Marietti v. Santacana

• Decision Date: 24 March 2017
• Docket Number: Civil No. 14-1902 (BJM)
• Parties: DIANA MARIETTI A/K/A DIANA ELIZABETH LUGO, Plaintiff, v. EDUARDO SANTACANA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

DIANA MARIETTI A/K/A DIANA ELIZABETH LUGO, Plaintiff, v. EDUARDO SANTACANA, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 14-1902 (BJM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

March 24, 2017

OPINION AND ORDER

Diana Marietti a/k/a Diana Elizabeth Lugo ("Marietti") brought this action under the court's diversity jurisdiction against Eduardo Santacana ("Santacana"), Sheila Gomez ("Gomez"), and their alleged conjugal partnership, seeking to collect alimony and child support awards issued by state courts in Minnesota and Puerto Rico. Docket No. 22. Contending that Gomez and Santacana "apparently" were never legally married, Gomez moved for partial summary judgment, Docket No. 69, and that motion was denied. Docket No. 84. Marietti moved for summary judgment, Docket No. 83, and defendants opposed. Docket No. 86. The case is before me on consent of the parties. Docket No. 55.

For the reasons set forth below, Marietti's motion is GRANTED IN PART.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is "genuine" only if it "is one that could be resolved in favor of either party." Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). A fact is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions" of the record materials "which it believes demonstrate the absence" of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

The court does not act as trier of fact when reviewing the parties' submissions and so cannot "superimpose [its] own ideas of probability and likelihood (no matter how reasonable those ideas may be) upon" conflicting evidence. Greenburg v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 1987). Rather, it must "view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). The court may not grant summary judgment "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

BACKGROUND¹

Santacana and Gomez are domiciled in Puerto Rico, and Marietti is domiciled in Minnesota. SUF ¶¶ 5, 6. Marietti and Santacana were previously married and were divorced by a Minnesota state court in June 2001. SUF ¶¶ 8, 9. The Minnesota state court approved a divorce settlement agreement reached by Marietti and Santacana, and issued a judgment ordering Santacana to pay Marietti child support and alimony. SUF ¶ 9. After divorcing Marietti, Santacana moved to Florida and, later, to Puerto Rico. SUF ¶ 12.

In 2004, Santacana asked the Minnesota court to modify and eliminate the alimony award. SUF ¶ 14. The Minnesota court denied those requests and ordered Santacana to payan additional amount of child support and alimony. SUF ¶ 14. In October 2013, the Minnesota court issued a judgment ordering Santacana to pay $321,747.82 for alimony, $91,297.71 for child support, $33,354.80 for violations related to the divorce decree, and $2,926.80 for attorney's fees. SUF ¶ 15. The Minnesota court has never relieved Santacana of his obligation to continue paying Marietti alimony. SUF ¶ 11.

In February 2014, Marietti filed an action in Puerto Rico state court, seeking to enforce the Minnesota state court's judgment. SUF ¶ 18. In January 2015, the Puerto Rico state court calculated the amount of alimony due under the Minnesota state court's judgment, ordered Santacana to pay $359,771.82 in alimony, and instructed Santacana that his obligation to make monthly alimony payments remains. SUF ¶¶ 20, 21. Marietti seeks to collect $487,351.13. SUF ¶ 21. This amount includes the $359,771.82 in alimony calculated by the Puerto Rico state court in January 2015, as well as the October 2013 Minnesota state court's order requiring Santacana to pay $91,297.71 for child support, $33,354.80 for violations related to the divorce decree, and $2,926.80 for attorney's fees. SUF ¶¶ 15, 20, 21. Santacana conclusorily claims that the amount he owes "has changed," but he has provided no evidence specifically showing that he actually owes less than the claimed $487,351.13. OSF ¶¶ 15, 20, 21.

Defendants' Marital Status

Marietti asserts Santacana and Gomez are married, and it is undisputed that in November 2001 Santacana and Gomez participated in a religious marriage ceremony in Miami, Florida. SUF ¶ 1; Docket Nos. 73-2, 90-2. Santacana and Gomez initially admitted that they were married, but have subsequently claimed that their marriage was not legally valid. OSF ¶ 1; Docket No. 51 ¶ 1; Docket No. 69. In support of this claim, Gomez filed an affidavit that improperly included a hearsay statement of an unidentified Miami-Dade County Clerk employee. Docket No. 84. This statement was offered to prove that no marriage certificate was recorded in Florida. Id. Thus, the court previously found a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Santacana and Gomez have a valid marriage. Id.

DISCUSSION

Marietti contends that Santacana's state-court decrees should be enforced against each of the three defendants. Docket No. 83 at 17. Santacana and Gomez respond that genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment as to all three defendants. Docket No. 86. Before proceeding to the merits of the parties' respective positions, it is necessary to address a threshold jurisdictional aspect of this diversity jurisdiction case.

The "domestic relations exception divests federal courts of jurisdiction over 'a narrow range of [cases implicating] domestic relations issues' that would otherwise meet the requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)." Irish v. Irish, 842 F.3d 736, 740 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 307 (2006)). Yet, "[i]n general, lawsuits affecting domestic relations, however substantially, are not within the exception unless the claim at issue is one to obtain, alter or end a divorce, alimony or child custody decree." Dunn v. Cometa, 238 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2001). "This narrow construction led the Court in Ankenbrandt," which involved claims "by a mother, on behalf of her daughters, charging their father, now divorced, and his companion with sexual and physical abuse of the children," to conclude "that the exception did not apply to [the] tort claims there at issue despite their intimate connection to family affairs." Irish, 842 F.3d at 740 (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 691, 703 (1992)).

The narrow domestic relations exception also does not bar "a suit to enforce compliance with a separation agreement's terms ordering alimony." Irish, 842 F.3d at 743 (citing Mooney v. Mooney, 471 F.3d 246, 247 (1st Cir. 2006)). Indeed, it is well-settled that "[f]ederal courts will . . . exercise jurisdiction over the enforcement of support arrearages." See Drewes v. Ilnicki, 863 F.2d 469, 471 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 591 (1858) ("The parties to a cause for a divorce and for alimony are . . . bound by a decree for both . . . . The decree in both is a judgment of record, and will be received as such by other courts. And such a judgment or decree, rendered in any State of the United States, the court having jurisdiction, will be carried into judgment in any other State, to have there the same binding force that it has in the State in which it was originally given. For such a purpose, both the equity courts of the United States and the same courts of the States have jurisdiction."); Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 1996) ("enforcing a decree involving alimony or child support is outside the scope of the [domestic relations] exception").

In this case, Marietti and Santacana reached a divorce settlement agreement that was incorporated into a divorce decree in 2001 by a Minnesota state court. Marietti underscores, without opposition from defendants, that this decree is a final judgment, and defendants do not suggest that the Puerto Rico state court decree is modifiable. Marietti seeks to enforce the amounts awarded by these state-court decrees. Because these amounts are "calculable solely from the records of the" state courts in Minnesota and Puerto Rico, Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 564 (5th Cir. 1981), and because Marietti does not seek to obtain, alter, or end an alimony or child support decree, Dunn, 238 F.3d at 41, the court, in this diversity jurisdiction case, must give full faith and credit to the state-court decrees. See Barber, 62 U.S. at 591; Maner v. Maner, 401 F.2d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1968); Maner v. Maner, 412 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir. 1969) (in diversity jurisdiction case, district court in Alabama correctly enforced Florida state court's alimony decrees, as these final judgments were "entitled to enforcement under the Full Faith and Credit Clause").

Marietti seeks to collect $487,351.13, which includes the $359,771.82 in alimony calculated by the Puerto Rico state court in January 2015, as well as the October 2013 Minnesota state court's decree requiring Santacana to pay $91,297.71 for child support, $33,354.80 for violations related to the divorce decree, and $2,926.80 for attorney's fees. While Santacana conclusorily claims that this amount "has changed," he has not pointed the court to any evidence showing that the amount he owes is actually less than $487,351.13. Since the $487,351.13 figure was calculated as of January 2015, and since Santacana remains obligated to pay alimony under the state-court decrees, it is quite...