Marchant v. Cook
| Citation | 967 P.2d 551 |
| Decision Date | 25 November 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-84,98-84 |
| Parties | Joyce M. MARCHANT, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. John Ronald COOK and Andrea Leone Cook, his wife, Appellees (Defendants). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Robert A. Hampe, Cheyenne, for Appellant.
Jack B. Speight, Robert T. McCue, and Martin L. Hardsocg of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, LLC, Cheyenne, for Appellees.
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, * JJ.
Appellant Joyce Marchant appeals from the summary judgment that was granted in favor of Appellees John Ronald Cook (Ron) and Andrea Cook.
We affirm.
The appellant presents four issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court [err] in granting Defendants['] motion for summary judg[ ]ment on Plaintiff's claim for fraud?
2. Did the trial court [err] in granting Defendants['] motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for conversion?
3. Did the trial court [err] in granting Defendants['] motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for undue influence?
4. Did the trial court [err] in not allowing Plaintiff to amend the complaint?
This case involves a controversy over the disposition of the assets that belonged to John Cook. John was married to June, and they had four children: Ron, Joyce, Shirley Brooks, and Jane Eickbush. John and June legally separated in February 1969. Ron married Andrea, and they had a daughter, Jayna Lybeck.
On October 17, 1980, John executed a revocable trust agreement and a pour-over will. In the trust agreement, he identified himself as the settlor and appointed himself as the trustee of the trust created by that agreement. He also appointed Ron to serve as the successor trustee in the event that he was not able to fulfill the trustee's duties. In his will, John named Ron as the personal representative of his estate. He conveyed the following assets to the trust: (1) stock in Cook-McCann Concrete, Inc.; (2) a fifty-percent partnership interest in rental property located at 1816 Fremont in Cheyenne; (3) a fifty-percent interest in a joint venture called J & J Partnership; and (4) unspecified certificates of deposit and savings accounts.
In 1983, John and his partner sold the J & J Partnership property. John did not place the sale proceeds into the trust. In 1985, he transferred his Cook-McCann stock to Ron. John amended his trust agreement on May 23, 1985, to reflect the stock transfer but made the disposition of the stock contingent upon Ron's surviving him. The Cook-McCann shareholders approved the stock transfer on June 24, 1985. John deeded his fifty-percent interest in the property located at 1816 Fremont to the partnership entity on May 24, 1989, and, as a result, the appellees, who owned the remaining fifty-percent interest, became the sole owners of the property.
John executed a second amendment to the trust agreement on November 14, 1989, in which he directed the trustee to divide his trust estate, upon his death, equally among his four children and to distribute it over a five-year period. He also deleted all mention of the Cook-McCann stock and the two partnership interests. On March 16, 1993, John executed a third amendment to his trust agreement in which he instructed the trustee to divide his trust estate, upon his death, equally among his four children and to distribute it one year after his death.
John died on February 13, 1995. Ron, acting as the personal representative of John's estate, petitioned to file John's will without probate or administration because the estate did not contain property that would be subject to probate. The petition and a copy of John's will were sent to each heir. John's attorney also sent letters to each heir, explaining that, during his lifetime, John disposed of all his assets that would have been subject to probate.
John had two bank accounts at the time of his death. One account had a balance of approximately $106,000 and was held jointly, with the right of survivorship, by John, Ron, and Jayna. The other account was owned jointly, with the right of survivorship, by John, Ron, and Shirley, and that account had a balance of $5,789.67. Ron, Shirley, and Jayna agreed to gratuitously distribute the proceeds of the accounts as follows: One-half to June; and one-half in equal shares to John and June's four children. The appellant, consequently, received $13,510.42.
On May 3, 1996, the appellant filed a petition for the probate of John's will and requested that the district court issue letters testamentary. Ron objected to the appellant's petition because the estate did not contain assets that were subject to probate. The appellant subsequently withdrew her petition.
On August 16, 1996, the appellant filed a complaint against the appellees that included a claim for conversion and/or an accounting of the assets in John's estate and trust. The district court dismissed the complaint because the appellant failed to state a claim for conversion and granted the appellant leave to file an amended complaint. The appellant filed the first amended complaint in which she stated two causes of action: (1) fraud and/or misrepresentation; and (2) conversion and/or accounting.
The appellees filed a motion for a summary judgment on September 19, 1997, asserting that they were entitled to be awarded a judgment as a matter of law on both of the appellant's causes of action. The district court held a hearing, and, subsequently, issued a decision letter and an order granting a summary judgment in favor of the appellees. The appellant perfected her appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court.
A summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to be awarded a judgment as a matter of law. Covington v. W.R. Grace-Conn., Inc., 952 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Wyo.1998). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an essential element of a cause of action or defense that the parties have asserted. Thunder Hawk By and Through Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 844 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Wyo.1992); Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533, 535 (Wyo.1991). The movant bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facia case for summary judgment. Weber v. McCoy, 950 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo.1997); Thunder Hawk By and Through Jensen, 844 P.2d at 1047. If the movant carries his burden, the party who is opposing the motion for a summary judgment must present specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Weber, 950 P.2d at 551; Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo.1987).
The Wyoming Supreme Court evaluates the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as the district court employed and used. Covington, 952 P.2d at 1106. We examine the record in the light most favorable to the party who opposed the motion for a summary judgment, and we give that party all the favorable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the record. Id. We do not accord deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. Ahearn v. Tri-County Federal Savings Bank, 948 P.2d 896, 897 (Wyo.1997).
The appellant asserts that the district court erred by granting a summary judgment in favor of the appellees on her fraud and/or misrepresentation claim. The district court concluded that the appellant had "wholly failed to come forward with any facts to support her claim or to show any material issue of fact."
"In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." W.R.C.P. 9(b).
Fraud is established when a plaintiff demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the defendant made a false representation intended to induce action by the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believed the representation to be true; and (3) the plaintiff relied on the false representation and suffered damages.
Jurkovich v. Tomlinson, 905 P.2d 409, 411 (Wyo.1995). See also M & A Construction Corp. v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 936 P.2d 451, 457 (Wyo.1997). When a party who is asserting a fraud claim is confronted with a motion for a summary judgment, that party must present clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists. McKenney v. Pacific First Federal Savings Bank of Tacoma, Washington, 887 P.2d 927, 929 (Wyo.1994); Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 466 (Wyo.1979).
The district court determined that the appellant had failed to allege, or to proffer evidence to establish, the elements of her fraud claim. The district court stated in part:
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint fails to allege any misrepresentation made to Plaintiff or, for that matter, to her father. Neither does Plaintiff allege any misrepresentation to herself or to her father which she or he believed to be true and which was, in fact, not true. Neither has Plaintiff presented any evidence what[so]ever of any such misrepresentation or reliance thereon in her response to Defendants' motion.
The appellant argues that she did submit evidence to demonstrate that the appellees made a false representation. She states in her appellate brief: "This false representation revolves around Decedent's mental state and Defendants['] intentional actions." The appellant maintains that the medical records and the testimony of John's longtime girlfriend confirmed that John's mental capacity was compromised and that he was, therefore, susceptible to being influenced by others.
The bulk of the statements in the appellant's fraud claim, as set forth in her first amended complaint, pertained to John's deteriorating mental and physical health. Only two paragraphs of her cause of action addressed the appellees' alleged fraudulent actions.
19. THAT before March, 1988, John Cook exhibited head pain,...
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