Marie M.E. Church of Chicago v. Trinity M.E. Church of Chicago

• Decision Date: 08 February 1912
• Parties: MARIE M. E. CHURCH OF CHICAGO et al. v. TRINITY M. E. CHURCH OF CHICAGO et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

253 Ill. 21

97 N.E. 262

MARIE M. E. CHURCH OF CHICAGO et al.

v.TRINITY M. E. CHURCH OF CHICAGO et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 21, 1911.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1912.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; John Gibbons, Judge.

Suit by the Marie Methodist Episcopal Church of Chicago and others against the Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church of Chicago and others. From a decree for complainants, defendants appeal. Reversed, and bill dismissed.Holland & Elliott, for appellants.

Seth F. Crews, for appellees.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

The appellee the Marie Methodist Episcopal Church of Chicago filed its bill in equity in the superior court of Cook county against the appellants, the Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church of Chicago and its trustees, praying the court to declare a trust in favor of said appellee in certain real estate in Chicago and to require the appellants to convey the same to it. The prayer for such relief was based on averments that the First Methodist Episcopal Church of Chicago contributed $10,000 to the erection of the building on said real estate under an agreement that Harlow N. Higinbotham, who had purchased the lots, should convey the same to said First Church within three years, and that said First Church should hold said real estate until there should be a legally incorporated Methodist Episcopal Church to take and hold the same, when the same should be conveyed by said First Church to such church so incorporated. Appellants demurred to the bill, and the demurrer was sustained and the bill dismissed. From that decree said appellee appealed to this court, and the decree was affirmed. Marie M. E. Church v. Trinity M. E. Church, 205 Ill. 601, 69 N. E. 73. Afterward said appellee filed the bill in this case in the circuit court, adding its pastor and a member of the church as complainants, against the appellants, and praying for the same relief. The appellants filed a plea of res judicata, setting up the former decree and judgment of this court in bar. The plea was set down for argument and held bad. The appellants then answered the bill, settingup the former judgment, and alleging that it was res judicata, and further answering the facts alleged in the bill. The issues were referred to a master in chancery, who took the evidence and reported in favor of the appellees. The court overruled objections to the report and entered a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill. From that decree this appeal was taken.

[1] There was identity of parties and subject-matter in the two suits, and the rule is that in such a case the question which was in issue and judicially passed upon and determined in the first suit is conclusively settled by the judgment and cannot be again litigated in another action between the same parties. Noyes v. Kern, 94 Ill. 521;Hanna v. Read, 102 Ill. 596, 40 Am. Rep. 608;Wright v. Griffey, 147 Ill. 496, 35 N. E. 732,37 Am. St. Rep. 228;Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Carson, 169 Ill. 247, 48 N. E. 402;People v. Hill, 182 Ill. 425, 55 N. E. 542. A complainant must present all the grounds showing his right to the relief prayed for which could have been presented, and, if he does not, he will not be allowed in a second suit to take advantage of the omission. All questions relating to the same subject-matter which were open to consideration and could have been presented are conclusively settled, whether they were presented or not. Bailey v. Bailey, 115 Ill. 551, 4 N. E. 394;Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122, 13 N. E. 161,5 Am. St. Rep. 502;Lusk v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 183, 71 N. E. 878.

[2][3] The former judgment must be upon the merits, but a judgment on demurrer is as conclusive as a judgment from a finding of the facts alleged in the bill. Nispel v. Laparle, 74 Ill. 306. Inasmuch as a judgment upon demurrer must be upon the merits to operate as a bar to a subsequent suit, such a judgment, by reason of a defective pleading or because a complainant has mistaken his remedy, which was at law instead of in equity, will not operate as a bar to a subsequent suit, where the cause of action is well pleaded or the suit is in the proper forum. Farwell v. Great Western Telegraph Co., 161 Ill. 522, 44 N. E. 891;Farmers' & Mechanics' Life Ass'n v. Caine, 224 Ill. 599, 79 N. E. 956. But where parties choose to present issues of law on the merits by demurrer, they are concluded just as much as though the judgment was upon a hearing. Vanlandingham v. Ryan, 17 Ill. 25. The same legal consequences follow whether the allegations of the bill are admitted by demurrer or proved. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Slaght, 205 U. S. 122, 27 Sup. Ct. 442, 51 L. Ed. 738.

[4] A defective pleading does not mean a statement of a defective title, or of facts which do not entitle a complainant to the relief prayed for. A demurrer to a bill for want of equity is always to the merits. In Stow v. Russell, 36 Ill. 18, where there was such a demurrer, the court said: ‘In chancery, a demurrer is always to the merits, and in bar of the relief sought, and proceeds upon the ground that, admitting the facts stated in the bill to be true, the complainant is not entitled to the relief he seeks.’ This was repeated in Harris v. Cornell, 80 Ill. 54.

[5] The facts were properly alleged in the former bill, and the complainant was bound to allege every fact that would entitle it to the relief prayed for. The case comes within the rule stated in Vanlandingham v. Ryan, supra, where the court said: ‘For it may be that the cause of action is well set forth, and the judgment proceed upon the ground that the cause is not sufficient to sustain an action. I should hold such judgment a bar to another action varying the statement and allegations, or changing even the form of the action. Such decision would be upon the merits and very right set up, and may as well be determined, concluded, and barred on an issue of law by demurrer as upon an issue of fact.’

[6] It is contended by counsel for appellees that the former judgment was not on the merits, but for a defective pleading. That is not true. In the bill the Marie Church claimed an equitable title in fee simple in the premises and alleged the facts on which that claim was founded. If the appellants had answered and the bill had been dismissed after a hearing in which the facts alleged were proved, it would not be thought that the decision was not on the merits, and it makes no difference whether a complainant is first compelled to prove the facts and the objection is then made that he is not entitled to the relief prayed for, or the defendant does not compel the complainant to prove the facts, but admits them.

[7] It...