Mareska v. State

• Citation: 534 N.E.2d 246
• Decision Date: 20 February 1989
• Docket Number: No. 75A03-8805-CR-134,75A03-8805-CR-134
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Parties: Joseph J. MARESKA, Sr., Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

Page 246

534 N.E.2d 246

Joseph J. MARESKA, Sr., Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 75A03-8805-CR-134.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Third District.

Feb. 20, 1989.

Martin R. Lucas, North Judson, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Richard C. Webster, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

HOFFMAN, Judge.

Joseph J. Mareska, Sr., is appealing his conviction of disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor. IND.CODE Sec. 35-45-1-3 (1982 Ed.). The Knox city court of Starke County, Indiana, after a jury verdict, sentenced Mareska to pay a $1.00 fine and to serve two months in jail, with all but five days suspended. Mareska appealed this conviction to the Starke circuit court for a trial de novo, and after a jury trial there, Mareska was again found guilty and was sentenced to pay a $25.00 fine. On appeal, Mareska raises two issues:

(1) whether the Knox city court has jurisdiction over criminal misdemeanors not committed within the Knox city limits; and

(2) whether the Knox city court jury selection system violates the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

In June 1986, Mareska was informed that his school bus driving contract with the North Judson-San Pierre School Corporation was going to be cancelled. In response Mareska requested a hearing before the school board, and he was placed on the agenda for the August 4, 1986 meeting. The meeting was held in the town of North Judson in Starke County, Indiana and Mareska was called to speak. At the meeting Mareska became loud, belligerent and vulgar. He refused repeated requests to sit down, and eventually the police were called. An officer from the North Judson Police Department arrived and Mareska dared the officer to arrest him. The policeman accepted the challenge, and Mareska was removed.

Subsequently, on August 4, 1986, an affidavit was filed in the Knox city court charging Mareska with disorderly conduct. Later, on March 25, 1987, Mareska filed a pro se motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The city court denied this motion after a hearing held on April 1, 1987. On December 12, 1987, a jury trial was held and Mareska was found guilty. Throughout the city court proceedings, Mareska maintained his jurisdictional objection by refusing to personally appear in court. He continued this stance until the court issued an arrest warrant on December 26, 1987. Mareska then posted a cash bond and appealed the city court conviction to the Starke circuit court for a trial de novo.

In the Starke circuit court, Mareska again filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction which the circuit court denied on February 28, 1988. A jury trial was held on March 4, 1988 which also resulted in a guilty verdict. During the circuit court proceedings, Mareska maintained his jurisdictional objections by refusing to personally appear and by instructing his trial counsel to limit his participation in the trial to preserving the jurisdictional issue.

Mareska's initial contention is that the Knox city court was without jurisdiction to decide the charges that were filed against him. He initially points out that city courts are courts of limited and inferior jurisdiction. These courts possess only such jurisdiction that is expressly conferred by statute. Gill v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 36, 111 N.E.2d 275. The criminal jurisdiction of the Knox city court is defined at IND.CODE Sec. 33-10.1-2-2 (1982 Ed.) which provides:

"A city court has the following criminal jurisdiction:

(1) Jurisdiction of all violations of the ordinances of the city.

(2) Jurisdiction of all misdemeanors and all infractions."

Mareska acknowledges that the Knox city court has subject-matter jurisdiction over his case, because he was charged with a misdemeanor and the above-cited statute clearly confers misdemeanor jurisdiction. Regardless of this, Mareska's central argument is that the city court lacks the requisite personal or territorial jurisdiction to hear this particular case. Mareska contends that the city court has no jurisdiction outside the city limits, and since the events in this case occurred outside of the Knox city limits, then the city court has no jurisdiction over his case.

Despite artful arguments to the contrary, it is clear that the Knox city court has county-wide misdemeanor jurisdiction. Mareska would read the second part of IND.CODE Sec. 33-10.1-2-2 as if it said, "(2) Jurisdiction of all misdemeanors and all infractions [occurring within the city limits ]." However a review of this statute's evolution demonstrates that the legislature did not intend such a limited interpretation. The current statute's predecessor, IND.CODE Sec. 18-1-14-5 (repealed 1980), in part, reads as follows:

"(b) He [the city court judge] has jurisdiction of all violations of the ordinances of such city.

(c) He also has original concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court for all misdemeanors and for all infractions...."

There is no question that the Starke circuit court has county-wide jurisdiction, IND.CODE Sec. 33-4-1-74.2 (1982), and thus under the former statute, city courts undisputably had county-wide territorial jurisdiction. Reading the present city court jurisdiction statute from the perspective of its predecessor, it is clear that the present version is simply a reiteration of the former, and the present version does not evince any legislative intent to reduce the city court's territorial jurisdiction.

The conclusion that the Knox city court had the requisite jurisdiction to decide the charges against Mareska does not dispose of this case. Mareska also raises an additional issue regarding the constitutionality of the jury that decided the charges against him in the city court. Specifically Mareska claims that the nature of the jury panel violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In relevant part this amendment reads:

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed...."

The city court jury that heard this case was impaneled pursuant to IND.CODE Sec. 33-10.1-5-5 (1982 Ed.) which provides:

"All issues of fact pending in city courts shall be tried by the judge, unless either party demands a jury trial. The jury must consist of six (6) qualified voters of the city, to be summoned by the bailiff by venire issued by the judge."

Mareska argues that his rights have been violated since his alleged crime was committed outside the Knox city limits and since the city court jury was composed solely of Knox city voters, then there was no "impartial jury of the ... district wherein the crime ... [was] committed."

This portion of the Sixth Amendment has never been interpreted in Indiana; however, there are cases from other jurisdictions which are instructive. In People v. Jones (1973) 9 Cal.3d 546, 108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705, the California Supreme Court decided a case which is highly analogous to the present situation. In Jones the defendant was charged with crimes that occurred in the Central Superior Court District of Los Angeles County. Due to a court backlog the case was transferred to Los Angeles County and tried before a jury drawn solely from the South West Superior Court District. On these facts, the...