Mares v. State

• Decision Date: 11 November 1971
• Docket Number: No. 9287,9287
• Citation: 1971 NMSC 106,83 N.M. 225,490 P.2d 667
• Parties: Steven MARES, Petitioner, v. STATE of New Mexico, Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 667

490 P.2d 667

83 N.M. 225

Steven MARES, Petitioner, v. STATE of New Mexico, Respondent.

No. 9287.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Nov. 11, 1971.

Stanley F. Frost, Tucumcari, for petitioner.

David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., C. Emery Cuddy, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for respondent.

OPINION

STEPHENSON, Justice.

Petitioner was tried and convicted of entering a dwelling with intent to commit a felony while armed with a deadly weapon. He appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Mares, 82 N.M. 682, 486 P.2d 618 (Ct.App.No. 561, decided May 28, 1971). We granted certiorari and reverse.

Following commission of the crime and on the same day, a juror was present in the dwelling in question with Mrs. C., the complaining witness, while two police officers (who testified at trial) were also present seeking latent fingerprints. Petitioner was convicted on fingerprint evidence. None of these facts came to light until after the verdict, at which time they were the subject of a motion for a new trial.

At the proceedings on petitioner's motion for new trial, Mrs. C. did not recall discussing the crime with the juror. Taking her statement at face value, neither did she deny such a conversation. We find it impossible to visualize a gathering such as the evidence discloses, taking into account the traumatic emotional experience suffered by Mrs. C.; the juror's long standing friendship with her with natural feelings of concern and solicitude; the presence of the police officers (apparently acquainted with the juror) busily engaged in their search for evidence, with no conversation concerning the crime or its facts having occurred. A phlegmatic detachment of such magnitude on the part of each person there present boggles the mind.

It is true that on voir dire the juror admitted his friendship with Mrs. C. However, a want of diligence in failing to challenge is not thereby indicated on the part of petitioner's counsel. In many of our counties, it would be practically impossible to obtain a jury the members of which were all unacquainted with principals in a lawsuit. It is also true the juror said that the acquaintance would not affect his decision, a statement to which the Court of Appeals seems to have attached great weight. We do not regard this statement as conclusive. People v. DeHaven, 321 Mich. 327, 32 N.W.2d 468 (1948); Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 181 P.2d 822 (1947); 47 Am.Jur.2d, Jury, § 276.

On voir dire, the prospective jurors were asked questions concerning purported knowledge of the facts of the case and the list of witnesses was read out. The only fact disclosed by the juror was that he had been a good friend of Mrs. C. and her late husband for twenty-two years. It seems to us the juror ought to have indicated the involvement we have described, at least to such an extent as would have put counsel on further inquiry. A prospective juror's silence can be the same as a negative answer upon which a party has a right to rely. 47 Am.Jur.2d, Jury, § 208.

Petitioner has a right to trial 'by an impartial jury.' U.S.Const. amend. VI, N.M.Const. art. 2, § 14.

An impartial jury is one 'where each and every one of the twelve members constituting the jury is totally free from any partiality whatsoever.' State v. McFall, 67 N.M. 260, 354 P.2d 547 (1960) (emphasis added).

The controlling question here is whether these constitutional rights were accorded to petitioner.

There have been a few cases which have allowed a new trial because of later discovered relationships between the jurors and the parties involved or because of relationships between jurors and persons involved in similar litigation. Thus, in People v. DeHaven, supra, the defendant was convicted of statutory rape of his stepdaughter. After trial it was discovered that two of the jurors had failed to reveal that a common relative had been convicted of a similar crime several years before. The court held that such a relationship was such as to deprive the defendant of an impartial jury.

We are impressed with the court's reasoning in Marvins Credit Inc. v. Steward, 133 A.2d 473 (Mun.Ct.App., D.C., 1957). It involved a contract action. None of the jurors responded when asked as a whole if they had a charge account with the plaintiff corporation or if they had ever been sued on a charge account with it. It was discovered after trial that one juror and her husband not only had an account with the corporation, but that they had been sued on the account and subjected to garnishment proceedings. The court, in reversing and granting a new trial, noted that if the juror had answered truthfully counsel could have 'probed her mind as to bias or prejudice' so as to obtain a challenge either for cause or peremptorily. The court then continued:

'While the decisions agree that in all jury trials the parties are entitled to have their matters adjudged by jurors as impartially as is hummanly possible, some cases hold to the view that the burden is on the complaining party to establish prejudice; others that the trial judge has wide discretion in determining whether to set aside a verdict; and that except where clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated, the appellate court should not interfere. Others have decided against the granting of a new trial because the questions asked were not sufficiently important or relevant, or that the juror's involvement in other controversies was too remote in time, or that the questions asked were vague or unclear. In some cases the courts have found that counsel already had knowledge of the facts that would otherwise justify the juror's disqualification and have held that counsel waived his rights.

'We think that the rule to govern such situations may be summarized as follows: Full knowledge of all relevant and material matters that might bear on possible disqualification of a juror is essential to a fair and intelligent exercise of the right of counsel to challenge either for cause or peremptorily. It is the duty of a juror to make full and truthful answers to such questions as are asked, neither falsely stating any fact nor concealing any material matter. If a juror falsely represents his interest or situation or conceals a material fact relevant to the controversy and such matters, if truthfully answered, might establish prejudice or work a disqualification of the juror, the party misled or deceived thereby, upon discovering the fact of the juror's incompetency or disqualification after trial, may assert that fact as ground for and obtain a new trial, upon a proper showing of such facts, even though the bias or prejudice is not shown to have caused an unjust verdict, it being sufficient that a party, through no fault of his own, has been deprived of his constitutional guarantee of a trial of his case before a fair and impartial jury.

See also Shulinsky v. Boston & M.R.R., 83 N.H. 86, 139 A. 189 (1927).

Our system of justice goes to great lengths in seeking compliance with the constitutional mandates regarding impartial juries. Opportunity for extensive voir dire is granted. Elaborate admonitions are given designed to insulate jurors from outside influence. Juries are often segregated, and any unauthorized contact with a juror is presumptively prejudicial to a criminal defendant. State v. Gutierrez, 78 N.M. 529, 433 P.2d 508 (Ct.App.1967). It seems incongruous to permit this verdict to stand, in light of these principles and policies.

We do not attribute conscious fault to any principal in this proceeding. We rather regard it as an unfortunate situation created by an unforeseen or unforeseeable web of coincidences. However, petitioner should not as a result be prejudiced.

Our trial courts have broad discretion in granting or denying new trials. State v. Pope, 78 N.M. 282, 430 P.2d 779 (Ct.App.1967). Expansion on this generality would be pointless, since each case must turn upon its own facts, but by nothing we have said do we intend to restrict or modify those powers.

The case is reversed, and the trial court ordered to grant petitioner a new trial.

It is so ordered.

McMANUS and MONTOYA, JJ., concur.

OMAN, Justice (dissenting).

I am unable to agree with the majority opinion. In my judgment, the Court of Appeals properly decided the issues presented on appeal.

Even though I were to agree with the result reached by the majority, in my opinion the nature of the issues presented on appeal are not such as to warrant our review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Section 16--7--14, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4, 1970) grants to this court appellate jurisdiction to review by certiorari a decision of the Court of Appeals which:

'(1) is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court;

'(2) is in conflict with a decision of the court of appeals;

'(3) involves a significant question of law under the Constitution of New Mexico or the United States; or

'(4) involves an issue of substantial public interest that should be determined by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis added)

It is apparent from a reading of the opinion of the Court of Appeals and the opinion of the majority of this Court that the decision of the Court of Appeals does not fall within the first (1), second (2), or fourth (4) areas of appellate review as provided and granted to this court by § 16--7--14, supra. In fact the contentions made by appellant in his petition for certiorari were (1) that he was '* * * denied * * * a fair trial by impartial jury as required by Article II, Section XIV of the Constitution of the State of New Mexico and Amendment VI of the United States Constitution,' and (2) that he '* * * was denied his constitutional right to due process of...