Margos v. Moroudas

• Decision Date: 31 January 1945
• Docket Number: 7.
• Citation: 40 A.2d 816,184 Md. 362
• Parties: MARGOS v. MOROUDAS (two cases).
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

40 A.2d 816

184 Md. 362

MARGOS v. MOROUDAS (two cases).

No. 7.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

January 31, 1945

Appeals from Baltimore City Court; Samuel K. Dennis, Chief Judge.

Suit by Mary Margos for personal injuries, and by Mike Margos for loss of his wife's services and for payment of hospital and medical bills for his wife, against Gus Moroudas. From orders quashing the writs of summons and setting aside the returns of the sheriff thereon, the plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

M. William Adelson, of Baltimore, for appellants.

Roszel C. Thomsen, of Baltimore (Harris & Medwedeff and Clark Thomsen & Smith, all of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, MELVIN HENDERSON, and MARKELL, JJ.

COLLINS Judge.

Mary Margos, a resident of the State of Pennsylvania, one of the appellants, on June 16, 1940, was injured while riding in an automobile in the State of Pennsylvania operated by the appellee, Gus Moroudas, a resident of the State of West Virginia. The automobile was owned by a third party who carried insurance.

Suit was entered in the Baltimore City Court on April 9, 1943, by Mary Margos through Bloom & Bloom and Bernard M. Savage, her attorneys, against Gus Moroudas for injuries received while riding in the automobile aforesaid. On the same date Mike Margos, the husband of Mary Margos, also a resident of Pennsylvania, entered suit in the same Court through the same attorneys against the same defendant for loss of his wife's services and for payment of hospital and medical bills for his wife which he claimed it was necessary for him to assume. On April 12, 1943, the defendant, Gus Moroudas being in Baltimore, was served with a writ of summons in both suits.

The defendant, on June 8, 1943, appearing specially, filed a motion to quash the writs of summons and to set aside the returns of the sheriff thereon on the ground that the plaintiffs are citizens and residents of the State of Pennsylvania and the defendant, a citizen and resident of the State of West Virginia; that he does not now nor did he ever transact any business in the State of Maryland. He further alleged that the defendant was persuaded by the plaintiffs through circumstances set out therein to come to Baltimore City and that he did not know that he was being inveigled into the State of Maryland for the purpose of being served with the writs of summons in this or any other action. After testimony taken in open court on the motions, the Judge of the Baltimore City Court in both cases quashed the writs of summons and set aside the returns of the sheriff thereon, and from that action the appellants in the two cases appeal to this Court.

At the hearing on June 20, 1944, on the question at issue, the defendant testified that he met the plaintiffs at a wedding at the time of the alleged accident in June, 1940, and he had not known them before. In December, 1942, he was approached by Mike Margos and asked to go to the office of Bloom & Bloom, attorneys in Washington, Pennsylvania, who he thought were the insurance people. He said he went to that office and further: 'I just sat in what I thought was the library, I think it was his office, a person came in, said he'd make a call, and he came back and said he could not make a contact.' He was next approached by Mike Margos the first week in April, 1943, who gave him forty dollars ($40) for expenses and a slip of paper on which was written the name and telephone number of Mr. Bernard Savage, a lawyer, and who asked him to go to Baltimore and when he got there to have a person whom the defendant knew call up Mr. Savage and tell him that he was there. He further testified: 'He said I'd help him with the insurance.' He was not told that he would be served with a process. He came to Baltimore to call Mr. Savage up, not to see him. He said he thought that the call was probably to make an appointment to go to see the lawyer because he probably wanted a few more facts about the accident, and he thought he was the insurance man and that Mike told him it would help with the insurance; that he had no other business in Baltimore of any kind and that the only reason he came to Baltimore was because Mike Margos gave him forty dollars ($40) to pay his expenses and asked him to go. He further testified that he did not know a case was coming up.

As a result, he left for Baltimore the day after he was given the forty dollars ($40). After his arrival in Baltimore, he went to Phillips' Restaurant on April 12th and had the proprietor whom he knew call up Mr. Savage, and he then sat in the restaurant and ate. While he was eating, a man came in and asked for him, and after he was pointed out sitting at a table eating, the man gave him two papers, one notifying him of a suit by Mike Margos for ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and the other of a suit by Mary Margos for twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). He said he read the papers after he got them and left that evening to go back to West Virginia.

Mr. Bernard M. Savage, attorney of Baltimore, testified that he had now stricken out his appearance in these cases, and further that in December, 1942, he received a telephone call from Mr. Bloom regarding these cases and subsequently received a letter with a statement of facts. After correspondence, he prepared the suit papers, forwarded them to Bloom & Bloom who signed them, returned them to him and he filed them on April 9th. At that time he did not know of any Maryland or Baltimore address of the defendant or any local address where he could be served. He said that Bloom & Bloom wrote him a letter saying that they would give him instructions as to when and where the defendant could be found in Baltimore City. He further said that two or three days after the suit was filed, he received a telephone call from a man who said he was Mr. Phillips and who said that Mr. Gus Moroudas, the defendant, was in his place at that time. Mr. Savage said he then notified the sheriff and told him to make service on the defendant at that address.

Neither of the appellants testified at the hearing on the motion.

The testimony which is not contradicted shows that the defendant did not know that suit had been entered against him in Maryland and that he came to Baltimore through the efforts of Mike Margos and Bloom & Bloom, attorneys for both appellants, to give information to a person who he thought was the insurance company lawyer for the purpose of helping the appellants get insurance which was carried by a third party. The testimony does not show that the appellee intended to use any improper methods to help appellants collect the insurance. His intended help to the appellants, according to the testimony, was to be the giving of the facts of the accident to the insurance representative.

Statutes of limitations having run against the plaintiffs in both the States of Pennsylvania and West Virginia, it is not contended by the appellee here that merely because neither the defendant nor the plaintiffs were residents of Maryland, the Court here was without jurisdiction in these cases. Hieston v. National City Bank of Chicago, 132 Md. 389, 396, 104 A. 281. The appellee relies on his contention that the service of process on the defendant was invalid. The law is settled in Maryland that a nonresident who comes into this State either as a witness or as a party plaintiff or defendant in a civil action is, while here for that purpose either coming, staying, or returning in good faith and without unreasonable delay, exempt from the service of process for the commencement of a civil action against him in this State. Feuster v. Redshaw, 157 Md. 302, 304, 145 A. 560.

The appellants in their contention that the writs of summons should not be quashed rely strongly on the case of Jaster v. Currie, 198 U.S. 144, 25 S.Ct. 614, 49 L.Ed. 988. In that case it was alleged that the plaintiff had brought a previous action in the State of Nebraska for the same cause and afterwards served notice upon the defendant's attorney that the plaintiff's deposition would be taken in Ohio at a certain place on September 5, 1899, for use in the cause. The defendant was advised by his attorney to be present and went to Ohio for that purpose only. The deposition was taken and the defendant then went to his father's house in the same county for the night of September 5th. On September 8th in the early morning, being the earliest time convenient for leaving his father's home for Nebraska, he took the train back. The writ in the Ohio suit was received and served on September 7th. It was contended that the notice to take the deposition was simply a ruse and was given for the purpose of enticing the defendant into Ohio and for no other reason. The Supreme Court of the United States, in holding that the service of the writ was not unlawful, pointed out that there was no misrepresentation, expressed or implied, with regard to anything, even the motives of the plaintiff; further that the parties were at arm's length; that the taking of the deposition needed no justification, and it could be taken arbitrarily if the plaintiff chose and that defendant could be served with process if he saw fit to linger in Ohio.

There are several material differences between that case and the one at bar. Moroudas did not come to this State to have his deposition taken. In the case now before us there had been no former suit between the parties, and they were not at arm's length, and the...