Marcus v. Young

• Decision Date: 20 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-510,94-510
• Citation: 538 N.W.2d 285
• Parties: 103 Ed. Law Rep. 1213 William MARCUS, Appellant, v. Douglas YOUNG and State of Iowa, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 285

538 N.W.2d 285

103 Ed. Law Rep. 1213

William MARCUS, Appellant, v.Douglas YOUNG and State of Iowa, Appellees.

No. 94-510.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 20, 1995.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 25, 1995.

Davis L. Foster, Iowa City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Charles S. Lavorato and Christie J. Scase, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and CARTER, SNELL, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.

SNELL, Justice.

This case involves the release of plaintiff's student records at the University of Iowa by the legal custodian pursuant to a subpoena.Plaintiff claims he was harmed by the release of his records and asserts an action for damages based on negligence.He claims his negligence action is authorized by statute and administrative rule.Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's alleged cause of action is not recognized in law by statute or rule.The district court granted defendants' motion.We affirm.

I.Factual and Procedural Background

William Marcus, Ph.D., was hired as an expert witness in a products liability case, Carroll v. Litton Systems, Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969(W.D.N.C.Oct. 29, 1990).Marcus was once a medical student at the University of Iowa but was dismissed for poor academic performance.During the course of discovery in the Carroll case, the defendant's attorney subpoenaed Marcus' academic and employment records.University of Iowa officials received a federal subpoena and the university's counsel, Julia Mears, reviewed it and decided the university should comply with it.

Prior to producing the records, Mears telephoned Marcus and informed him of the university's intent to comply with the subpoena and asked him if he wished to receive a copy of the documents.Mears subsequently sent Marcus a copy of the records in question.Douglas M. Young, controller and secretary for the university, acting upon the advice of Mears, produced the subpoenaed records.Marcus was subsequently terminated as an expert witness in the Carroll case and did not collect his expert witness fee.

In June of 1992, Marcus brought a suit against Young and the State of Iowa arguing the release of his academic records constituted a violation of Iowa Code section 22.7(1991)andIowa Administrative Code rule 681-17.13(22)(1988).Prior to trial, Young and the State filed three motions for summary judgment.The district court denied all three motions, but the judge who denied the third motion determined neither of the court's two previous rulings had addressed the issue of whether Iowa Code chapter 22 provides a statutory duty which could give rise to a private negligence action and general tort damages.Therefore, on the court's own motion, it set a date for hearing on the issue.Following the hearing, the trial court determined neither chapter 22 nor rule 681-17.13(22) of the Iowa Administrative Code give rise to a private remedy for a violation of those provisions.

Marcus has appealed the district court's ruling.On appeal, Marcus asserts chapter 22 and rule 681-17.13(22) provide a legal duty to maintain the confidentiality of student records, and individuals may bring private suits for breach of this duty because the legislature's goal in enacting chapter 22 was not only to provide for the availability of public records, but also to protect the confidentiality of certain documents.Marcus also asserts chapter 22 and rule 681-17.13(22) give rise to a private cause of action because (1)legislative intent implies the existence of a private remedy; and (2) a private cause of action is consistent with the underlying purposes of the statute.

II.Standard and Scope of Review

When reviewing a trial court grant of a motion for summary judgment, we consider the evidence in the entire record in the light most favorable to the non-movant and determine whether there exists any genuine issue as to any material fact.Ciha v. Irons, 509 N.W.2d 492, 493(Iowa1993);West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Iowa Iron Works, Inc., 503 N.W.2d 596, 598(Iowa1993).We will affirm a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment if no issue as to any material fact exists such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Ciha, 509 N.W.2d at 493;West Bend Mut. Ins., 503 N.W.2d at 598;Engstrom v. State, 461 N.W.2d 309, 313(Iowa1990).We review the district court's ruling for errors of law.Iowa R.App. P. 4;Ciha, 509 N.W.2d at 493;Keller v. State, 475 N.W.2d 174, 179(Iowa1991);Bates v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 467 N.W.2d 255, 257(Iowa1991).

III.Existence of Legal Duty or Private Cause of Action

Iowa Code section 22.7, "Confidential Records," provides in pertinent part:

The following public records shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise ordered by a court, by the lawful custodian of the records, or by another person duly authorized to release such information:

1.Personal information in records regarding a student, prospective student, or former student maintained, created, collected or assembled by or for a school corporation or educational institution maintaining such records.

Marcus asserts Young and the State were negligent in releasing his student records.Negligence is a common-law tort which we define as "conduct that 'falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.' "Seeman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 37(Iowa1982)(quotingRestatement (Second) of Torts§ 282(1965)).The elements of a negligence claim include existence of a duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect others, failure to conform to that standard, proximate cause, and damages.Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381, 385(Iowa1984)(citingW. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts§ 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971)), overruled on other grounds, Gail v. Clark, 410 N.W.2d 662, 669(Iowa1987).Thus, a standard of care or duty is a necessary element of negligence.Seeman, 322 N.W.2d at 37.

In order for a negligence claim to lie for violation of a statutory duty, such provision must be made, either explicitly or implicitly, by the statute.Id. at 37-38.In the absence of such a provision, the violation of a statutory duty does not give rise to a private cause of action.Id. at 38.

Upon examination of chapter 22 of the Iowa Codeandrule 681-17.13(22) of the Iowa Administrative Code, it is clear there is no such provision present explicitly creating a private cause of action for the negligent release of confidential information.Iowa Code ch. 22;Iowa Admin.Code r. 681-17.13(22).The question then becomes whether such a cause of action may be implied from the statute.Seeman, 322 N.W.2d at 38.In answering this question, Iowa has adopted a four-factor test established by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash.Id.(citingCort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26(1975)).The test adopted in Seeman is as follows:

1.Is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted?

2.Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to either create or deny such a remedy?

3.Would allowing such a cause of action be consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation?

4.Would the private cause of action intrude into an area over which the federal government or a state administrative agency holds exclusive jurisdiction?

Id.;see alsoShidler v. All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., 775 F.2d 917, 921-25(8th Cir.1985);Bates, 467 N.W.2d at 259;Engstrom, 461 N.W.2d at 313;Unertl v. Bezanson, 414 N.W.2d 321, 325(Iowa1987).

After applying the four-factor test to this case, the district court held the second and third elements required a finding that no private cause of action exists.On examining the first factor, the court held "it can be persuasively argued that [Marcus] is protected by the statute in light of the special provisions relating to confidentiality."Regarding the fourth factor, the district court held such an action would not intrude into any area over which the federal government or a state agency has exclusive jurisdiction.

After close examination, we hold the plaintiff's case does not satisfy the requirements under the second and third elements and therefore affirm the district court's grant of the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis neither Iowa Code chapter 22 nor Iowa Administrative Code rule 681-17.13(22) provide a private remedy.

IV.Legislative Intent

Lord Coke once remarked

If I am asked a question of common law I should be ashamed if I could not immediately answer it; but if I am asked a question of statute law I should be ashamed to answer it without referring to the Statute Book.

1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction§ 28.01 (5th ed. 1993).In order to determine whether Iowa Code chapter 22 or rule 681-17.13(22) provides for an implied private cause of action, we must focus primarily on their texts.LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bonnecroy, 304 N.W.2d 422, 424(Iowa1981).Rules of statutory construction are to be applied only when the explicit terms of a statute are ambiguous.Heins v. City of Cedar Rapids, 231 N.W.2d 16, 18(Iowa1975).Precise unambiguous language will be given its plain and rational meaning in light of the subject matter.Maguire v. Fulton, 179 N.W.2d 508, 510(Iowa1970).Therefore, it is not the province of the court to speculate as to probable legislative intent without regard to the wording used in the statute, and any determination must be based upon what the legislature actually said, rather than what it might or should have said.Iowa R.App. P. 14(f)(13);State v. Brustkern, 170 N.W.2d 389, 392(Iowa1969).

In examining the statutes at hand, we are to be guided by the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"--expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.State v. Flack, 251 Iowa 529, 533, 101 N.W.2d 535, 538(196...