Marez v. Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 September 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:09CV999MLM
• Parties: Kathleen MAREZ, Plaintiff, v. SAINT-GOBAIN CONTAINERS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

740 F.Supp.2d 1057

Kathleen MAREZ, Plaintiff,

v.SAINT-GOBAIN CONTAINERS, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 4:09CV999MLM.

United States District Court,

E.D. Missouri,

Eastern Division.

Sept. 13, 2010.

Kristin F. Whittle Parke, Law Office of Kristin F. Whittle, L.L.C., St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff.

Kathleen Marez, Bismarck, MO, pro se.

Carolyn Clay Hall, Jeffery Martin Mallamad, Katherine Gehring Erdel, Bingham and McHale, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Dennis C. Donnelly, Bryan Cave LLP, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARY ANN L. MEDLER, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc. ("Defendant"). Doc. 53. Plaintiff Kathleen Marez ("Plaintiff") filed a Response. Doc. 67. Defendant filed a Reply. Doc. 70. Also before the court is Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Exhibits A, D, E, SS, and TT. Doc. 76. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Doc. 7.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The court may grant a motion for summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The substantive law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. See also Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that an issue is genuine "if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party").

A moving party always bears the burden of informing the court of the basis of its motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact, not the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary" will not preclude summary judgment. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Raschick v. Prudent Supply, Inc., 830 F.2d 1497, 1499 (8th Cir.1987). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. With these principles in mind, the court turns to an analysis of Defendant's motion.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE

Plaintiff argues that the court should strike Defendant's Exhibits A, D, E, SS, and TT, which are affidavits filed in supportof Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. 76. Plaintiff contends that the court should strike these affidavits because they are not signed before a notary and/or not dated. Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and, alternatively, asked the court for leave to refile the affidavits in question, which have been notarized and dated. Doc. 79. The court finds that Defendant's request for leave to refile Exhibits A, D, E, SS, and TT should be granted. As such, the court finds that Plaintiff's Motion to Strike is moot.

BACKGROUND and UNDISPUTED FACTS ¹

This court has previously dismissed Count I of the Second Amended Complaint in which Plaintiff alleged that Defendant retaliated against her in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.010. In Count II of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on January 30, 2008, Defendant discharged her in violation of the MHRA, in that Plaintiff's gender, female, was a contributing factor to Defendant's discharging her. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the MHRA, in that Plaintiff's age, forty-four, was a motivating factor in Defendant's discharging her on January 30, 2008. In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611, et seq., by its terminating her and docking her pay because she took leave under the FMLA in August and September 2007. In Count V, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the FMLA by its terminating her on January 30, 2008 because she requested FMLA leave on January 28, 2008. Doc. 26. In the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant seeks summary judgment in its favor in regard to Counts II-V.

Defendant is a manufacturer of glass containers for the food and beverage industry. One of Defendant's plants is located in Pevely, Missouri. Defendant's Pevely plant operates multiple production lines, which include a hot end and a cold end. The Pevely plant operates twenty-four hours a day. Defendant's hourly employees are represented by the Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers International Union (the "Union"). With a small exception, to support Defendant's twenty-four hour operation, full-time day employees alternate between the day shift, the second shift, and the third shift, with a varying number of days off between shifts.

Plaintiff worked as a Shift Supervisor at the Pevely plant from the date of her hire, June 12, 2007, until she was terminated on January 30, 2008. Plaintiff's birth year is 1963 and, at the time she was hired, she was forty-two years old. Plaintiff's starting salary was $60,000.

While Plaintiff worked for Defendant, Charlie Franzoi was the Pevely Plant Manager, Scott Meade was the Operations Manager, Lisa Steiner was the Human Resources Manager, and Sandy Cook was the Cold End Manager. These persons supervised Plaintiff either directly or indirectly. Plant Manager Franzoi's date of birth is 1953; Operations Manager Meade's date of birth is 1967; Human Resources Manager Steiner's date of birth is 1959; and Cold End Manager Cook's date of birth is 1951. As such, all of these persons, with the exception of Operations Manager Meade, were older than Plaintiff. It is disputed who made the decision to hire Plaintiff. Defendant contends that Plant Manager Franzoi, Human Resources Manager Steiner, and Cold End ManagerCook made the decision to hire Plaintiff and Plaintiff contends that it was Jeff Rasnic, Production Manager, and Plant Manager Franzoi. The parties also dispute what the chain of command was at the Pevely plant at the time Plaintiff was employed there. Def. Facts, ¶¶ 11, 13; Pl. Resp. Def. Facts, ¶ ¶ 11, 13. At the time she was hired, Plaintiff said that she had over twenty years of previous supervisory experience, although she did not have previous glass making experience.

It is disputed whether Defendant had formal training for Shift Supervisors and disputed what the training for salaried employees was. Def. Facts, ¶ 16-17; Pl. Resp. Def. Facts, ¶ ¶ 16-17. The manner in which Plaintiff was trained by Defendant and the extent of this training is also disputed. Def. Facts, ¶ ¶ 17-20; Pl. Resp. Def. Facts, ¶ ¶ 17-20. Whether Plaintiff received more training than any other shift supervisor and whether she complained that her training was inadequate are disputed. It is undisputed, however, that, as part of her training, Plaintiff shadowed Shawn Eggemeyer. Mr. Eggemeyer, whose birthday is 1971 and who started work for Defendant in 1994 as an hourly employee, became a Shift Supervisor in 2001. After Plaintiff's initial training, Plaintiff worked as a Shift Supervisor on the C Shift. Plaintiff's duties included: organizing and directing hourly employees in the hot end and the cold end; implementing process controls; maintaining administrative records to comply with job requirements and to ensure accurate record keeping; and providing regular training of employees. Defendant contends, and Plaintiff denies, that she was expected to follow Standard Operating Procedures ("SOPs"). It is also disputed what Defendant's SOPs were and whether Plaintiff received training on the SOPs.

During off-shifts, Plaintiff ran the entire plant. Defendant received a letter from the GMP Local President complaining about Plaintiff, although the date this letter was received is disputed. Def. Ex. L. Defendant contends that Plaintiff had the nickname "Marlboro woman," because she was rarely on the production floor and always in the women's restroom smoking. Plaintiff disputes this fact and contends that, although she was a chain smoker, she smoked on the production floor, as that was permitted. Def. Facts, ¶ 30; Pl. Resp. Def. Facts, ¶ 30. Defendant also contends that Cold End Manager Cook and Human Resources Manager Steiner were concerned that Plaintiff was more interested in becoming friends with hourly employees rather than supervising them, which fact Plaintiff denies. Def. Facts, ¶ 32; Pl. Resp. Def. Facts, ¶ 32.

On May 16, 2007, Human Resources Manager Steiner attended a meeting with Plaintiff, Cold End Manager Cook, Operations Manager Meade, and Plant Manager Franzoi, during which meeting they discussed the discipline of Faith Armor, an hourly employee on Plaintiff's shift. Plaintiff's conduct during that meeting is disputed....