Maravilla-Diego v. MBM Constr. Ii, LLC

• Decision Date: 21 July 2015
• Docket Number: C.A. No. N14C-03-135 PRW
• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Parties: JAIME MARAVILLA-DIEGO Plaintiff, v. MBM CONSTRUCTION II, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; GENNA CONSTRUCTION, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; SAEZ AND SON'S LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendants. And SAEZ AND SON'S LLC, Defendant/ Third Party Plaintiff v. GENNA CONTRACTING, INC. Third Party Defendant.

JAIME MARAVILLA-DIEGO Plaintiff, v. MBM CONSTRUCTION II, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company;

GENNA CONSTRUCTION, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company;

SAEZ AND SON'S LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendants.

And SAEZ AND SON'S LLC, Defendant/ Third Party Plaintiff v. GENNA CONTRACTING, INC. Third Party Defendant.

C.A. No. N14C-03-135 PRW

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

Submitted: April 23, 2015

July 21, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Upon Defendant Saez and Son's LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment

GRANTED.

Kyle Kemmer, Esquire, Shelsby & Leoni, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiff.

Mary E. Sherlock, Esquire, Weber Gallagher Simpson Stapleton Fires & Newby LLP, Attorney for Defendant MBM Construction II, LLC.

Louis J. Rizzo, Esquire, Reger Rizzo & Darnall LLP, Attorney for Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff Saez and Son's LLC.

Gerald J. Hager, Esquire, Margolis Edelstein, Attorney for Third Party Defendant Genna Contracting, Inc.

WALLACE, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Jaime Maravilla-Diego ("Maravilla-Diego"), suffered a work-place injury while employed by Defendant, Saez & Son's, LLC ("Saez & Son"). Saez & Son did not carry workers' compensation insurance. Under 19 Del. C. § 2374(e), Maravilla-Diego therefore had a choice between two avenues of relief: compensation under the workers' compensation framework, or a claim for damages at law. Initially, Maravilla-Diego filed a Petition to Determine Compensation Due with the Industrial Accident Board ("IAB"). But he subsequently withdrew that Petition and filed a negligence suit against Saez & Son and other third parties. While the negligence claims were pending, Maravilla-Diego again attempted to pursue compensation through a number of IAB filings. Ultimately, the IAB found that his efforts were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Saez & Son now seeks summary judgment on the negligence claims. They say that the IAB's final finding precludes Maravilla-Diego's negligence claim under the election of remedies doctrine. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds Maravilla-Diego elected a remedy under the workers' compensation framework and is therefore barred from pursuing damages at law. Saez & Son's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Maravilla-Diego was injured at work on March 21, 2012. He was installing apartment siding and fell 40 feet to the ground from a bucket lift, sustaining multiple injuries. He subsequently instituted proceedings both before the IAB and this Court to recover for his injuries.

A. IAB Proceedings

Maravilla-Diego first filed a Petition to Determine Compensation Due ("First Petition") on January 29, 2013 before the IAB seeking compensation from Saez & Son for his injuries.¹

The IAB held a hearing on June 26, 2013 to determine the nature of the employment relationship between Maravilla-Diego and Saez & Son. The Board issued a written decision on July 10, 2013 finding that Maravilla-Diego was Saez & Son's employee, not an independent contractor.² The Board also awarded Maravilla-Diego attorney's fees.

In December, 2013, Maravilla-Diego inexplicably withdrew the First Petition.³

Yet, beginning in early April, 2014, Maravilla-Diego resumed filing applications before the IAB. He first requested that the IAB order Saez & Son to post a $100,000 bond to cover certain medical expenses. The IAB denied that request on April 15, 2014 because Maravilla-Diego had no Petition pending before it at that time.⁴ In its Order denying Maravilla-Diego's bond request, the IAB acknowledged that Saez & Son did not maintain workers' compensation insurance.⁵ The IAB further noted that Maravilla-Diego was past the two-year statute of limitations on his workers' compensation claim.⁶

Despite the IAB's finding, on April 16, 2014, Maravilla-Diego filed a Second Petition to Determine Compensation Due ("Second Petition") for the same injury.⁷ On May 6, 2014, he also appealed the IAB's decision denying the requested bond order.⁸ This Court has stayed that appeal indefinitely, pending the resolution of this matter.⁹

Saez & Son filed a motion to dismiss the Second Petition on the grounds that it was filed outside of the 2-year statute of limitations for workers' compensation claims.¹⁰ On July 14, 2014, the IAB granted that motion.¹¹ In its decision, the IAB rejected Maravilla-Diego's argument that he had mistakenly withdrawn the First Petition and denied his request to reinstate the First Petition.¹²

B. Maravilla-Diego's Negligence Claims

After withdrawing his First Petition, but before proceeding with his other numerous workers' compensation filings, Maravilla-Diego instituted this negligence action on March 17, 2014 against his Saez & Son and other contractors, including MBM Construction II, LLC ("MBM"), Genna Construction, LLC ("Genna Construction"), and A.P. Croll & Son, Inc. ("A.P. Croll").¹³

Saez & Son now moves for summary judgment on Maravilla-Diego's negligence claims. They contend his pursuit of compensation under the DelawareWorkers Compensation Act bars his negligence claim under the election of remedies doctrine.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Delaware Superior Court Rule 56, summary judgment may only be granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¹⁴ The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of making such showing; if it is successful, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is a material fact in dispute.¹⁵ If there is a material fact in dispute, or if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of the law, summary judgment is inappropriate.¹⁶ The Court views all facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.¹⁷

IV. THE PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

Saez & Son argues it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Maravilla-Diego's negligence claim is barred because he elected a remedy under the Delaware Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"). According to Saez & Son,the moment of election occurred once Maravilla-Diego obtained a final decision on the merits from the IAB that his Second Petition was time-barred.¹⁸

In response, Maravilla-Diego and MBM contend Maravilla-Diego's negligence claim is not barred by the election of remedies doctrine. They argue that 19 Del. C. § 2374(e) permits an employee to initially pursue benefits under the Act against an uninsured employer and then later decide to pursue damages at law if there is no "viable" avenue of recovery under the Act. In their view, because Maravilla-Diego did not recover—and, they believe, could not have recovered—anything under the Act, he made no election and was therefore entitled to sue for damages. Maravilla-Diego posits that Saez & Son has no company-owned property, assets, or cash available with which to post bond, so he had no viable avenue of recovery under the Act.

V. DISCUSSION

A. The Language of 19 Del. C. § 2374(e) Permits Recovery of Damages at Law Against an Uninsured Employer.

Generally, the Act provides an employee the exclusive remedy for a workplace injury against his or her employer.¹⁹ But if an employer violates the Act'smandatory insurance coverage provisions,²⁰ the Act eliminates the employer's immunity from personal injury claims at law.²¹ Title 19 of the Delaware Code, section 2374(e) provides:

(e) Whoever, being an employer, refuses or neglects to comply with the sections referred to in subsection (a) of this section on a continuing basis after notice by the Department of Labor shall be subject to a civil penalty:

[. . . ]

(3) The employer shall also be liable to the employer's injured employees during continuance of such neglect or refusal, either for compensation under this chapter or in an action at law for damages.²²

Should an injured employee choose to pursue damages at law, the employer is deprived of some of its common-law defenses, such as comparative fault and assumption of the risk.²³

It is undisputed that Saez & Son failed to maintain workers' compensation insurance here. This Court has previously determined in Lyon v. In Bocca AlLuppo Trattoria,²⁴ that under § 2374(e) "the employee may opt for compensation through the 19 Del. C. § 2301 et seq. framework, or may choose to pursue an action at law where certain otherwise available defenses may not be raised."²⁵ Thus, Maravilla-Diego "had the option of pursuing a remedy at law for damages or a claim for workers' compensation relief."²⁶

B. Maravilla-Diego Elected a Remedy Under 19 Del. C. § 2374(e) by Obtaining a Final Judgment from the IAB that His Claim Was Time-Barred.

Saez & Son raises the election of remedies doctrine as a defense. In response, Maravilla-Diego claims he has not elected a remedy under either his compensation or negligence claims because he has not yet recovered under either. The Court must therefore decide, with this procedural history, if the negligence suit must be dismissed because Maravilla-Diego elected a remedy rooted in compensation under § 2374(e).

1. The election of remedies doctrine.

The doctrine of election of remedies arises where a claimant has two or more inconsistent remedies available to redress a single right.²⁷ The claimant must"elect" to pursue one of them to the exclusion of the others and may not later pursue the other inconsistent remedies.²⁸ The election of remedies doctrine applies to § 2374(e) because the employee must choose between recovering compensation under the Act or damages at law.²⁹

A party elects a remedy when "he makes any decisive act, 'with knowledge of his rights and of the facts, indicating an intent to pursue one remedy rather than the other.'"³⁰ There are limitations to this rule. For instance, a party who mistakenly pursues what is otherwise a legally unavailable avenue of relief does not make the "type of decisive act that would trigger the...