Manzanares v. Attorney Gen. Sean D. Reyes

• Decision Date: 14 September 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:14-cv-00040
• Parties: Robert Benito Manzanares, et al, Plaintiff, v. Attorney General Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General of the State of Utah, et al Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

Robert Benito Manzanares, et al, Plaintiff, v. Attorney General Sean D. Reyes,Attorney General of the State of Utah, et al Defendants.

Case No. 2:14-cv-00040

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

September 14, 2015

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS SHURTLEFF AND SWALLOW

District Judge David Nuffer

Magistrate Judge Evelyn J. Furse

Plaintiffs Robert Benito Manzanares and "at least three hundred" other unmarried biological fathers and their minor children ("the Manzanares Plaintiffs") claim portions of the Utah Adoption Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-101 to 78B-6-146, unconstitutionally deprive them of fundamental rights and violate the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the protection against self-incrimination, and the Open Court's Provision of the Utah Constitution. (1st Am. Compl. 1, ¶¶ 54-64, ECF No. 35.) The Manzanares Plaintiffs contend the Utah Adoption Act has created such a complex process for unwed fathers to preserve their interest in their children that it violates both the father's and the children's rights. (1^st Am. Compl. ¶ 54, ECF No. 35.) Moreover, the Manzanares Plaintiffs allege that Utah Code section 78B-6-106 legalizes fraud and kidnapping, (1^st Am. Compl. ¶ 55, ECF No. 35), because it requires the unwed father to comply strictly with all of the Act's requirements regardless of what the unwed mother or third parties may do or say.

The Manzanares Plaintiffs named the current Utah Attorney General, Sean D. Reyes and two former Utah Attorneys General, Mark L. Shurtleff and John E. Swallow, as Defendants in their official and personal capacities. (1^st Am. Compl. ¶ 48-50, ECF No. 35.)

Defendants Mark L. Shurtleff and John E. Swallow ("Mr. Shurtleff and Mr. Swallow") moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (the "Complaint") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which the Court could grant relief. (Defs. Shurtleff & Swallow's Mot. to Dismiss & Supporting Mem. ("Mot. to Dismiss") ii-iv, ECF No. 38.) Based on careful consideration of the parties' memoranda, the undersigned¹ RECOMMENDS the District Court GRANT the Motion to Dismiss claims against Mr. Shurtleff and Mr. Swallow WITH PREJUDICE because sovereign, absolute, and qualified immunity shield them both from suit in both their official and personal capacities.

Sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment prohibit a claim for monetary damage against Mr. Shurtleff and Mr. Swallow in their official capacities. Prosecutorial and legislative immunity prohibit any claims against Mr. Shurtleff and Mr. Swallow in their individual capacities for actions taken or omitted in their role as prosecutors or in their involvement in the legislative process. As to the remaining allegations against Mr. Shurtleff and Mr. Swallow in their individual capacities, the constitutionality of parts of the Utah Adoption Act remains unclear at this time. Absent clearly established law holding the Act unconstitutional, the Court cannot hold Mr. Shurtleff and Mr. Swallow personally liable for acts or omissions under the Act. Pursuant to Civil Rule 7-1(f) of the Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the District of Utah, the Court concludes it does not need oral argument and will make a recommendation on the Motion on the basis of the written memoranda.

I. Motion to Dismiss Standard

To withstand a motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must have enough allegations of fact, taken as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While "'a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint,'" this rule does not apply to legal conclusions. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "[A] plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim." Id. (citation omitted). A complaint survives only if it "'states a plausible claim for relief.'" Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The Court sets forth the relevant facts as alleged in the Complaint.

II. Factual Background

In their Complaint, nineteen named Plaintiffs² join Mr. Manzanares in bringing suit on behalf of themselves and their minor children. (1st Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 35.) The Manzanares Plaintiffs are biological fathers of children adopted pursuant to the Utah Adoption Act and their minor children. (1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-47, ECF No. 35; see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-101 to 78B-6-146.) The Manzanares Plaintiffs also note they expect to identify additional plaintiffs "through discovery and/or through the potential certification of this matter as a class." (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 47, ECF No. 35.)

The Manzanares Plaintiffs assert Mr. Shurtleff and Mr. Swallow failed "to correct the fraud and deception that has consequently led to the unlawful and unconstitutional removal of children from their biological families." (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 54, ECF No. 35.) The ManzanaresPlaintiffs claim "through the Utah Attorney General's affirmative actions and through gross inaction," the adoptions laws "have violated the fundamental civil rights of the Biological Fathers and their Minor Children. (Id. at ¶ 63.)

In support of their claims, the Manzanares Plaintiffs point to, among other details, public promises by Mr. Shurtleff and Mr. Swallow obligating them to take legislative action. Mr. Shurtleff, for instance, said in a Dateline television interview that he would "'look at [the issue] and talk to [the Utah] legislature about that." (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 480, ECF No. 35 (brackets in original).) Mr. Swallow "stated ... that he was committed to keeping the Dateline promise of Shurtleff, and would assist with the eradication in Utah of adoptions sanctioned through fraudulent and other unconstitutional means." (Id. at ¶ 485.) The Manzanares Plaintiffs further take issue with Mr. Shurtleff and Mr. Swallow's failures to enter appearances in Utah cases challenging the Adoption Act or take any other action to signal the unconstitutionality of the Utah Adoption Act. (Id. at ¶ 478.) Additionally, the Manzanares Plaintiffs decry the failure of the Attorneys General "to prosecute the illegal conduct of Utah adoption agencies; [the] failure to prosecute other parties engaging in or complicit with fraudulent adoption practices; and [the] failure to protect children from abusive adoption practices." (Id. at ¶ 495.)

In sum, the Manzanares Plaintiffs allege the Utah Adoption Act unconstitutionally deprives unwed biological fathers of parental rights and their minor children of their rights to a relationship with their biological fathers without the due process or equal protection guaranteed by the United States Constitution and in violation of the right against self-incrimination, the Utah open courts provision, and other constitutional provisions. (Id. at ¶¶ 54-64.) The Manzanares Plaintiffs further allege, Utah Code section 78B-6-106 "essentially legalizes and incentivizes biological mothers (and in many cases, lawyers and adoption agency representatives workingwith them) to commit fraud against [b]iological [f]athers," (id. at ¶ 59), by stating "[a] fraudulent representation is not a defense to strict compliance with the requirements of this chapter, and is not a basis for dismissal of a petition for adoption, vacation of an adoption decree, or an automatic grant of custody to the offended party." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-106; (1^st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59-60.) Mr. Shurtleff and Mr. Swallow caused the Manzanares Plaintiffs' deprivation by "turn[ing] a blind eye to such practices, in direct contradiction to their personal promises, their oath of office, their statutory mandates, and their stated priorities, and also their oaths as licensed attorneys in Utah." (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 494, ECF No. 35.)

The Utah Legislature amended parts of the Utah Adoption Act in 2015. See Adoption Amendments, 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 194, S.B. 101. Because the Manzanares Plaintiffs' allegations against Mr. Shurtleff and Mr. Swallow relate to conduct under the statute before its modification, this Motion to Dismiss does not require the Court to consider the new legislation's impact on the Manzanares Plaintiffs' claims.

III. Analysis.

The Manzanares Plaintiffs sue Mr. Shurtleff and Mr. Swallow in both their official and personal capacities. (1st Am. Compl. 1, ¶¶ 492-96, ECF No. 35.) In Kentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court distinguished between the two types of suits in the context of damages actions:

Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Official-capacity suits, in contrast, "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.

473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (footnote and citations omitted).

The requirements for plaintiffs to succeed in each type of suit vary considerably. On their merits, personal capacity suits must "show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right." Id. at 166 (citation omitted). An official capacity action requires a plaintiff establish the defendant entity "is a 'moving force' behind the deprivation," meaning that "the entity's 'policy or custom' must have played a part in the violation of federal law." Id. (citations omitted).

Different immunities apply to defendants in each type of action. A defendant in a personal capacity suit can assert "personal immunity defenses" such as absolute prosecutorial immunity, absolute legislative immunity, or qualified immunity. Id. at...