Marable v. Marion Military Inst.

• Decision Date: 05 November 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:11–cv–563–CG–B.
• Parties: Reginald D. MARABLE, Sr., Plaintiff, v. MARION MILITARY INSTITUTE and Col. Thomas L. Tate, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

906 F.Supp.2d 1237

Reginald D. MARABLE, Sr., Plaintiff,

v.MARION MILITARY INSTITUTE and Col. Thomas L. Tate, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants.

Case No. 2:11–cv–563–CG–B.

United States District Court,

S.D. Alabama,

Southern Division.

Nov. 5, 2012.

Mary E. Pilcher, Stein and Pilcher, LLC, Fairhope, AL, for Plaintiff.

Jennifer Stapleton Morgan, Mobile, AL, Mark T. Waggoner, Hand Arendall, L.L.C., Stephen Noble Fitts, Birmingham, AL, Matthew Beam, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

ORDER

CALLIE V.S. GRANADE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on the motion for summary judgment of the defendants, Marion Military Institute (“MMI”), and Col. Thomas L. Tate (“Tate”), in his individual and official capacities (collectively, “the defendants”). (Doc. 69). The defendants and the plaintiff, Reginald D. Marable, Sr. (“Marable”), have filed briefs and evidentiary materials in support of their respective positions, and the motion is now ripe for resolution. After careful consideration, the court concludes that the defendants' summary judgment motion is due to be GRANTED. For the reasons enumerated below, the defendants' Objections and Motion to Strike and for Sanctions is hereby DENIED as MOOT.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Marable has asserted the following claims: (1) a retaliation claim against MMI pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) a First Amendment retaliation claim against both defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) a claim against MMI for a hostile work environment pursuant to Title VII and § 1981; (4) an equal protection claim against both defendants pursuant to § 1983; (5) a failure to promote claim against MMI pursuant to Title VII and § 1981; and (6) a state law claim against MMI for negligent and wanton training and supervision. See Doc. 1 at 9–15. Marable seeks money damages, including punitive damages, and injunctive relief. Id. at 15–16.

MMI is an Alabama state college and military educational college. (Doc. 72 at 2). From August 2008 until May 2010, Marable was employed by MMI as a Trainer Advisor Counselor Officer (“TAC officer”). (Doc. 1 at 3, 7). His job responsibilities included training cadets in military and life skills, physical training, and providing general “counseling and assistance” to cadets. (Doc. 80–1 at 31–32). Marable was also responsible for cadet discipline for all cadets assigned to his company. Id. at 32. Marable was employed pursuant to a one-year employment contract for the 2008–09 academic year, which MMI renewed for the 2009–10 academic year. (Doc. 72 at 2, 3). It is undisputed that, at all relevant times, Marable was a probationary employee. (Doc. 72 at 11).

Marable's supervisor at MMI was the Commandant of Cadets, Col. Thomas L. Tate, who was “in charge of ensur[ing] the health, safety, welfare, and good order and discipline of the entire student population,” and who supervised all TAC officers. Id. at 2. MMI's president was Col. David Mollohan, USMC (ret.), who came to MMI in August 2009. Id.

Marable's Complaint paints an unflattering portrait of racial discrimination at MMI during the time he was employed there. Specifically, Marable asserts that he observed that African–American cadets were disciplined more harshly for less serious infractions while white cadets were disciplined less harshly for more serious infractions. (Doc. 1 at 4). Marable also alleges that Tate personally disciplined black students for “mingling” with white students and directed them to “stay with their own kind.” Id. He also claims that on one occasion he heard Tate say that his (Tate's) daughter “would never be with a nigger,” (Doc. 80–1 at 52), and recalls another occasion when he heard Tate refer to a black cadet as a “thug,” and when questioned about his use of the term said, “well he is black isn't he?” Id.

Marable claims that he addressed his concerns regarding the disparate treatment of African–American cadets with several colleagues and supervisors. (Doc 1 at 5). For example, he testified that he complained to Tate at some point before November 2009 about both the treatment of minority cadets and “his own personal feelings of discrimination.” (Doc. 80–1 at 42). Marable also asserts that in April 2010, he and another African–American faculty member approached Tate and Mollohan and “raised concerns regarding Tate and MMI's disparate treatment of African–American students.” (Doc. 1 at 5). He also claims that he had a conversation about Tate with Mollohan shortly after the 2009–10 academic year began. (Doc. 80–1 at 44).

While the first year of Marable's employment at MMI saw him receive high performance review ratings from Tate, see Doc. 84–1 at 1, his second year was more turbulent. In September 2009, Marable wrote a note to Tate regarding two cadets who displayed disrespectful conduct towards him, and referenced a confrontation with a third cadet, who had to be restrained. (Doc. 86–14). Marable wrote that “I WILL NOT TOLERATE (IT.) Cadets coming @ me. I WILL DEFEND myself this year.” Id. (emphasis in original). Later the same month, Marable was accused of hazing cadets and placed on administrative leave, (Doc. 85–2), pending an investigation which ultimately cleared him of the hazing accusations, but which found that he had violated MMI training policies. (Doc. 85–6 at 4–8). At the conclusion of the hazing investigation in October 2009, Mollohan issued a “letter of formal counseling” to Marable, which stated Mollohan's concerns over “a pattern of conduct that appears to include recurring failure to comply with orders given [and] policies established ...” (Doc. 70 at 226–27). One month later, a dispute arose between Tate and Marable over grooming standards for TAC officers, (Doc. 70–3 at 45–46), after which Mollohan stated that Marable “displayed a total disrespect for directives which reinforced my lack of trust and confidence in Mr. Marable's performance and conduct.” (Doc. 70–1 at 6). On November 29, 2009, Marable emailed Mollohan and requested mediation between himself and Tate. (Doc. 70–3 at 48). Mollohan directed Susan Stevenson, MMI's Executive Vice President, and Janice McGee, MMI's Director of Human Resources, to meet with Marable. (Doc. 80–1 at 54). Tate did not attend. Id.

In April 2010, Tate recommended to Mollohan against renewing Marable's employment contract for the following academic year. (Doc. 72 at 11). Mollohan agreed, and placed Marable on administrative leave with full pay and benefits until his contract terminated on May 31, 2010. (Doc. 1 at 7; Doc. 72 at 11).

Marable claims that the events of his troubled second year at MMI were the result of retaliation stemming from his “opposition and complaints regarding racially disparate enforcement of student policy and procedures at MMI.” (Doc. 1 at 5). He claims that the hazing allegations originated with Tate and were false. See Doc. 95 at 3, 19. He also claims that he was the only TAC officer who was required to report to the commandant's office upon his arrival on campus, (Doc. 80–1 at 54); that Tate did not allow him to take four days of FMLA leave when his mother-in-law was dying of cancer, id.; and that Tate reprimanded him for allegedly unauthorized leave and absences which, in fact, were legitimate. (Doc. 95 at 5).

Additionally, Marable alleges that in October 2009, he applied for an admissions counselor position at MMI for which he was well-qualified. (Doc. 1 at 5). Marable was interviewed as one of three finalists for the position in November 2009. Id.; Doc. 72 at 15. Marable claims that the interview panel considered him the best candidate for the position. (Doc. 80–1 at 38). Nevertheless, a white candidate, Harry Howell, who Marable asserts was less qualified for the position, was selected. (Doc. 1 at 6).

Shortly before his contract with MMI expired, Marable filed an EEOC charge alleging race and age discrimination and retaliation on May 27, 2010. (Doc. 70–3 at 40). Approximately 8 months later, on February 4, 2011, Marable filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama. (Doc. 70–13 at 2). Marable filed the instant lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on July 1, 2011. See Doc. 1 at 1. The case was then transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama on September 29, 2011. See Doc. 11.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The trial court's function is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “The mere existence of some evidence to support the non-moving party is not sufficient for denial of summary judgment; there must be ‘sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.’ ” Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. (internal citations omitted).

The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” SeeAnderson, 477 U.S. at 251–252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. O'Ferrell v. United States, 253 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir.2001). In evaluating the argument of the moving party, the court must view all evidence...