Marais v. Chase Home Fin. LLC
Decision Date | 26 November 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 12-4248,12-4248 |
Parties | CHRISTINE MARAIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHASE HOME FINANCE LLC, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 13a0332p.06
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
No. 2:11-cv-00314—George C. Smith, District Judge.
Before: GILMAN and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.*
ARGUED: Troy J. Doucet, DOUCET & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Daniel C. Gibson, BRICKER & ECKLER LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Troy J. Doucet, Audra L. Tidball, DOUCET & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Daniel C. Gibson, Anne Marie Sferra, Nelson M. Reid, BRICKER & ECKLER LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.
Christine Marais appeals the dismissal of her claims under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., on Defendant Chase Home Finance(Chase)'s motion for judgment on the pleadings. We AFFIRM the dismissal of the TILA claim and REVERSE the dismissal of the RESPA claims.
This case arises from a residential loan servicing agreement between Marais, the obligor/borrower, and Chase, a servicer of her loan. The background facts set forth by the district court are undisputed:
PageID 626-28/R. 33.
Well after Marais filed the instant action and after Marais responded to Chase's motion for judgment on the pleadings, Chase for the first time identified the owner of Marais's loan, Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae).1
The district court granted Chase's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the TILA and RESPA claims, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, and dismissed the case in its entirety. PageID 626/R. 33.
This court reviews the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) applying the same de novo standard of review applicable to orders of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Poplar Creek Dev. Co. v. Chesapeake, 636 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir. 2011). "[A]ll well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." Id. (citation omitted); see also Coyer v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc., 701 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (6th Cir. 2012).
Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," it does require more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). And, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
The declared purpose of TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., is "to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices." Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412 (1998) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a)). Accordingly, TILA requires creditors/owners to "provide borrowers with clear and accurate disclosures of terms dealing with things like finance charges, annual percentage rates of interest, and the borrower's rights." Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631, 1632, 1635, 1638). TILA is a remedial statute and should be given "a broad, liberal construction in favor of the consumer." Klemmer v. Key Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 539 F.3d 349, 353 (6th Cir. 2008); Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio N.A., 163 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 1998).
15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (formerly § 1602(f)).
Because the debt was not initially payable to Chase, Marais has not alleged that Chase is or was a creditor of her loan.
Marais's claim is based on her interpretation of amendments to TILA's civil-liability provision, § 1640, and liability-of-assignees provision, § 1641. She contends that Chase's liability does not depend on its being a creditor.
The TILA amendments on which Marais relies were part of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 404(g), 123 Stat. 1632, 1658, which amended TILA in two ways. First, it added subsection (g) to § 1641, requiring that new owner-assignees of loans (referred to as "new creditors") notify the borrower of certain information about the assignment. Second, and directly at issue here, it added the phrase "subsection (f) or (g) of section 1641"2 (in bold type below) to the civil liability provision, § 1640.
Section 1640 now provides:
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (emphasis added).
Section 1641, addressing the liability of assignees, provides that any civil action that may be brought against a creditor may also be brought against a creditor's voluntary assignee only if the violation is apparent on the face of the disclosure statement:
15 U.S.C. §...
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