Mapfre Ins. Co. v. Ruiz
| Decision Date | 06 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:18-cv-00047-DAD-EPG,1:18-cv-00047-DAD-EPG |
| Parties | MAPFRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. MARIA DEL RAYO RUIZ, ELIAS RUIZ, DAVID RUIZ, and JUAN BARTOLA AISPURO BARRAZA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY THE ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RENEWAL AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
This matter is before the court on defendants Maria Del Rayo Ruiz, David Ruiz, and Elias Ruiz's motion to stay the action. (Doc. No. 13.) A hearing on this motion was held on May 30, 2018. (Doc. No. 29.) Attorneys Dean Pappas and Todd Roberts appeared telephonically on behalf of plaintiff. Attorneys Jay Christofferson personally appeared on behalf of defendants Maria, Elias and David Ruiz and attorney Antonio Rodriguez appeared telephonically on behalf of defendant Barraza. Having considered the parties' briefs and oral arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, the court will deny defendants' motion to stay the action.
Defendants Maria Ruiz, David Ruiz, and Elias Ruiz ("Ruiz defendants") are insured by plaintiff MAPFRE Insurance Company ("plaintiff" or "MAPFRE") and move to stay this declaratory relief action until the underlying litigation in state court is resolved. (Doc. No. 13.) The underlying actions are comprised of: 1) two liability claims currently pending in Fresno County Superior Court, brought by defendant Juan Bartolo Aispuro Barraza ("defendant Barraza"), against all other defendants in the present action, seeking damages arising out of tort liability; and 2) a worker's compensation claim filed by defendant Barraza. (See Doc. No. 14 at 3-4.) The suit was filed in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction (18 U.S.C. § 1332) and is a declaratory relief action in which plaintiff MAPFRE seeks a determination that there is no insurance coverage applicable to the underlying action in state court under the commercial automobile insurance policy it issued to Maria Ruiz. (Doc. No. 1 at 2, ¶ 5.)
On September 26, 2015, defendant Barraza, at the direction of the Ruiz defendants, was performing tree trimming services at the home of Ryan Jacobsen ("Jacobsen"),1 who had hired the Ruiz defendants to perform tree trimming services. (Doc. No. 1 at 3, ¶ 9-10.) While working on a raised cherry picker mounted on a 1990 white Chevrolet truck, defendant Barraza suffered a spinal cord injury and a fractured femur. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Here, MAPFRE alleges that the Ruiz defendants did not have workers' compensation insurance at the time of defendant Barraza's injury. (Id. at ¶ 11.)
On August 31, 2016, defendant Barraza filed a civil action for damages against defendant Maria Ruiz in Fresno County Superior County, Case No. 16CECG02820. (See Doc. No. 1 at 3, ¶ 12.) On September 25, 2017, defendant Barraza filed a first amended complaint against defendant Maria Ruiz and added Ryan Jacobsen as a defendant, alleging that he was Barraza's employer under California Labor Code § 3706 and was thus liable for any damages suffered by Barraza. (See id.) On the same date, defendant Barraza also filed a second action seeking damages arising from the alleged negligence of defendants Elias Ruiz and Maria Ruiz in Fresno County Superior Court, Case No. 17CECG03289. (Id. at ¶ 13.) In this second state court action, defendant Barraza alleged that defendants Elias Ruiz and Maria Ruiz were negligent inmaintaining, inspecting, and ensuring the safety of the boom truck that Barraza used to trim trees. (Id.) Following the accident, defendant Barraza also pursued a claim for workers' compensation benefits. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.)
MAPFRE issued a commercial automobile policy to Maria Ruiz covering the period of May 8, 2015 to May 8, 2016. (Doc. No. 1 at 4-6.) In relevant part, the policy specifically excludes coverage of:
(Doc. No. 16 at 14.)2 Under Paragraph 6.b. of the policy, the definition of "mobile equipment" includes: cherry pickers and similar devices mounted on automobile or truck chassis and used to raise or lower workers. (Id. at 22.) However, at other points in the policy, the same equipment is defined as an automobile, rather than mobile equipment. (See id.)
"[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); accord Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 411 (1995) . Deciding whether to grant a stay pending the outcome of other proceedings "calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance." Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55. The party seeking such a stay must "make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else." Id. at 255.
In considering whether to grant a stay, this court must weigh several factors, including "[1] the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, [2] the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and [3] the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay." CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55). A stay may be granted regardless of whether the separate proceedings are "judicial, administrative, or arbitral in character, and does not require that the issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the court." Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1979).
At the outset, MAPFRE requests that the court take judicial notice of the following documents: 1) defendant Barraza's answer filed in this case (Doc. No. 20); 2) the Ruiz defendants' memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion to stay this action (Doc. No. 24); and 3) the declaration of Maria Del Rayo Ruiz in support of the motion to stay (Doc. No. 16). (Doc. No. 26.) Defendants do not oppose taking judicial notice of these documents.
Ordinarily, the court considers only the complaint and attached documents in deciding a motion to dismiss; however, the court may also take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). Pursuant to the Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a court may "judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readilydetermined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Public records are properly the subject of judicial notice because the contents of such documents contain facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute, and the facts therein "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Id.; see also Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007).
Here, the exhibits for which MAPFRE requests judicial notice are all documents that have been filed in this case. "It is well established that a court may take judicial notice of its own records." United States v. Author Servs., Inc., 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986), amended, 811 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 157 (1969)). Though the court will grant plaintiff's unopposed request for judicial notice, the parties are, however, "advised for future reference that [they] need not seek judicial notice of documents filed in the same case." Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (citing NovelPoster v. Javitch Canfield Grp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 954, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
The Ruiz defendants, who are the insurance policy holders, seek a stay of this declaratory action. (Doc. No. 14 at 2.)3 In the complaint for declaratory relief before this court, MAPFRE, the insurance provider, seeks a declaration that it has no duty to defend or indemnify any person or entity insured under the commercial automobile insurance policy issued to defendant Maria Ruiz in defense of any claim or suit filed on behalf of defendant Barraza. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) MAPFRE seeks a declaratory judgment based on: 1) the operations exclusion; and 2) exclusions related to the employment status of the injured worker. (Doc. No. 23 at 1.) There are twounderlying liability actions that have been brought by defendant Barraza against the Ruiz defendants and Jacobsen pending in state court in which Barraza seeks damages stemming from the alleged malfunctioning of a cherry picker installed in the bed of a truck owned by the Ruiz defendants. (Doc. No. 14 at 3.) Additionally, defendant Barraza filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits,...
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