Mapson v. Cox, Civ. A. No. 70-C-7-C.
Citation | 313 F. Supp. 465 |
Decision Date | 21 May 1970 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 70-C-7-C. |
Parties | Eugene Samuel MAPSON, Petitioner, v. J. D. COX, Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary, Respondent. |
Court | United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Western District of Virginia) |
Gerald L. Baliles, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., for respondent.
This proceeding comes before the court on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in forma pauperis by Eugene Samuel Mapson, a state prisoner, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The petition was transferred from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond, and filed herein on the 12th of March, 1970.
Petitioner Mapson is currently serving a life sentence in the Virginia State Penitentiary pursuant to a judgment of the Corporation Court of the City of Charlottesville, imposed on October 27, 1965, for first-degree murder. Mapson entered a plea of guilty during his criminal trial in said Corporation Court, after having originally plead not guilty and having asked for a jury trial.
The record reflects that on March 6, 1968 the Corporation Court of the City of Charlottesville denied Mapson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and that the Virgina Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed such a denial on the 21st of January, 1969. It appears that the petitioner has exhausted his available state remedies in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as interpreted by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed. 837 (1963).
The petitioner seeks to have his conviction set aside based upon the following allegations. (These allegations are similar to the ones which were considered by the state courts.)
An examination of the complete record before us does not present this court with any other alternative than to deny the relief Mapson seeks to obtain. The record, together with applicable case law, points to only one conclusion, namely, a dismissal of Mapson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This court, in analyzing the allegations as raised by the petitioner, can come to no other conclusion for the following reasons.
The first allegation centers on petitioner's arrest, an arrest which he claims was based upon an invalid warrant. The record clearly shows that Mapson was arrested in Norfolk, Virginia pursuant to his recent escape from the state convict road camp near Charlottesville, Virginia. After receiving information, via teletype, that the petitioner had escaped from the road camp, police officers of the Norfolk Division apprehended Mapson at the home of his wife. At the time of apprehension Mapson was hiding out in the attic of the house. (See Transcript Pages 98-100). As mentioned long ago in United States v. Cotter, 80 F.Supp. 590 (E.D.Va., 1948), when reasonable or probable cause is the basis for an arrest, the mere fact that it was made without a warrant, does not make the arrest invalid. The petititioner, after he was in custody on the escape violation, was presented with the warrant charging him with first-degree murder. This court can in no way see how the petitioner was denied any constitutional rights in his first allegation.
Petitioner Mapson was not only granted a preliminary hearing but it appears that any questions raised as to "undue delay" must be attributed to Mapson himself. The record does not reflect that the petitioner was prejudiced, in any way, by the lateness of the preliminary hearing on the 29th of April, 1965.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Snyder v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1009, 121 S.E.2d 452, 456 (1961) dealt with the preliminary hearing question. The court stated that:
* * * (w)e are of the opinion that the requirement for such a (preliminary) hearing is procedural only, and not jurisdictional, and any defect in connection therewith must be raised before trial, or forever lost as a grounds for objection. (Word Added)
Recent cases support the above mentioned concept. See Blankenship v. Peyton, 295 F.Supp. 16 (1969) and Dunnivan v. Peyton, 292 F.Supp. 173 (1968).
Grundler v. North Carolina, 283 F.2d 798, 801 (1960). The record illustrates quite clearly that the conviction was not "totally devoid of evidentiary support" so as to raise a due process issue. The Fourth Circuit continued by saying in Grundler that:
* * * (N)ormally, the admissibility of evidence, the sufficiency of evidence, and instructions to the jury in state trials are matters of state law and procedure not involving federal constitutional issues. It is only in circumstances impugning fundamental fairness or infringing specific constitutional protections that a federal question is presented. Id. at 802.
Not only does the foregoing refute petitioner's claim, but the recent case of Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 169 S.E.2d 569 (1969), clearly shows that Mapson's plea of guilty waived all defenses which he could make, except those of a jurisdictional nature. The court in the King case said that:
* * * (a) voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty by an accused is, in reality, a self-supplied conviction authorizing imposition of the punishment fixed by law. It is a waiver of all defenses other than those jurisdictional, effective as such not only in the lower court but as well in this court. Id. at 571. (Emphasis Added)
See Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 291, 46 S.E.2d 340 (1948). In line with the foregoing, it seems quite obvious that petitioner's third claim is one which does not raise a jurisdictional matter, and likewise is a claim without sufficient legal basis so as to afford the petitioner relief.
Finally, Mapson contends that during his criminal trial he had ineffective representation of counsel which deprived him of certain constitutional rights. The petitioner supplements the above contention by pointing out that he was (a) coerced into making his eventual plea of guilty by his attorney, and (b) that his attorney failed to bring in any relevant facts helpful to the petitioner.
The general contention of ineffective representation of counsel, more so than any other allegation, has continually been alleged in petitions for habeas corpus relief. A voluminous number of cases have dealt with the question involved herein. In...
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Ex parte Williams
...83. A plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defenses including contention as to the insufficiency of the evidence. Mapson v. Cox, 313 F.Supp. 465 (D.C.Va.1970). If the court is satisfied a factual basis exists for the guilty plea, a federal court may enter judgment upon that plea. Fed......
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...83]. A plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defenses including contention as to the insufficiency of the evidence. Mapson v. Cox, 313 F.Supp. 465 (D.C.Va.1970). "If the court is satisfied a factual basis exists for the guilty plea, a federal court may enter judgment upon that plea. F......
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Ashby v. Cox
...The preliminary hearing granted by § 19.1-163.1 of the Code of Virginia (1960 Repl. Vol.) is not jurisdictional. Mapson v. Cox, 313 F.Supp. 465, 467 (W.D.Va. 1970); Bird v. Peyton, 287 F.Supp. 860, 862-863 (W.D.Va.1968); Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 31, 129 S.E.2d 22, 27-28 (1963). And......