March v. Committee of Bar Examiners

• Citation: 67 Cal.2d 718,63 Cal.Rptr. 399,433 P.2d 191
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Decision Date: 16 November 1967
• Parties: , 433 P.2d 191 Herbert MARCH, Petitioner, v. COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS, Respondent. L.A. 29370.

Page 399

63 Cal.Rptr. 399

67 Cal.2d 718, 433 P.2d 191

Herbert MARCH, Petitioner, v. COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS, Respondent.

L.A. 29370.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Nov. 16, 1967.

[433 P.2d 192] [67 Cal.2d 719] John T. McTernan, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

Kenneth D. McCloskey and John A. Mitchell for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Herbert March, seeks review of the action of the Committee of Bar Examiners in refusing to certify him to this court for admission to practice law in California. (Bus. & Prof.Code § 6066.)

The committee's refusal is based upon its conclusion that he is not a person of good moral character, as is required for certification under subdivision (c) of section 6060 of the Business and Professions Code, that he has not shown himself possessed of good moral character, has not removed any and all reasonable suspicion concerning his moral fitness, and has not shown himself entitled to the high regard and confidence of the public within the meaning of Rule X, § 101, of the Rules Regulating Admission to Practice Law. ¹

The committee based its conclusion on the following findings: (1) petitioner testified falsely under oath before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (hereinafter called the Dies Committee) in November 1939 when questioned by Congressman Martin Dies; (2) on June 17, 1959, while petitioner was a member of Local 108 of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association he made numerous false statements, not under oath, to a union trial committee and permitted his counsel at that hearing to read from the transcript of his testimony before the Dies Committee; (3) prior to January 1961 and again in March 1961 petitioner mailed an appeal from the union committee's decision to executives of the union and made numerous false statements in this document; (4) petitioner did not mention these matters in May 1961 when he filled out a registration form as a law student, and he answered in the negative question 13(g) asking whether there was any incident of a derogatory nature, not called for by the prior questions on the form, which might have some bearing on his character and fitness to practice law; (5) in April 1965 petitioner answered in the negative a similar question on his application for examination and admission to practice law and did not mention the matters related in (1), (2) and (3) above.

This court recently had occasion to set forth the rules relating to the review of proceedings of the type involved here. In Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1966) 65 Cal.2d 447, 450--453, 55 Cal.Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76, we stated that the findings of the committee are given great weight but are not binding on this court and that the burden of showing that the findings are not supported by the evidence or that the committee's action is erroneous or unlawful is on the petitioner. This court examines and weighs the evidence and passes upon its sufficiency, and any reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of the petitioner. We stated that the fundamental question to be determined is the same whether the matter at issue relates to an applicant for admission or an attorney upon whom discipline has been imposed: Is the petitioner a fit and proper person to Throughout these proceedings petitioner has freely and frankly admitted that he testified falsely before the Dies Committee and in the union proceedings and that the appeal submitted by him contained false statements. He conceded--indeed, almost insisted--throughout the hearings before the bar examiners that he acted improperly and unjustifiably in making the false statements but asserted with equal vehemence that although he felt he was justified in his conduct at the time he acted, he no longer holds this view and that his study of law contributed significantly to the change in his outlook. Petitioner denies that he attempted to deceive the committee in filling out the forms referred to above.

[433 P.2d 193] be permitted to practice law, and the answer to this usually turns upon whether he has committed or is likely to continue to commit acts of moral turpitude.

Initially, we must determine whether petitioner has met the burden of making a prima facie showing of good moral character. He presented to the committee letters from 13 persons attesting to his good moral character. Most of the testimonials were from attorneys and from persons who had known petitioner for 16 to 30 years. Four of the writers were aware of petitioner's misconduct before the Dies Committee and the union trial committee. These 13 letters are overwhemingly commendatory and speak in the most laudatory terms of petitioner's moral character and ability. A few excerpts will suffice.

An attorney who had known petitioner for over 30 years and who had been a member of the Illinois bar for more than 45 years wrote that petitioner was a man of unquestioned honesty, integrity and responsibility, and recommended him to the committee unreservedly.

Another attorney, who had known petitioner for 16 years while petitioner was involved in the labor movement wrote, 'I can express without qualification the personal judgment that I have always considered him a person of total personal integrity and honesty, with a very strong sense of responsibility toward the obligations of any position which he held. He worked in the labor movement during a period of great turbulence and wide diversity of opinion, both within and without the labor movement, as to the role and tactics of the labor movement in our society. As an attorney representing a number of unions, * * * I can recall specific occasions when leaders, in his union and in others, holding views sharply at variance with his on matters of union and public policy, have gone out of their way to indicate their great respect for him as an individual and their complete confidence, despite any differences of opinion between them, in his personal honesty and personal commitment to the welfare of the union members whos representation was his responsibility. * * * (I)t would be my firm conclusion that, as an attorney, Mr. March would function with complete honesty and with a firm dedication to the best interests of his clients. I sincerely believe that he would be a credit to the Bar.'

A professor of economics who had known petitioner for 16 years wrote that petitioner was generous and kind, constantly helping others with his time and money, had all the attributes of a good citizen, such as respect for the law and a strong belief in the democratic process, and that he was a man of strong character, honest, dependable, a hard worker, very well self-disciplined and organized, and a thoroughly decent and respectable person.

At the time of the hearings petitioner was employed by a law firm as an investigator and researcher. His employer, an attorney who had known him for seven years and who was aware of the false statements made by him, wrote: 'I am thoroughly convinced of his honesty; I am confident that he will be completely reliable in meeting all of his obligations to his clients and to the courts if he is admitted. * * * He is personally dedicated to the support of our constitutional form of government and to the achievement of such changes as he Another attorney, who had known petitioner for 24 years and who was also aware of his false statements, wrote, 'In his (petitioner's) work in the Union, he was always ready to place principle and the welfare of the organization ahead of his personal interests. He stuck by his positions when he thought them right, no matter how unpopular they were and many times at personal sacrifice. His approach to the problems of the Union, * * * was always one of seeking a solution which served a broad social or organizational interest. I feel that I can state with confidence that he could be relied upon to place the interest of his clients and the public welfare far above any consideration of personal gain, and to serve in what I conceive to be the highest tradition of the Bar.' He concluded that although his letter was written at the specific request of petitioner's attorney, even if this had not been the case, he would have felt he was rendering a service to the bar by volunteering the judgments expressed therein.

[433 P.2d 194] believes in through constitutional processes. * * * While Mr. March, of course, wishes to make a living out of the practice of the law, he is much more concerned with using the law as a means of serving the needs of people than he is with any great personal advantage of his own. He sees the law as a means of making our democratic processes work and work effectively.' ²

There are other letters, equally commendatory, but it is unnecessary to quote from them in order to demonstrate that petitioner has made the prima facie showing required of him.

Petitioner has led a colorful and controversial life. He played an active role in the earlier, turbulent days of the labor movement, was a member of the Communist Party for many years, and was arrested numerous times in connection with these activities. The committee specifically found that his involvement in the labor movement and the Communist Party and his several arrests did not justify a conclusion that he was unfit for certification; we refer to these matters, therefore, only for the purpose of describing petitioner's background and the context in which his false statements were made.

Petitioner was 54 years old at the time of the hearings before the bar examiners. He had been married for 34 years and his three children. One son is a nuclear physicist, another was working on his doctorate degree at the time of the hearings, and a third was a university student. Petitioner began the study of law in 1961 at the age of 48, was graduated cum laude from Southwestern University School of Law in 1965, and passed the bar examination given in August of that year.

At the age of 16 he joined the Young...