Margulies v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or.
| Decision Date | 08 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | 3:13-cv-00475-PK |
| Parties | ALLEN MARGULIES, JOHN OLSEN, and STEPHEN FUNG, individually, and CHRISTOPHER DAY and THOMAS GOLDHAMMER, individually and as class representatives, Plaintiffs, v. TRI-COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT OF OREGON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Plaintiffs filed the instant action against defendant Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon ("TriMet"), alleging that TriMet engages in a pattern or practice of failing to pay its bus and train operators for all compensable work, including overtimepay, in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and Oregon law. Now before the court is TriMet's motion for partial summary judgment (#120). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
On December 19, 2012, plaintiff Allen Margulies sent a letter to TriMet, indicating that he intended to file a lawsuit "on behalf of all current employees and former employees of TriMet" due to TriMet's failure to compensate its employees for all hours worked and its failure to pay overtime wages. Ex. A, Declaration of Joel B. Young ("Young Deck"), #124-1, at 1-9. The caption of the letter states that it is a notice of a class action pursuant to Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure 32H. Id. at 1. On January 14, 2013, plaintiffs Stephen Fung and Christopher Day also sent TriMet a'notice of their intent to file an action "on behalf of all current and former employees of TriMet." Ex. C, Young Deck, #124-1, at 1-9. Like Margulies's letter, Fung and Day cited TriMet's failure to compensate its employees for all hours worked and its failure to pay overtime wages as the basis of the class action. Id. On January 17, 2013, TriMet responded to both letters, stating that, as public employees, Margulies, Fung, and Day were subject to a collective-bargaining agreement, which governed the wage issues raised in the letters. Ex. B, Young Deck, #124-1, at 1; Ex. D, Young Deck, #124-1, at 1.
Thereafter, on January 22, 2013, Margulies filed an action against TriMet in the Circuit Court for the County of Multnomah, alleging various claims under the FLSA and Oregon law on behalf of himself and "all other similarly situated individuals currently and/or formerly employed by" TriMet. Ex. 3, Declaration of Jennifer Goodrich ("Goodrich Deck"), #122-3, at 1. On February 15, 2013, Margulies filed an amended complaint in the Circuit Court for the County ofMultnomah, adding Day and John Olsen as named plaintiffs. Ex. 4, Goodrich Decl., #122-4, at 1. On February 21, 2013, plaintiffs served TriMet with a copy of the complaint and the amended complaint. Ex. 5, Goodrich Decl., #122-5, at 1-3.
TriMet subsequently removed the case to this court on the basis of federal-question and supplemental jurisdiction. Notice of Removal, #1, at 1-5. Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on June 17, 2013, alleging that TriMet fails to pay bus and train operators for: "(1) non-commute travel time between disparate start and end points of operators' scheduled runs, (2) the differential between scheduled run times and actual run times, (3) pre-departure time, (4) mandatory meetings with supervisors, (5) mandatory medical examinations, and [(6)] any applicable overtime due for such compensable time." Second Amended Complaint, #18, ¶ 4. Plaintiffs allege claims under the FLSA (Claim I); Oregon's minimum-wage law, Oregon Revised Statute ("ORS") § 653.025 (Claim II); Oregon's overtime-pay law, ORS § 653.268 (Claim III); and Oregon's timely-wage-pay law, ORS § 652.120 (Claim IV). Plaintiffs further allege that TriMet's violation of Oregon law was willful, in violation of ORS § 652.140 (Claim V).
On October 10, 2013, the court granted TriMet's first motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff-bus operators' FLSA claims. October 10, 2013 Opinion and Order, #61, at 40. The court also granted plaintiffs' motion to conditionally certify the action as a representative collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Id. To date, 458 plaintiffs have opted to join the action, including the five named plaintiffs.1 On January 22, 2014, the court grantedthe parties' stipulated motion to dismiss the minimum-wage claims. See January 22, 2014 Minute Order, #108. Thus, the following claims remain: (1) plaintiff-train operators' FLSA and state-law overtime and untimely-wage-pay claims; and (2) plaintiff-bus operators' state-law overtime and untimely-wage-pay claims.
On April 4, 2014, TriMet filed the instant motion for partial summary judgment, seeking summary judgment in its favor on ninety-three plaintiffs' state-law claims. See TriMet's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, #120, On April 28, 2014, plaintiffs filed their resistance. See Plaintiffs' Resistance, #124. On June 12, 2014, TriMet filed its reply in support of the motion for partial summary judgment. See TriMet's Reply, #127. The court heard oral argument on the motion on June 25, 2014. The matter is fully submitted and ready for decision.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, "show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is not proper if material factual issues exist for trial. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S, 242,247-48 (1986); Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). The substantive law governing a claim or defense determines whether a fact is material. See Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998). In evaluating a motion for summaiy judgment, the district courts of the United States must draw all reasonableinferences in favor of the nonmoving party and may neither make credibility determinations nor perform any weighing of the evidence. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,150 (2000); Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-55 (1990).
TriMet seeks summary judgment on ninety-three plaintiffs' state-law claims. TriMet contends that summary judgment is appropriate because these plaintiffs did not provide timely notice of their claims as required by the Oregon Tort Claims Act ("OTCA"). Plaintiffs respond that their claims are not "torts" within the meaning of the OTCA and, even if they were, the ninety-three plaintiffs at issue provided the requisite notice by virtue of Margulies's December 19, 2012 letter to TriMet. I begin by reviewing the relevant provisions of the OTCA before addressing the central questions at issue—that is, whether plaintiffs' claims are torts subject to the OTCA's requirements and, if so, whether the ninety-three plaintiffs TriMet identifies in its motion complied with the OTCA's notice provision.
ORS § 30.260(8). A "public body" includes, among other entities, a municipal corporation. ORS § 30.260(4).
Relevant to the instant dispute is the OTCA's requirement that a plaintiff may notmaintain an action against a public body "unless notice of [the] claim is given." ORS § 30.275(1). The notice requirement is "mandatory . . . and a condition [precedent] to recovery" under the OTCA. Urban Renewal Agency of City of Coos Bay v. Lackey, 275 Or. 35, 40, 549 P.2d 657, 660 (Or. 1976). "The purpose of the notice requirement of ORS [§] 30.275 is to allow the public body an opportunity to investigate a matter promptly and to settle all meritorious claims without litigation." Flug v. Univ. of Or., 170 Or. App. 660, 671, 13 P.3d 544, 551 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Robinson v. Shipley, 64 Or. App. 794, 797, 669 P.2d 1169,1171 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)); accord Urban Renewal Agency, 275 Or. at 41, 549 P.2d at 660.
A plaintiff satisfies the OTCA's notice requirement if, "within 180 days after the alleged loss or injury," ORS § 30.275(2)(b), the plaintiff gives formal notice, actual notice, or commences an action on the claim, ORS § 30.275(3). The notice must include: (1) a "statement that a claim for damages is or will be asserted against the public body"; (2) a "description of the time, place and circumstances giving rise to the claim, as far as known to the claimant"; and (3) the "name of the claimant and the mailing address to which correspondence concerning the claim may be sent." ORS § 30.275(4), "When the purposes of the notice requirement have been met, the court may use the theory of substantial compliance to ignore technical errors in notices otherwise proper in form and content, avoiding the harsh results of insisting on strict compliance with the statute," Robinson, 64 Or. App. at 797, 669 P,2dat 1171; see also Urban Renewal Agency, 275 Or. at 40, 549 P.2d at 660 ().
In this case, TriMet contends that plaintiffs' state-law claims are subject to the OTCAbecause TriMet is a "public body" and plaintiffs' state-law claims are "torts." Thus, TriMet maintains that plaintiffs must establish compliance with the OTCA's notice provision. Plaintiffs do not dispute that TriMet is a "public body" within the meaning of the OTCA2 but contend that the OTCA does not apply to their state-law claims because such claims are more properly characterized as contract claims, which are...
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