Maraglino v. California, Case No.: 1:20-cv-00826-SAB (PC)
| Decision Date | 19 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 1:20-cv-00826-SAB (PC) |
| Parties | DOROTHY GRACE MARIE MARAGLINO, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE TO THIS ACTION
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff Dorothy Grace Marie Maraglino is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's first amended complaint, filed September 28, 2020. (ECF No. 12.)
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that "fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or that "seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" is not sufficient, and "facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint and first amended complaint as true only for the purpose of the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Plaintiff was sentenced to Life Without the Possibility of Parole ("LWOP") under the felony murder rule. It was alleged that Plaintiff's participation was in the form of conspiracy without direct participation in the murder.
On December 2, 2015, Plaintiff arrived at Central California Women's Facility (CCWF). Plaintiff was assessed a 48 point custody level due to the LWOP sentence. Plaintiff was placed on "closed custody" status due to her LWOP sentence. Plaintiff was denied employment on the facility yard, prison industry authority, and joint venture due to her LWOP sentence. Plaintiff was also denied transfer to the California Institution for Women (CIW). Plaintiff has been denied participation in programming due to her LWOP sentence.
In July 2020, Plaintiff learned that LWOPs had parole eligibility until 1994. LWOP parole law was repealed in 1994 without legislative action.
On July 30, 2020, Plaintiff received a road to rehabilitation plan published by CDCR. The milestones can be achieved to rehabilitate, but LWOPs are now allowed to go to parole board hearings for parole consideration.
The first week of August 2020, Plaintiff discovered an article from "Parole Matters" with numerous court decisions that state it is unconstitutional to hold a rehabilitated person in prison.
While in protective custody following being raped, Plaintiff witnessed the prison's death row. The quality of life for prisoners on death row is better than Plaintiff's experience in general population. The crimes eligible for LWOP are also eligible for death row. Plaintiff's request during trial for a death row sentence was denied.
In May 2002, Plaintiff requested prison rehouse her on death row. On June 9, 2020, Warden M. Pallares wrote Plaintiff a letter denying her request to be housed on death row.
On August 26, 2020, CDCR sent a letter to Plaintiff regarding updates to Penal Code section 1170(d) stating it does not apply to LWOPs.
In August 2020, emergency covid release information was given to Plaintiff with notation that relief is not extended to LWOPs.
LWOP goes beyond mere classification and issued as a tool for discrimination. Discrimination against gender has moved beyond how a person looks physically. It's possible for an African American who appears White to be discriminated against by those who discover his/her ethnic background.
LWOP may not be physical identifiable but it is a "describing classification" that causes "inherently suspect" attitudes among prison staff, CDCR administration and the law makers of California. LWOPs are an arbitrary classification based on prejudices.
LWOP conjures up assumptions of a violently dangerous person who has taken another person's life. A significant percentage of LWOPs are non-killers. Actual killers who killed out of rage and not accidentally during a felony crime are sentenced to parole eligibility dates. They are called "lifers." Lifers qualify to be housed at CIW in two person cells. LWOPs are not. Lifers maywork for prison industry authority and joint venture, but LWOPs cannot. Lifers may earn time off their sentences while LWOPs cannot. Lifers qualify for 25 years and under as juvenile, while LWOPs are 18 years and under.
When an LWOP is a non-killer level 2 (lowest an LWOP can earn) and has been discipline free for years there is no reason other than discrimination to force them to work with no time relief, limited employment opportunities, limited program opportunities, and limited housing opportunities.
A review of Plaintiff's amended complaint reveals that Plaintiff did not sign the complaint under penalty of perjury. All filings submitted to the Court must bear the signature of the filing party. Local Rule 131; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). In such instance, the Court would generally strike the complaint from the record and direct that an amended complaint with an original signature under penalty of perjury be filed; however, in this case such amendment would be futile because for the reasons explained below Plaintiff has not and cannot state a cognizable 1983 claim.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause requires only that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Hartmann v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008).
The Constitution does not require individuals who are, in fact, differently situated, to be treated equally under the law. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (citations omitted); Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994) (). Thus, absent threshold allegations that Plaintiff is similarly situated to others who allegedly receive what he perceives as more favorable treatment, he fails to state a plausible equal protection claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 () Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); Hernandez v. Cate, 918 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1005-06 (C.D. Cal. 2013). Thus, to state an Equal Protection claim, Plaintiff must allege that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him based on her membership in a protected class. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1030; Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003).
LWOP inmates are not a suspect class. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (); see also 2013 WL 3456964. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege that LWOP inmates are similarly situated to non-LWOP inmates who are also housed in the general population. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005) (); see also Wilson v. Nesbeth, 341 Fed.Appx. 291, 293 (9th Cir. 2009) (). Although Plaintiff contends that CDCR denies access to jobs and programming with credit, Plaintiff fails to set forth further facts to plausibly show how or why she is similarly situated to non-LWOP inmates. Further, Plaintiff as an LWOP prisoner, is not similarly situated to prisoners who are eligible for parole hearings. See People v. Jacobs, 157 Cal. App. 3d 797, 803, 204 Cal.Rptr. 234 (1984) (); Thomas v. Arnold, No. 3:16-cv-02986-WQH-NLS, 2018 WL 279975, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2018) (...
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