Mariano v. Gharai
| Decision Date | 21 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 12–1400 CKK |
| Citation | 999 F.Supp.2d 167 |
| Parties | Joseph Mariano, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Sassan Gharai, et al., Defendants. SGA Holdings, Inc., Third–Party Plaintiff, v. Lane Building Services, LLC, Third–Party Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Donald M. Temple, Donald M. Temple, P.C., Reginald J. Richter, The Richter Law Group, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Allan Ames Noble, G. Calvin Awkward, III, Budow & Noble, P.C., Bethesda, MD, Arthur Thomas Kelley Norris, Terrence M. McShane, Lee & McShane, PC, Washington, DC, Edwin Hubbard Staples, II, Michael S. Steadman, Jr., Council, Baradel, Kosmerl & Nolan, P.A., Annapolis, MD, David L. Rubino, McCarthy Wilson, Rockville, MD, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs, Joseph Mariano and Anna Biedsinska–Mariano filed suit in District of Columbia Superior Court against Defendants 1367 Florida Avenue, LLC, SGA Holdings, Inc., Sassan Gharai, and SGA Architects, Inc. After Defendants removed the case to this Court, Defendant SGA Holdings, Inc., subsequently filed a Third–Party Complaint against Lane Building Services, LLC. Presently before the Court is Third–Party Defendant Lane Building Services, LLC's [23] Motion to Dismiss and/or Compel Arbitration. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions,1 the applicable authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court shall DENY WITHOUT PREJUDICE Third–Party Defendant's [23] Motion to Dismiss and/or Compel Arbitration.
This suit arises out of alleged damage to Plaintiffs' home and collapse of their backyard into the yard of the neighboring property, which was being excavated as part of a construction project to build a condominium building. See Third–Party Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 2; Third–Party Pl.'s Opp'n at 2. Plaintiffs initially filed suit in District of Columbia Superior Court against four Defendants: (1) 1367 Florida Avenue, LLC—the alleged owner of the neighboring property; (2) SGA Holdings, Inc.—the company allegedly responsible for the construction activity; (3) SGA Architects, Inc.—the architect allegedly responsible for the construction project; and (4) Sassan Gharai—the owner of SGA Holdings, Inc. Id.
Subsequently, Defendant SGA Holdings, Inc. (“SGA Holdings”) filed a [18] Third–Party Complaint for negligence and breach of contract against the alleged “general contractor” for the construction project, Lane Building Services, LLC (“Lane Building Services”). Third–Party Compl. ¶ 5. The Third–Party Complaint references and attaches as an exhibit a Contract entered into between 1367 Florida Avenue, LLC, SGA Architects, and Lane Building Services to provide construction services for the property located at 1367 Florida Avenue NE, Washington, DC (“Contract”).Id. at ¶ 15, Ex. B (Contract between 1367 Florida Avenue, LLC, SGA Architects, and Lane Building Services, LLC). SGA Holdings is a member of 1367 Florida Avenue, LLC. Third–Party Compl. ¶ 4.
The Contract contains an arbitration agreement, which states:
Id., Ex. B at 16–17. The Contract also defines the word “Claim” as follows:
7.11 CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: Definition. A claim is a demand or assertion by on [sic] of the parties seeking, as a matter of right, adjustment or interpretation of Contract terms, payment of money, extension of time or other belief with respect to the terms of the Contract. The term “Claim” also includes other disputes and matters in question between the Owner and GC arising out of or relating to the Contract. Claims must be initiate [sic] by written notice. The responsibility to substantiate Claims shall rest with the party making the Claim.
Id., Ex. B at 15. Invoking these provisions, Third–Party Defendant Lane Building Services subsequently filed the present [23] Motion to Dismiss and/or Compel Arbitration, arguing that SGA Holdings is a third-party beneficiary of the Contract and should be required to arbitrate the claims it raises in its Third–Party Complaint.
In the time since this motion has been pending, the status of the parties has changed slightly, although not in any way that affects the substance of this Court's ruling. This Court has dismissed 1367 Florida Avenue, LLC from this litigation due to Plaintiffs' failure to serve this Defendant. See Order, ECF No. [27]. In addition, pursuant to their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have added Lane Building Services as a Defendant in this action. See Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. [42]. Defendants SGA Architects and Sassan Gharai subsequently filed a cross-claim against Lane Building Services. See Cross–Claim of Defendants Sassan Gharai and SGA Architects, Inc. Against Lane Building Services, LLC, ECF No. [44]. Lane Building Services has also filed a cross-claim against all of the other remaining Defendants—SGA Architects, Sassan Gharai, and SGA Holdings. See Defendant/Cross–Plaintiff Lane Building Services, LLC's Cross–Claim Against Defendants/Cross–Defendants Sassan Gharai, SGA Companies, Inc. f/k/a SGA Architects, Inc. t/a SGA Architects, and 1367 Florida Avenue, LLC, ECF No. [63].
Accordingly, due to the timing of the various filings in this case, Lane Building Services is now a Defendant, a Cross–Plaintiff, a Cross–Defendant, and a Third–Party Defendant in this action. Similarly, SGA Holdings is a Defendant, a Cross–Defendant, and a Third–Party Plaintiff in this suit. However, because this opinion only discusses the motion to compel arbitration with respect to the third-party claim asserted by SGA Holdings against Lane Building Services, for ease of reference, the Court refers to SGA Holdings as Third–Party Plaintiff and Lane Building Services as Third–Party Defendant.
“When considering a motion to stay proceedings and/or compel arbitration, the appropriate standard of review for the district court is the same standard used in resolving summary judgment motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a).” Sheet Metal Workers' Intern. Ass'n v. United Transp. Union, 767 F.Supp.2d 161, 167 (D.D.C.2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Thus, it is appropriate to grant a motion to stay proceedings when the pleadings and the evidence demonstrate that ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ). “In this situation, the movant (the party seeking summary judgment or arbitration) bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Kindig v. Whole Foods Mkt. Group, Inc., 811 F.Supp.2d 410, 413 (D.D.C.2011). In order to establish that a fact is or cannot be genuinely disputed, a party must (a) cite to specific parts of the record—including deposition testimony, documentary evidence, affidavits or declarations, or other competent evidence—in support of his or her position, or (b) demonstrate that the materials relied upon by the opposing party do not actually establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Conclusory assertions offered without any factual basis in the record cannot create a genuine dispute sufficient to survive summary judgment. Ass'n of Flight Attendants–CWA, AFL–CIO v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 564 F.3d 462, 465–66 (D.C.Cir.2009).
When faced with a motion for summary judgment, the district court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence; instead, the evidence must be analyzed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, with all justifiable inferences drawn in his or her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If material facts are genuinely in dispute, or undisputed facts are susceptible to divergent yet justifiable inferences, summary judgment is inappropriate. Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C.Cir.2009). In the end, the district court's task is to determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In this regard, the non-movant must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted).
The threshold question at issue in this motion is whether SGA Holdings is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between 1367 Florida Avenue, LLC, SGA Architects, and Lane Building Services. Third–Party Defendant Lane Building Services argues that SGA Holdings is a third-party beneficiary to the contract, meaning that its claims grounded in the contract are subject to arbitration. Third–Party Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 10–12. Because Lane Building Services would be entitled to invoke the arbitration clause against its contractual counter-parties...
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