Mariculture Prods. Ltd. v. Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London
Decision Date | 14 May 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 33214.,33214. |
Citation | 142 Conn.App. 484,70 A.3d 92 |
Parties | MARICULTURE PRODUCTS LTD. v. THOSE CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S OF LONDON Individually Subscribing to Certificate No. 1395/91 et al. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James T. Hargrove, pro hac vice, with whom were Christopher Bristol, Greenwich, and, on the brief, Frederic Rickles, for the named defendants (appellants).
Ilan Markus, with whom were Michael J. Dorney, New Haven, and, on the brief, Robert M. Barrack, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).
ALVORD, ESPINOSA and PELLEGRINO, Js.*
The present appeal represents the third appeal in an extensive history of litigation concerning an insurance claim dispute that arose after Hurricane Bob, in 1991, had destroyed much of the Maine fish hatchery business of the plaintiff, Mariculture Products Ltd. In Mariculture Products Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 84 Conn.App. 688, 854 A.2d 1100, cert. denied, 272 Conn. 905, 863 A.2d 698 (2004)( Mariculture I ), this court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court, holding that the statute under which the plaintiff brought its claim for interest, Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 24–A, § 2436, was inapplicable to the policy at issue, and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment on that count in favor of the defendants, Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London Individually Subscribing to Certificate No. 1395/91. 1Id., at 708–10, 718, 854 A.2d 1100. In Mariculture Products Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 110 Conn.App. 668, 955 A.2d 1206 (2008)( Mariculture II ), this court reversed the supplemental judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff post-judgment interest under General Statutes § 37–3a, holding that the parties' stipulation had limited the issue of postjudgment interest to Maine law, and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to vacate its order granting postjudgment interest. Id., at 676–77, 679, 955 A.2d 1206. The defendants now appeal from the trial court's judgment applying the law of Maine and granting the plaintiff postjudgmentinterest on its jury award pursuant to Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 1602–C. The defendants claim that the trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff was entitled to postjudgment interest because it improperly (1) considered the plaintiff's motion for postjudgment interest under the procedural law of Maine and (2) determined that the plaintiff had not waived its right to postjudgment interest under § 1602–C. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following relevant facts and procedural history were set forth in Mariculture II. “ ‘The plaintiff owned and operated fish hatcheries at three separate locations in Maine. Gershon G. Navon served both as the president and sole shareholder of the plaintiff and its parent corporation, Mariculture Products Corporation. The plaintiff's inventory of fish at each of its hatcheries was insured by the subject insurance policy that was issued by the defendants. The policy covered fish that were lost due to death, destruction or escape.
“ ‘The property insurance policy also included a clause naming Key Bank [of Maine (Key Bank) ] as a loss payee. Key Bank had loaned to the plaintiff a total of $9 million to finance the establishment of the plaintiff's business. Key Bank initially loaned to the plaintiff $5 million for construction of the hatcheries and sites. This loan was disbursed in three installments from 1988 through 1991. Key Bank loaned an additional $4 million to the plaintiff in 1992. That loan was equally divided between a working capital loan and a term loan. The working capital funds operated as a revolving line of credit.
“ ‘The plaintiff entered into a series of security agreements with Key Bank to secure the loans. The plaintiff's machinery, cages and other assets related to the construction of the hatchery facilities served as collateral for the $5 million construction loan. The revolving line of credit associated with the $2 million of working capital was secured by the plaintiff's inventory of fish.
“ ‘The plaintiff sustained a significant loss of fish at its Frenchboro farm on August, 19, 1991, as a result of Hurricane Bob. On March 3, 1992, the plaintiff submitted a formal claim to the defendants specifying losses of $744,070. The plaintiff later reduced this claim to $729,672. On April 2, 1992, the defendants denied the claim by letter, stating that the claim was “excessive” and providing no further explanation.
“ ‘Meanwhile, between January and March, 1992, the plaintiff was engaged in negotiations with Key Bank regarding its inability to make its loan payments. Key Bank had sent a written notice of default and acceleration to the plaintiff on February 27, 1992, outlining various defaults allegedly committed by the plaintiff. During the course of these negotiations, on March 17, 1992, Key Bank physically seized the plaintiff's assets.
“ ‘On May 26, 1993, allegedly on behalf of the plaintiff, Key Bank submitted a proof of loss form to the defendants, claiming $150,000 in losses. This proof of loss form purported to release the defendants from all further claims by the plaintiff. Subsequently, the defendants paid $150,000 to Key Bank pursuant to a settlement between the defendants and Key Bank.
“ ” Mariculture II, supra, 110 Conn.App. at 671–73, 955 A.2d 1206.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mariculture II, supra, 110 Conn.App. at 673–74, 955 A.2d 1206.
“ ” Id., at 674, 955 A.2d 1206.
The defendants appealed from that supplemental judgment, claiming, in Mariculture II, that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the stipulation by the parties as permitting a claim for interest under Connecticut law. The defendants argued that “the parties could not have contemplated or arrived at any agreement concerning interest under Connecticut law because the plaintiff's claim to interest before, during and after the trial had been under Maine law.” Id., at 675, 955 A.2d 1206. We agreed with the defendants and concluded that the jury's answers to interrogatories, which were specifically addressed at making factual findings on the plaintiff's claims under Maine law, did not support the court's determination on remand that the plaintiff was entitled to interest pursuant to § 37–3a. Id., at 679, 955 A.2d 1206. Because the trial court's factual determination on remand, that the jury's responses set forth the requisite factual basis for an award of interest under Connecticut law, was clearly erroneous, we reversed the court's grant of prejudgment and postjudgment interest and remanded the case with direction to vacate that order. Id.
On June 8, 2010, the plaintiff filed a motion for order on remand seeking an order from the trial court that the defendants pay the underlying jury award, pay prejudgment interest pursuant to Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 1602–B, and pay postjudgment interest pursuant to Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 1602–C, or alternatively, an order requiring the defendants to pay the postjudgment interest previously ordered by the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 37–3a.
In a memorandum of decision filed on February 14, 2011, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion in part, reasoning that the plaintiff was the holder of a...
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