Margiotta v. CHRISTIAN HOSP.

• Decision Date: 09 February 2010
• Docket Number: No. SC 90249.,SC 90249.
• Citation: 315 S.W.3d 342
• Parties: Daniel MARGIOTTA, Appellant, v. CHRISTIAN HOSPITAL NORTHEAST NORTHWEST d/b/a Christian Hospital, and BJC Health System, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

315 S.W.3d 342

Daniel MARGIOTTA, Appellant, v. CHRISTIAN HOSPITAL NORTHEAST NORTHWEST d/b/a Christian Hospital, and BJC Health System, Respondents.

No. SC 90249.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

February 9, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ferne P. Wolf, D. Eric Sowers, M. Beth Fetterman, Sowers & Wolf, LLC, St. Louis, for Appellant.

JoAnn T. Sandifer, Mark G. Arnold, Michael P. Nolan, Christine F. Miller, Husch Blackwell Sanders LLP, for St. Louis, for Respondents.

WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Chief Justice.

I. Introduction

Daniel J. Margiotta, an at-will medical image technician, brought a wrongful termination action against his former employer, Christian Hospital Northeast Northwest ("Hospital"), alleging that the Hospital terminated him for reporting violations of federal and state regulations. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital. The judgment is affirmed.

II. Facts and Procedural Posture

A. The Procedure for Summary Judgment 1

The required procedure for summary judgment motions is found in Rule 74.04. The party seeking summary judgment must attach "a statement of uncontroverted material facts ... stated with particularity in separately numbered paragraphs" and supported "with specific references to the pleadings, discovery, exhibits, or affidavits." Rule 74.04(c)(1) (emphasis added). The responding party must then "admit or deny each of the movant's factual statements in numbered paragraphs" based on the record. Rule 74.04(c)(1). The response "may also set forth additional material facts that remain in dispute presented in consecutively numbered paragraphs," to which the movant must respond with a supplemental statement that controverts each factual assertion from the record. Id. "A denial may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleading." Rule 74.04(c)(2). This procedure is not discretionary; it is mandatory and must be followed.

B. Uncontroverted and Controverted Facts

It is uncontroverted that Daniel Margiotta was an at-will medical technician in the Hospital's CT scan unit from April 2005 until his termination on December 8, 2007. Although the remaining facts are controverted, they are not material to the judgment as a matter of law and serve only to provide context for this case.

The Hospital alleged that it terminated Margiotta because he had a violent outburst on December 6, 2007. In that incident, Margiotta reportedly yelled at co-workers in front of a patient and threw a pillow across the room, knocking a canister off the wall. Margiotta denies that the incident was violent or that he engaged in aggressive behavior.

In contrast, Margiotta alleges he was terminated because he continuously reported incidents of safety violations pertaining to patient care to his supervisors. Margiotta claims that three separate incidents led to his termination. First, in June or July 2005, he reported to supervisors that patients were being left unattended in the Hospital's hallways. Second, during the fall of 2005, he complained that the Hospital would use only one orderly to transfer a patient from the stretcher to the CT scanning table, which, in one incident, led to a patient being dropped. Third, sometime between July and September 2005, he reported that a pregnant woman underwent a CT scan, a practice he considered unsafe.

Although the dates of these reports predate his termination by almost two years, Margiotta argued that the Hospital retaliated against him for reporting these incidents by terminating him. Accordingly, Margiotta brought a cause of action against the hospital for wrongful termination of an at-will employee under the following regulations:

Margiotta points to a federal and a Missouri regulation as being at issue:

The patient has the right to receive care in a safe setting. 42 C.F.R. 482.13(c)(2).

Each hospital shall develop a mechanism for the identification and abatement of occupant safety hazards in their facilities. Any safety hazard or threat to the general safety of patients, staff or the public shall be corrected. 19 C.S.R. 30-20.108(3).

Christian Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, first, that Margiotta did not prove that the reporting of violations was the exclusive cause of his termination and, second, that the regulations at issue did not constitute clear mandates of public policy.

The trial court granted summary judgment on both grounds. This Court has jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

III. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews the trial court's granting of summary judgment de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). An appellate court can sustain the trial court's judgment on any ground as a matter of law, even if different than one posited in the order granting summary judgment. ITT Commercial Fin., 854 S.W.2d at 387-88.

B. The At-Will Employment

The at-will employment doctrine is well-established Missouri law. Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo.1988); Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191 (Mo.1985); Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414 (Mo.1981). Absent an employment contract with a "definite statement of duration ... an employment at will is created." Luethans v. Washington University, 894 S.W.2d 169 (Mo.1995); McCoy v. Spelman Memorial Hosp., 845 S.W.2d 727 (Mo.App.1993). An employer may terminate an at-will employee "for any reason or for no reason." Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo. banc 1998); see also McCoy v. Caldwell County, 145 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Mo. banc 2004); Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 n. 2 (Mo. banc 1984); Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 662; Dake, 687 S.W.2d at 192-93; Amaan, 615 S.W.2d at 415. The at-will doctrine is "rooted in freedom of contract and private property principles, designed to yield efficiencies across a broad range of industries." James A. Sonne, Firing Thoreau: Conscience and At-Will Employment, 9 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 235 (2007); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L.Rev. 947, 953-58 (1984).

However, the at-will doctrine is limited in certain respects. An employer cannot terminate an at-will employee for being a member of a protected class, such as "race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability." Section 213.055, RSMo. Supp.2005. In addition, Missouri recognizes the public-policy exception to the at-will-employment rule. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute, Inc., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo. banc 2010); Adolphsen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 333 (Mo.App.1995).

C. The Public Policy Exception for Wrongful Discharge

The public policy exception to the at-will employment rule, often called the wrongful discharge doctrine, is very narrowly drawn. An at-will employee may not be terminated for refusing to perform an illegal act or reporting wrongdoing or violations of law to superiors or third parties. See Porter v. Reardon Mach. Co., 962 S.W.2d 932 (Mo.App.1998); See also Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.App.1985).¹

1. Well Established and Clearly Mandated Public Policy

It is well-settled that public policy is not found "in the varying personal opinions and whims of judges or courts, charged with the interpretation and declaration of the established law, as to what they themselves believe to be the demands or interests of the public." In re Rahn's Estate, 316 Mo. 492, 501, 291 S.W. 120, 123 (Mo.1926). Therefore, a wrongful discharge action must be based on a constitutional provision, a statute, a regulation based on a statute or a rule promulgated by a governmental body. See Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Mo. banc 1988). Absent such explicit authority, the wrongful discharge action fails as a matter of law. Id. Moreover, not every statute or regulation gives rise to an at-will wrongful termination action. See, e.g., Lay v. St. Louis Helicopter Airways, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 173 (Mo.App.1993).

A vague or general statute, regulation, or rule cannot be successfully pled under the at-will wrongful termination theory, because it would force the court to decide on its own what public policy requires. See id. Such vagueness would also cause "the duties imposed upon employers to become more vague" and create difficulties "for employers to plan around liability based on the vagaries of judges." Timothy Heinz, The Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine, 48 Mo. L.Rev. 855, 876 (1983).

2. Reporting Violations of Law: Whistleblowing

Margiotta claims that he falls into the second theory of wrongful discharge, that of reporting violations of law or public policy to his superiors, commonly referred to as "whistleblowing." Lynch v. Blanke Baer & Bowey Krimko, Inc. 901 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Mo.App.1995). For Margiotta to prevail, he must show that he "reported to superiors or to public authorities serious misconduct that constitutes a violation of the law and of .... well established and clearly mandated public policy." Id. (emphasis added).

"The mere citation of a constitutional or statutory provision in a pleading is not by itself sufficient to state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the public policy mandated by the cited provision is violated by the discharge." 82 Am.Jur.2d § 61 citing Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill.2d 495, 154 Ill.Dec. 649, 568 N.E.2d 870 (1991); See generally Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 663. Generally, there is no whistleblowing protection for an employee who merely disagrees personally with an employer's legally-allowed policy. Daniel P. Westman, Whistleblowing the Law of Retaliatory Discharge, 112(1991). See also 82 Am.Jur.2d § 54.

However, the violation of the applicable authority need not result in criminal sanctions. Whether the violation results in civil fines, injunctions, or disciplinary action against a professional license is immaterial to the wrongful discharge...