Manzanares v. Law Firm of Aronowitz & Mecklenburg, LLP
| Decision Date | 03 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13-cv-01158-BNB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
| Parties | ELISEO ADAME MANZANARES, Plaintiff, v. THE LAW FIRM OF ARONOWITZ & MECKLENBURG, LLP, ROBERT ARONOWITZ, SUSAN J. HENDRICK, KIMBERLY PITANIELLO, BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., BANK OF NEW YORK, and 2 UNNAMED ARAPAHOE SHERIFF DEPUTIES, Defendants. |
Plaintiff, Eliseo Adame Manzanares, acting pro se, initiated this action on May 2, 2013, by filing a Complaint, ECF No. 1, challenging a state court foreclosure proceeding and eviction. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, ECF No. 6, and an Ex-Parte Motion for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 7. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction for his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, and 1343(a), and Colo. Rev. Stat. 13-1-124(1)(c). He also claims violations of the following: (1) the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.; (3) Civil Rights Act of 1964 for Equal Accommodation Rights, § 2000d; (4) Fair Housing Act of 1968; and (5) protected activities under 18 U.S.C.§§ 242, 245 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 3631 and 14141,and seeks relief pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-35-204(6) for slander of title, and 13-40-102, 103, and 18-4-502(7) for trespassing. Plaintiff throughout the Amended Complaint refers to his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment. Finally, the Plaintiff asks for relief and compensation under Colo. R. Civ. P. 105; a hate crime investigation; an order quieting title to the subject property adjudicating him as the owner; and costs and damages.
Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland reviewed the Amended Complaint and on August 14, 2013, order Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint that complies with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Magistrate Judge Boland directed Plaintiff to state his claims clearly and concisely and to assert what each named Defendant did to violate his rights. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on September 16, 2013.
The Court must construe the Second Amended Complaint liberally because Plaintiff is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). If the Amended Complaint reasonably can be read "to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, [the Court] should do so despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements." Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
The Court has reviewed the Second Amended Complaint and finds dismissal is proper for the following reasons. Plaintiff asserts his claims in the same repetitive fashion as he did in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff also refers generally to "all Defendants" or to "foreclosing" defendants when identifying who was responsible for performing a specific act. Plaintiff's claims are conclusory and vague, and thejurisdictional basis for his claims in part are listed throughout the entire Complaint rather than stated under the section of the Second Amended Complaint that specifically provides for a statement of jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not complied with the August 4 Order. The Court, therefore, finds that a second opportunity to amend is not in the interest of judicial economy and will review the claims as presented.
Plaintiff is claiming ownership of a home that was foreclosed in a state court action against Barry L. Overton and Litisha C. Turner. See Amended Compl., ECF No. 6-1, at 3. Plaintiff contends that on June 6, 2011, prior to the foreclosure, he purchased the home in a legal conveyance pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-10-123, 38-30-120, and 38-41-101 et seq., and has paid all bills, HOA fees, back fees, and property taxes since purchasing the home. Sec. Am. Compl., ECF No. 11, at 7. Plaintiff further asserts that he has always planned to pay a fair price for the home through a judicial acquisition or settlement with the real owner pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-101(5)(a)(i)(ii) but not through a loan or loan assumption. Id.
Plaintiff also asserts that the property was subject to a fraudulent foreclosure through issuance of a false confirmation deed to Defendant Bank of New York, Sec. Am. Comp. at 8, and as a result, the Arapahoe County Court lacked authority to issue a writ of restitution and evict Plaintiff from the home, Id. at 9. Plaintiff further asserts that his due process rights were violated because the court failed to determine the issue of ownership on the merits and foreclosing attorneys and Defendant Susan conspired with Defendants Judge Ollada and Arapahoe County Sheriffs to effect the unlawful eviction. Id. at 11-12.
Plaintiff further contends that the state court, court clerks, and DefendantsArapahoe County Sheriffs and Susan used "false papers" but were not criminally charged or subjected to civil penalties for doing so, even though their acts were racially motivated. Id. at 14. Plaintiff also asserts that on April 5, 2013, Defendants Arapahoe County Sheriffs forcefully removed Plaintiff and his family from the house and, during the eviction, made racial slurs against Plaintiff and his family and stole $7,500 worth of Plaintiff's personal property. Id. at 13. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Kimberly listed the house for sale on April 7, 2013, even though the property had been stolen. Id. at 14.
On Pages One and Two of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for Equal Accommodation Rights, § 2000d; Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 3601; 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 245; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3631 and 14141; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-204, Slander of Title; and Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-40-102 and 103 and § 18-4-502, Trespassing. On Page Three, under a section titled, Plaintiff refers to § 1983, the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1343(a), and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124(1)(c), for the basis of the jurisdiction and venue for his claims. Throughout the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also refers to 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; The Supremacy Clause; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-10-123, 38-30-120, and 38-41-101 et seq.; Colo. Const. Art. 2 § 3; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-101(5)(a)(i)(ii); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-35-117 and 38-101(6)(b); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-10-101; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-117(2); and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-38-504.
Finally, Plaintiff seeks relief and compensation under Colo. R. Civ. P. 105 andthe Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff also seeks (1) punitive and actual damages; (2) restitution of the property to him; (3) a ruling that the banks and attorneys have no interest in the property and forever are barred and enjoined from asserting a claim in the property; (4) a finding that the state court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the possession rights to the property and to issue a writ of restitution; and (5) an order quieting title to the property and determining that he is the owner of the property in fee simple.
Plaintiff may not challenge the Arapahoe County Court eviction proceeding in this action. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts, other than the United States Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to adjudicate claims seeking review of state court judgments. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (). Review of the state court judgment must proceed to the state's highest court and then to the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars not only cases seeking direct review of state court judgments; it also bars cases that are "inextricably intertwined" with a prior state court judgment. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16. "To determine whether a federal plaintiff's claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment, [the Court] must pay close attention to the relief the plaintiff seeks." Crutchfield v. Countrywide Home Loans, 389 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 2004) overruled in part on other grounds by Exxon Mobil Corp, 544 U.S. 280. "Where a plaintiff seeks a remedy that would disrupt or undo a state court judgment, the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment." Id. at 1148. Furthermore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "precludes not only review of adjudications of the state's highest court, but also the decisions of its lower courts." See Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Court acknowledges the Tenth Circuit's decision in Miller v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. (In re Miller), 666 F.3d 1255, 1262 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2012), finding that no final judgment is entered in a Colo. Rev. Civ. P. 120 proceeding (an order authorizing a sale) for purposes of Rooker-Feldman. However, as in Dillard v. Bank of New York, 476 F. App'x 690 (10th Cir. 2012), Plaintiff is attempting to completely undo the foreclosure and eviction proceeding, which was final before Plaintiff...
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