Manville Jenckes Corp.. v. Lubinski., 1938.
| Decision Date | 04 August 1949 |
| Docket Number | No. 1938.,1938. |
| Citation | 68 A.2d 107 |
| Parties | MANVILLE JENCKES CORPORATION v. LUBINSKI. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Walter Curry, Judge.
Petition by Manville Jenckes Corporation, employer, against Catherine Lubinski, employee, to review a preliminary agreement for compensation. From an adverse decree, the employee appeals.
Appeal sustained and decree reversed in part and modified in part, and otherwise affirmed, and cause remanded with direction.
Worrell & Hodge, Paul H. Hodge, Providence, for petitioner.
Raymond F. Henderson, Pawtucket, for respondent.
This is an employer's petition for review of a preliminary agreement based on the ground that the respondent employee's incapacity resulting from the injury stated in the agreement has ended or diminished. After a hearing in the superior court, the trial justice found that such incapacity had ended. A decree was duly entered containing that finding and also the following findings: that respondent is now disabled by hypertrophic arthritis which antedated the accident; that such condition was not changed or aggravated by the accident; and that respondent's present incapacity is not the result of the accident. From that decree respondent has appealed to this court.
Her appeal raises several questions, but on our view of the record we need consider and decide only one of them, namely, whether there is any legal evidence to support the decree. Respondent contends there is no such evidence. She further contends the evidence is undisputed that her present incapacity is due to an injury to her back which resulted indirectly from the accident. Petitioner one the other hand contends that the evidence is undisputed that respondent is no longer incapacitated from the injury stated in the preliminary agreement and that such injury is the only one that can be considered under its petition for review of that agreement.
Respondent, while in the course of her employment with the petitioner on April 25, 1944, slipped on a wet spot on the floor of its mill in Manville in this state and fractured the sixth, seventh and eighth ribs on her left side. On the next day she became totally incapacitated and so remained until July 12, 1944 when she voluntarily returned to work. After two days she was compelled to cease work due to the pain in her left side. Thereafter she entered into a preliminary agreement for compensation with petitioner wherein the accidental cause of her injury was described: ‘Slipped on wet spot on floor, and struck side of loom’ and she stated her injury resulting therefrom as ‘Fractured left 6th, 7th 8th ribs.’ It was agreed therein that due to such injury respondent was then totally incapacitated and was entitled to compensation therefor commencing July 17, 1944 for the duration of such incapacity or until otherwise terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. General Laws 1938, chapter 300.
The instant petition seeks a review of that agreement to determine whether respondent's incapacity resulting from such injury has ended or diminished. That is the only question open to inquiry in this proceeding. Petitioner has the burden to prove that the injury stated in the agreement no longer incapacitates the respondent at all or to the same degree as when the agreement was made, but petitioner cannot be required to meet and defend a claim by respondent of continuing incapacity from any other injury not stated in the agreement even though respondent may be able to show that the accident...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Coletta v. Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc.
...an original petition for compensation based on the new injury. Leviton Manufacturing Co. v. Lillibridge, supra; Manville Jenckes Corp. v. Lubinski, 76 R.I. 36, 68 A.2d 107 (1949); Meierovitz v. George A. Fuller Co., The employee further argues that the commission erred when it consulted dic......
-
Ricci v. U.S. Rubber Co.
...the specific injury stated in that agreement. Airedale Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Cote, 75 R.I. 361, 66 A.2d 802; Manville Jenckes Corp. v. Lubinski, 76 R.I. 36, 68 A.2d 107; Peters v. Monowatt Electric Corp., 78 R.I. 134, 79 A.2d 922, 81 A.2d 424; Wanskuck Co. v. Puleo, 78 R.I. 447, 82 A.2d 87......
-
Capobianco v. United Wire & Supply Corp.
...terms thereof are in issue and that it cannot be attacked or otherwise amended excepting as provided in the act. Manville Jenckes Corp. v. Lubinski, 76 R.I. 36, 68 A.2d 107; Meierovitz v. George A. Fuller Co., 75 R.I. 378, 67 A.2d 45; Airedale Worsted Mills, Inc., v. Cote, 75 R.I. 361, 364,......
-
Macedo v. Atlantic Rayon Corp.
...does not dispute the law as stated in Peters v. Monowatt Electric Corp., 78 R.I. 134, 79 A.2d 922, 81 A.2d 424; Manville Jenckes Corp. v. Lubinski, 76 R.I. 36, 68 A.2d 107, and Airedale Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Cote, 75 R.I. 361, 66 A.2d 802. But she claims in effect that the trial justice mi......