Maria Aide Delgado Fed. Reg v. U.S. Marshal
| Decision Date | 09 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:12-cv-0347 SECTION P |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
| Parties | MARIA AIDE DELGADO FED. REG #68452-179 v. UNITED STATES MARSHAL |
Pro se plaintiff Maria Aide Delgado, proceeding in forma pauperis, filed the instant civil action on February 3, 2012. Delgado is a federal prisoner1 in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), currently housed at the Federal Correctional Institution located in Aliceville, Alabama. Delgado complains that she and her mother, Sabina Luna Valdez, were "remanded" to the custody of the United States Marshal for the February 6, 2012 trial of her brother, Antonio Luna Valdez, Jr., and thereafter returned to BOP custody on or about March 2, 2012. [See rec. docs. 1, 4 and 9]. While Delgado was in the Marshal's custody, she was housed at the Iberia Parish Jail ("IPJ") in New Iberia, Louisiana.
In her original handwritten pleading, filed while she was still housed at the IPJ, Delgado complained about the conditions of confinement at IPJ. More specifically, shealleged that the IPJ is unsanitary2, that she received inadequate medical care for "ovary pain"3 and that she and her mother, Sabina Luna Valdez (who were housed together at FMC Carswell) where not placed in the same cell.
She alleged that the United States Marshal for the Western District of Louisiana was responsible for either negligently failing to correct the unwholesome conditions of the IPJ, or for negligently transferring her and her mother to the IPJ in the first instance. [rec. doc. 1]. Accordingly, she sought injunctive relief - an Order of this Court requiring the Marshal to correct the complained of conditions and circumstances she encountered at the IPJ and ordering the Marshal to house Delgado and her mother, Sabina Luna Valdez, in the same cell in the C-pod of the IPJ4, or, alternatively, ordering that both be transferred to the Acadia Parish Jail to be housed in the "isolation room", where she and her mother had apparently been housed prior to their convictions.
Delgado was ordered to file her Complaint utilizing this Court's form for filing prisoner civil rights complaints. [rec. doc. 3]. Accordingly, on February 27, 2012, while still detained at IPJ, Delgado submitted an Amended Complaint on the proper form. She once again named the Marshal as the sole defendant and she again complained of conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care at the IPJ.5 Plaintiff prayed for injunctive relief only - an Order of this Court directing the Marshal to correct the complained of conditions and circumstances she encountered at the IPJ and ordering the Marshal to house Delgado and her mother, Sabina Luna Valdez, in the same cell. [rec. doc. 4].
On July 20, 2012, Delgado filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement her Complaint. By this Motion, Delgado asked that her mother, Sabina Luna Valdez (Fed. Reg. No. 46413-179) be joined as an additional plaintiff. She also requested that the following persons be named as additional defendants: (1) Two male federal employees,one employed by the BOP's Oklahoma Transfer Center and the other employed by the Marshal Service who were present at the airport in Fort Worth, Texas on January 31, 2012 when plaintiff and her mother were transported to Louisiana; (2) Department of Corrections employees who inspected the IPJ on February 14, 2012; (3) The Sheriff of Iberia Parish (Sheriff Ackel); (4) The Warden of the IPJ (Warden Hayes); and (5) The Warden's brother, a Captain employed at the IPJ (Captain Hayes). Plaintiff expressed her desire to exclude "U.S. Marshal Corey" from the Complaint. She additionally withdrew her original request for injunctive relief and, instead, requested compensatory damages from each of the defendants. [rec. doc. 22].
On October 19, 2012, the Court denied Delgado's request to add Sabina Luna Valdez as an additional plaintiff and denied Delgado's request to name the two male federal employees, one employed by the BOP's Oklahoma Transfer Center and the other employed by the Marshal Service who were present at the airport in Fort Worth, Texas on January 31, 2012 when plaintiff and her mother were transported to Louisiana. Delgado was permitted to name the unidentified Department of Corrections employees who inspected the IPJ on February 14, 2012, the Sheriff of Iberia Parish, the Warden of the IPJ and the Warden's brother, a Captain employed at the IPJ as defendants. [rec. doc. 25].
Although the Court advised Delgado that she could not proceed against unknown John Doe defendants, because Delgado provided sufficient factual detail of the nature of the claims which she wished to pursue against each of these defendants, the Courtsubsequently decided to conduct an initial review on the allegations as alleged, instead of requiring Delgado to properly identify each proposed defendant by name. [rec. doc. 47].
Delgado's Motion for Stay seeking a 12 month stay so that she could exhaust administrative remedies required by the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") with respect to her negligence claims against the United States Marshal was denied. [rec. doc. 25]. Thereafter, Delgado's claims against the United States Marshal were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on grounds that the plaintiff failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit.6 [rec. docs. 24 and 33].
Delgado's request to file a Third Amended Complaint, styled as a class action lawsuit, was denied because she had already filed an original, first standardized and second amended complaint, because she is not a lawyer authorized to file pleadings on behalf of others, because any additional claims not previously presented were prescribed and because Delgado was clearly engaging in "recreational litigation", the abuse that Congress sought to deter in enacting the PLRA. [rec. doc. 49].
Since the initiation of this lawsuit, Delgado has filed numerous frivolous Motions and amendments to her pleadings.7 Indeed, what began as an action against the United States Marshal (which insofar as the action arose under the FTCA was dismissed8), has now primarily been converted into a civil rights action against officials of the Iberia Parish Jail (Sheriff Ackel, Warden Hayes and Captain Hayes) in which Ms. Delgado complains about the conditions of her brief confinement at the facility beginning February 1, 2012 and ending March 2, 2012. These remaining claims are addressed herein.
When a prisoner files suit in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court is obligated to evaluate the complaint and dismiss it without service of process, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990).
A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Gonzalez v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1998) citing Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. Jones v. Bock, 549U.S. 199, 215 (2007); See also Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). To withstand dismissal, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Green v. Revel, 2011 WL 165453, *1 (5th Cir. 2011) citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007); Emerson v. Thaler, 544 Fed. Appx. 325, 327 (5th Cir. 2013) quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
In her Complaint and Amended Complaints, Delgado has set forth specific facts which she claims entitles her to damages; she has pleaded her best case. The facts alleged by Delgado have been accepted as true for the purposes of this Report. Nevertheless, Delgado's claims are subject to dismissal for the reasons which follow.
Complaints about prison conditions are analyzed under the Eighth Amendment which proscribes cruel and unusual punishment. While the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit punishment it does prohibit cruel and unusual punishment including the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Additionally, while the Eighth Amendment does not mandate comfortable prisons, it does not permit inhumane ones. Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999).
Federal courts employ a two-part test to determine whether a prisoner has established an Eighth Amendment violation. Harper, 174 F.3d at 719. First, there is anobjective requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate conditions "so serious as to deprive prisoners of the minimal measure of life's necessities," as when the prisoner is denied "some basic human need." Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir.1995); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Second, under a subjective standard, it must be shown that the responsible prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's conditions of confinement. Id. "The second requirement follows from the principle that only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
For conditions of confinement to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, they must be "cruel and unusual" under contemporary standards. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. Id. However, when the restrictions of confinement rise to a...
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