La Mar v. State
Decision Date | 05 January 1953 |
Docket Number | No. 28919,28919 |
Citation | 231 Ind. 508,109 N.E.2d 614 |
Parties | LA MAR et al. v. STATE. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
William S. Spangler (of Strom & Spangler), Gary, Herman L. Key, Gary, for appellants.
J. Emmett McManamon, Atty. Gen., William T. McClain and John Ready O'Connor, Deputies Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellants were charged by affidavit with procuring a female as an inmate for a house of prostitution, under § 10-4211, Burns' 1942 Replacement. A plea of not guilty was entered, trial by jury was waived, there was a finding of guilty, and judgment and sentence followed.
Appellants assign as error the overruling of their motion for new trial.
The motion for new trial asserts that the finding of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law. Other grounds have been waived under our Rule No. 2-17(f).
The pertinent part of the affidavit, filed on June 23, 1951, is as follows:
'The undersigned, being duly sworn upon his oath says that on or about the 23rd day of June, A.D. 1951, at and in the County of Lake, and State of Indiana, the above named defendants did then and there unlawfully and feloniously procure one Diane Hamilton, a female, as an inmate for a house of prostitution located at 1533 Jefferson Street, Gary, Indiana, and by promises, threats and violence and by a device and scheme, did cause and encourage the said Diane Hamilton, a female person, to become an inmate of said house of prostitution at said 1533 Jefferson Street, Gary, Indiana, and by promises, threats, violence and by a device and scheme, cause, induce, persuade and encourage the said Diane Hamilton, an inmate of said house of prostitution to remain there as an inmate, then and there being contrary to the form of the statute in such case and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.'
The evidence of Diane Hamilton, a witness for the State, reveals that she was a prostitute and knew both of appellants, having met appellant LaMar at a restaurant operated by the latter at 1533 Jefferson Street, in Gary, when the witness went there to inquire about a job working as a prostitute. Appellant McCully was not there at that time; she came in September or October. Appellant LaMar lived in the rear of the restaurant with another woman. Arrangements were made between the witness and appellant LaMar that $2 out of every $5 and $4 out of $10 would go to appellant from each act of prostitution. The witness collected and divided the money. She paid no rent. The witness came there in August, 1950, and stayed until November, 1950. She came back two or three times after that, leaving for good in July, 1951. In June, 1951, other arrangements were made in which the witness was to divide the money equally with appellant LaMar. During June, and up to the time the witness left permanently, in July, 1951, one-half of the money collected by the witness was paid to appellant LaMar. On one of the occasions when the witness retunred, appellant McCully was there. The latter waited on customers in the restaurant, and gave appellant LaMar money from acts of prostitution. Appellant McCully and the witness worked five or six months 'in the same place.' When the witness returned after being gone for a period of time, she had a conversation with appellants--'I went and asked for my job back and I got it back, that's all I can remember.' The witness testified that: 'She (appellant LaMar) still didn't charge me any rent for my room.' The reputation of appellants and the witness was shown to be that of prostitutes.
The above, in substance, is the pertinent testimony.
This court has often said that we cannot weigh the evidence, but will examine it to see if there is substantial evidence of probative value on each material element of the crime charged. Price v. State, 1933, 204 Ind. 316, 184 N.E. 181.
The affidavit charges three separate acts under § 10-4211, Burns' 1942 Replacement--(1) that appellants procured a female to become an inmate for a house of prostitution; (2) by promises, threats, violence, and by a device and scheme, did cause and encourage a female person to become an inmate of a house of prostitution; and (3) by promises, threats, violence, and by a device and scheme, did cause, induce, persuade and encourage an inmate of a house of prostitution to remain therein.
The affidavit charges conjunctively, three forbidden acts, under § 10-4211, Burns' 1942 Replacement, and the burden was on appellee to prove one of the acts charged. Rosenbarger v. State, 1900, 154 Ind. 425, 56 N.E. 914.
There is a complete lack of evidence of substantial and probative value against appellant, Frances McCully, to prove any of the acts charged in the affidavit, under § 10-4211, Burns' 1942 Replacement. Therefore the finding and judgment is contrary to law as to appellant, Frances McCully. Price v. State, supra.
It is necessary that we look to the evidence most favorable to appellee which would be pertinent to prove the acts charged to have been committed by appellant LaMar.
From the evidence as herein set out, there is no evidence to prove threats or violence; and the only evidence in the record bearing upon 'the procuring' and 'promises' and 'by a device and scheme' appears as follows:
'Q. What were the circumstances under which you met? A. I told her I had heard about a place that she wanted a girl and she gave me the job.
'Q. Needed what kind of a girl? A. Nothing, but a girl who could hustle.
'Q. What business was she engaged in at that time? A. I don't understand the question.
'Q. What was her occupation, what did she do? A. Well, she had this place, it was something like a restaurant and she lived in the back.
'Q. Where did you do this hustling that you tell us about? A. Well, she had a basement and we would take them to the basement, then later on she had an apartment over on the other side.
'Q. What do you mean on the other side? A. It is North, her place, it is on the second floor, it is a three room apartment.
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'Q. What was your arrangement with the Defendant, Minnie Lee LaMar with respect to your rent for your room? A. Well, I didn't pay any rent.
'Q. Did you have any conversation with her at that time about the rent? A. Well, I didn't pay any rent.
'Q. You can answer that 'Yes' or 'No,' did you have any conversation about that? A. Yes.
'
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From this evidence we cannot say that any promises were made, or a device and scheme was entered into, to cause Diane Hamilton to become an inmate of a house of prostitution; nor is there any evidence to show any device, scheme, cause, inducement, persuasion, or encouragement of Diane Hamilton to remain as an inmate of a house of prostitution.
In the case of State v. Topham, 1912, 41 Utah 39, 45, 123 P. 888, 890, the court said:
The court further said, at page 59 of 41 Utah, at page 896 of 123 P.:
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