De Marcos v. Overholser, 8441.

• Decision Date: 09 August 1943
• Docket Number: No. 8441.,8441.
• Citation: 78 US App. DC 131,137 F.2d 698
• Parties: DE MARCOS v. OVERHOLSER.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

78 US App. DC 131, 137 F.2d 698 (1943)

DE MARCOS v. OVERHOLSER.

No. 8441.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Argued June 4, 1943.

Decided August 9, 1943.

Mr. Llewellyn C. Thomas, of Washington, D. C., (appointed by this court), for appellant.

Mr. Charles B. Murray, Assistant United States Attorney, of Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Edward M. Curran, United States Attorney, and John P. Burke, Assistant United States Attorney, both of Washington, D. C., appeared on the brief, for appellee.

Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and EDGERTON and ARNOLD, Associate Justices.

ARNOLD, Associate Justice.

Appellant, who is confined in St. Elizabeths Hospital on the ground that he is of unsound mind and that his release would be dangerous, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court dismissed the petition and discharged the writ. The sole ground of error presented by counsel, appointed to represent the indigent petitioner in this court, is that the court failed to submit the issue of appellant's sanity to the Commission on Mental Health in the District of Columbia.

Petitioner repudiated the argument of his counsel and presented independent briefs and arguments, on his own behalf. However, all the issues which petitioner raises independently (except his assertion of the right to a jury trial¹) have been decided adversely to him by this court in an appeal from the discharge of a former writ of habeas corpus which he filed in 1940,² and we need not consider them again.

Therefore, the only questions for consideration on this appeal are (1) whether in the interests of a fair trial of a habeas corpus proceeding brought to release an alleged insane person from confinement, it is the duty of the court of its own motion to call for and to obtain a report and recommendation from the Commission on Mental Health, and (2) whether that duty is affected by the fact that petitioner does not request or desire the recommendation of the Commission.

There can be no question that it is desirable for the court to utilize the services of the Commission on Mental Health in a habeas corpus proceeding where the issue is the sanity of the petitioner. Habeas corpus is a proper remedy to challenge the continued confinement of persons who claim to be restored to mental health.³ Yet the right to bring habeas corpus would be of little value to an indigent person unless expert testimony were available to him to rebut the opinion evidence of the staff of the institution who believed he should be continued in custody.

No careful judge is likely to assume the responsibility of allowing an alleged insane person to go free when the sole expert opinion in the record advises him that such a course is dangerous to the community. In this case the possible danger is apparent. Petitioner is alleged to be the victim of paranoia. Such patients are sometimes called the aristocracy of the insane because they are often highly intelligent and extremely skillful in handling their affairs to obtain the distorted objectives of their abnormal minds. Obsessed with the delusion of persecution they may become highly dangerous. In cases where the symptoms of paranoia are mild the patient may be safely left to the treatment of relatives and friends. Yet no judge would be justified in using his own amateur judgment in classifying a paranoiac as a mild case, against the opinion of psychiatrists who were holding him in custody, unless he were supported by the opinion of some independent expert.

Therefore, where an indigent confined in a mental hospital seeks habeas corpus it is more important to provide him with an independent psychiatric examination than to give him independent counsel. If such an examination is demanded and denied, the right of an indigent alleged insane person to petition for habeas corpus is entirely meaningless.

It follows that a fair trial cannot be given in a case like this unless the court is permitted to avail itself of every opportunity which the law allows to consult scientific experts. No funds are provided to employ private psychiatrists to examine the petitioner and the court has no power to command their professional services. If, therefore, the statute establishing the Commission on Mental Health permits the court to resort to the expert opinion of that body, it ought to be prompt to exercise that right when in a proper case it is requested to do so.

The statute⁴ providing for the Commission on Mental Health was passed in 1938 in recognition of the fact that the assistance of unbiased experts was essential to assist courts in dealing with insanity cases. The duty of the Commission, as stated in the statute, is to "examine alleged insane persons, inquire into the affairs of such persons, and the affairs of those persons legally liable as hereinafter provided for the support of said alleged insane persons, and make reports and recommendations to the court as to the necessity of treatment, the commitment, and payment of the expense of maintenance and treatment of such insane persons." The Commission is...