De Marey v. Brugas

• Decision Date: 23 December 1925
• Citation: 131 A. 392,103 Conn. 667
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: DE MAREY v. BRUGAS ET AL. SCHOLAN v. BRUGAS ET AL.

131 A. 392

103 Conn. 667

DE MAREY v. BRUGAS ET AL.

SCHOLAN v. BRUGAS ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 23, 1925

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; George E. Hinman Judge.

Actions by George De Marey against John Brugas and another and by James Scholan against same defendants. Judgment for named defendant in each case, and judgment for plaintiffs against other defendant, who appeals. No error on either appeal.

Nathaniel R. Bronson and Richardson Bronson, both of Waterbury, for appellant Gray Line Bus Corporation.

Theodore E. Conway, of Waterbury, for appellees.

CURTIS, J.

These two actions were brought by guests of the defendant Brugas, who were riding in his automobile driven by him, when it came into collision with a bus in the intersection of Kossuth and Clarence streets in Bridgeport; the complaint alleged that the bus was one of the busses of the Gray Line Bus Corporation, and that the collision occurred because of the negligence of Brugas and of the driver of the bus, as proximate causes of the collision, and the cases were tried together by consent of the parties. The Gray Line Bus Corporation moved that the verdicts against it should be set aside, as against the evidence. The corporation makes two claims: (1) That under the evidence the jury could not reasonably have found that the negligence of the driver of the bus was a proximate cause of the collision; and (2) that the jury could not reasonably have found that the bus which was involved in the collision was a bus of the defendant corporation, or that the driver of the bus was its servant.

As to the first claim, there was evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found that the bus in question was at the time in question running northerly on the easterly side of Kossuth street engaged in carrying passengers, and was approaching Clarence street, in the intersection of which with Kossuth street the collision occurred; that, as the bus approached Clarence street, it slackened its speed and was apparently about to stop to let a passenger alight; that as this occurred the driver of the automobile was about to enter such intersection on the westerly side of Clarence street, and, when the bus slackened its speed apparently to stop, the driver of the automobile proceeded into the intersection to cross Kossuth street during the stoppage of the bus; that the driver of the bus, instead of stopping to let the passenger alight, merely slowed up, and the passenger alighted from the forward easterly side of the bus while it was in motion, and the driver of the bus thereupon started forward and drove rapidly into the intersection, and the bus struck the automobile near the right-hand rear wheel and overturned it.

Under such circumstances the jury could reasonably have found that the automobile had the right of way into the intersection since under the apparent situation the driver of the automobile, acting with reasonable care, could reasonably have believed that he...