claims are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract, and (2) when the signatory alleges substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by the nonsignatory and another signatory and the allegations of interdependent misconduct are founded in or intimately connected with the obligations of the underlying agreement.
Id. at 1128–29 (citations, alteration, and quotation marks omitted).
Defendant contends Plaintiff's claims are intimately founded in and intertwined with the Sale Contract because the manufacturer's express and implied warranties are additional terms of the Sale Contract. Mot. at 11–14. It is undisputed that Defendant's warranties arise from the sale transaction. See Compl...
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