Marianist Province of the U.S. v. City of Kirkwood

• Decision Date: 13 December 2019
• Docket Number: No. 18-3076,18-3076
• Citation: 944 F.3d 996
• Parties: MARIANIST PROVINCE OF the UNITED STATES; St. John Vianney High School, Inc. Plaintiffs - Appellants v. CITY OF KIRKWOOD; Board of Adjustment of the City of Kirkwood Defendants - Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

944 F.3d 996

MARIANIST PROVINCE OF the UNITED STATES; St. John Vianney High School, Inc. Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.CITY OF KIRKWOOD; Board of Adjustment of the City of Kirkwood Defendants - Appellees

No. 18-3076

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 26, 2019

Filed: December 13, 2019

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant and appeared on the brief was Daniel Paul Dalton, of Detroit, MI. The following attorney(s) also appeared on the appellant brief; Michael P. Stephens, of Saint Louis, MO., Ronald E. Jenkins, of Saint Louis, MO., Stephen L. Kling, Jr., of Saint Louis, MO., Noel W. Sterett, of Belvidere, IL., Sally Sinclair Perez, of Saint Louis, MO.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee and appeared on the brief was John M. Hessel, of Saint Louis, MO. The following attorney(s) also appeared on the appellee brief; Joseph Ernest Martineau, of Saint Louis, MO., Sarah Anne Milunski, of Saint Louis, MO.

Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Marianist Province of the United States and St. John Vianney High School, Inc. (collectively, "Vianney") appeal the district court’s summary judgment rulings on their Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") claims, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(b)(1) and 2000cc(a)(1), Missouri Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("Missouri RFRA") claim, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.302.1, and inverse condemnation claim under Missouri’s Constitution, Mo. Const. art. I, § 26. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment regarding Vianney’s RLUIPA claims and inverse condemnation claim but vacate and remand the grant of summary judgment regarding the Missouri RFRA claim with instructions to dismiss that claim without prejudice.

I.

Vianney is an all-male Marianist high school that has operated in the City of Kirkwood, Missouri since 1960. Vianney is a leasehold owner of the school property pursuant to a long-term lease with Marianist Province. The school’s mission statement provides that it is "dedicated to forming young men for spiritual, academic and personal excellence in the Catholic, Marianist tradition." Vianney states that its students and faculty use all of its approximately thirty-seven-acre property as a forum to evangelize by drawing people to the campus and sharing their faith. Student athletes and coaches pray before every athletic event and practice.

The school campus includes classroom buildings, a track, an outdoor football and soccer stadium, and a sports field used primarily for baseball. Vianney’s track, football, and soccer facility is equipped with lights and a sound system that were installed before 2012. The baseball field is bordered by residential homes and has been used to play baseball and other sports without lights for decades. Vianney’s efforts, from 2012 to 2016, to install lights and an updated sound system on this baseball field form the basis of this dispute.

Before 2012, Kirkwood’s zoning code did not contain any lighting regulations. In November 2012, Kirkwood adopted a revised zoning code that included new regulations limiting the maximum level of light a property owner can cast onto nearby residential properties to 0.1 foot-candles. The stated purpose of the 2012 regulations was to "strike a balance of safety and aesthetics by providing lighting regulations that protect drivers and pedestrians from glare and reduce ... the trespass of artificial lighting onto neighboring properties." Kirkwood also has sound regulations that prohibit "loud, unnecessary noises" that "unreasonably or unnecessarily disturb[ ] ... the comfort, repose, health, peace, or safety of others in the city."

Vianney began the process of installing lights on its baseball field in late 2014. In 2015, contractors told the school that no lighting configuration could both comply with the lighting regulations and be bright enough to play baseball safely at night. Vianney therefore applied for a variance from the regulations. Kirkwood’s city planner told Vianney it did not need a variance, mistakenly thinking the baseball field already had lights. In October 2015, Vianney submitted a site plan for its improvements to the baseball field, which Kirkwood approved. Vianney then installed the lights at a cost in excess of $235,000. In January 2016, Vianney also installed an updated sound system on its baseball field.

After the lights were installed and tested, neighbors complained. Vianney submitted another site plan in 2016, which the city approved subject to several conditions on the use of the lights and sound system. Vianney took issue with the conditions, claiming they deprived it of all meaningful use of its baseball field at night.

Both Vianney and the local public high school, Kirkwood High School ("KHS"), have football stadiums that are used for other sports, such as soccer, and were equipped with lights and sound systems before 2012. Both parties acknowledge that the city "grandfathered in" the lights on both schools’ football fields after the lighting regulations were adopted, allowing unrestricted use of the lights and sound systems on those fields. Both high schools also have baseball fields that were not equipped with lights before 2012, and KHS has not installed lights on its baseball field.

In January 2017, Vianney filed a petition against Kirkwood in state court, alleging two claims under RLUIPA, a claim under the Missouri RFRA statute, and inverse condemnation under Missouri’s Constitution. Kirkwood removed the case to federal court based on Vianney’s RLUIPA claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Both Vianney and Kirkwood moved for summary judgment. In September 2018, the district court granted summary judgment to Kirkwood, which Vianney now appeals.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo . Ball v. City of Lincoln , 870 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 2017). "Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ...." Torgerson v. City of Rochester , 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Id .

A.

We begin by examining Vianney’s substantial burden and equal terms claims under RLUIPA. RLUIPA was enacted by Congress to provide "broad protection" for religious exercise in two areas of government activity. § 2000cc-3(g). Section 2 governs land-use regulation, § 2000cc, and Section 3 governs religious exercise by institutionalized persons, § 2000cc-1. See Holt v. Hobbs , 574 U.S. 352, 357, 135 S.Ct. 853, 190 L.Ed.2d 747 (2015). The land-use provisions include the two causes of action relevant here: a "substantial burden" claim and an "equal terms" claim. §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc(b)(1). Congress mandated that RLUIPA "shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution." § 2000cc-3(g). This case is this circuit’s first examination of RLUIPA in the land-use context.

First, we address Vianney’s claim that Kirkwood’s lighting and sound regulations (collectively, "regulations") substantially burden its religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA. RLUIPA’s substantial burden subsection provides that no government shall implement a land-use regulation in a manner that "imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise" of an institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposing the burden (1) furthers a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. § 2000cc(a)(1).

Vianney asserts that various forms of religious exercise "motivate the school’s use" of its baseball field at night. The school emphasizes that athletics is part of the "formation of young men" in the Catholic Marianist tradition and that nighttime sports games allow it to reach out to the community and engage in religious fellowship. RLUIPA broadly defines "religious exercise" to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." § 2000cc-5(7)(A). Assuming Vianney’s uses of its baseball field at night for forming young men, engaging in religious fellowship, and reaching out to the community constitute religious exercise, we examine its claim that the regulations substantially burden this exercise.

Vianney has not demonstrated that its religious exercise is substantially burdened, rather than merely inconvenienced, by its inability to use its baseball field at night. See Holt , 574 U.S. at 361, 135 S.Ct. 853 (stating that RLUIPA claimant bore the burden of proving his religious exercise was substantially burdened). We agree with other circuits that have concluded requiring a religious institution to use feasible alternative locations for religious exercise does not constitute a substantial burden. See, e.g. , San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill , 360 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that, although a Christian college was not permitted to provide religious education at its desired location, this was not a substantial burden because the college did not demonstrate that it was "precluded from using other sites within the city"); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside , 366 F.3d 1214, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding that requiring a synagogue to relocate to a different location was not a substantial burden even though it required elderly congregants to "walk[ ] a few extra blocks"). In a factually similar situation, the Sixth Circuit found that a Christian school was not substantially burdened by the denial of a special-use permit to relocate its school to a new, more convenient location because the school could still carry out its religious mission at its current location. Livingston Christian...