Marin v. Utah State Bar

• Docket Number: 20250101
• Decision Date: 26 June 2025
• Citation: Marin v. Utah State Bar, 2025 UT 18, 20250101 (Utah Jun 26, 2025)
• Parties: Melvin M. Marin, Petitioner, v. Utah State Bar, Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

1

2025 UT 18

Melvin M. Marin, Petitioner, v. Utah State Bar, Respondent.

No. 20250101

Supreme Court of Utah

June 26, 2025

Submitted April 11, 2025

On Petition for Extraordinary Relief

Attorneys:

Melvin M. Marin, San Diego, Cal., pro sepetitioner

Maribeth L. LeHoux, Emily A. Lee, Salt Lake City, for respondent

JUSTICE POHLMANauthored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE JUSTICE PETERSEN, and JUSTICE HAGEN joined.

OPINION

POHLMAN, JUSTICE

INTRODUCTION

¶1 This matter is before us on a petition for extraordinary relief.Melvin M. Marin, an attorney once licensed to practice in New York, seeks relief in this court by collaterally attacking a New York court's 1998 order suspending him from the practice of law in that jurisdiction.If we deny his primary request to decline to give full faith and credit to the New York order, Marin alternatively requests a waiver of rules 14-704(a)(7)and14-704(a)(8) of our bar admission rules, which require attorney applicants to establish that they are in good standing in all jurisdictions where they are currently admitted and that they are not currently subject to lawyer discipline.Utah Sup. Ct. R. Pro. Prac. 14-704(a)(7), (a)(8).We deny both requests.

BACKGROUND^[1]

¶2 In 1992, Marin was admitted to practice law by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Third Department(New York court).^[2]In re Marin, 250 A.D.2d 997, 997(N.Y.App.Div.1998)(per curiam), appeal dismissed, 704 N.E.2d 228(N.Y.1998), leave to appeal denied, 708 N.E.2d 177(N.Y.1999).

¶3 In April 1997, the Committee on Professional Standards brought an attorney disciplinary action against Marin in the New York court, charging him with six violations of New York's Code of Professional Responsibility.Id. at 997-98;see alsoComm. on Pro. Standards v. Marin, No. 1:97-CV-1361, 2017 WL 5515854, at *1(N.D.N.Y.Mar. 30, 2017), aff'd, 764 Fed.Appx. 82(2d Cir.2019).Among the violations, Marin was charged with commencing and pursuing a frivolous action and appearing as an attorney of record in New York without maintaining an office in the state.In re Marin, 250 A.D.2d at 997-98.

¶4 Several months after Marin answered the disciplinary complaint, he removed the action to the federal district court for the Northern District of New York.Comm. on Pro. Standards, 2017 WL 5515854, at *1.Marin contended that the federal court had jurisdiction over the state action because, according to Marin, he was a federal officer in part charged with New York state residency violations by virtue of his position as a federal officer.But the federal court did not share Marin's view.It rejected his removal the same day it was filed, and it remanded the case back to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.^[3]Seeid. at *1-2.

¶5 Back in New York state court, the court considered the parties' written submissions and heard oral argument.In re Marin, 250 A.D.2d at 998.And in May 1998, the court sustained four of the six disciplinary charges and suspended Marin's law license for a period of six months.Id.

¶6 Marin sought review of the disciplinary decision in the New York Court of Appeals, but his efforts were unsuccessful.^[4]SeeIn re Marin, 704 N.E.2d 228(N.Y.1998), leave to appeal denied, 708 N.E.2d 177(N.Y.1999).For reasons not apparent in the record, Marin's suspension is still in effect today.^[5]

¶7 In 2018, twenty years after the New York court issued its order of discipline, Marin moved that court for an order vacating, ab initio, its 1998 order suspending him from the practice of law.^[6]In re Marin, 158 A.D.3d 889, 889-90(N.Y.App.Div.2018), appeal dismissed, 108 N.E.3d 1025(N.Y.2018).Marin also requested a statement confirming that he had continually been in good standing as a member of the New York Bar since 1992.Id. at 890.The court denied both requests, and it likewise denied Marin's request for reconsideration.Id.;In re Marin, 162 A.D.3d 1198, 1199(N.Y.App.Div.2018).

¶8 At least one federal district court also has rejected Marin's effort to void the May 1998 disciplinary order.SeeMarin v. New York, No. 17-CV-4668, 2017 WL 6405847, at *4(S.D.N.Y.Aug. 28, 2017)(dismissing Marin's complaint and referencing another federal court's dismissal of similar claims in 2000).And another federal court has rejected Marin's request to reopen and vacate its 1997 remand order.SeeComm. on Pro. Standards, 2017 WL 5515854, at *1, 5.

¶9 Undeterred, Marin now has filed in this court a petition for extraordinary writ, in which he seeks to mount "a collateral attack" against the New York court's disciplinary order.^[7]He claims the 1998 disciplinary order has frustrated his ability to seek admission to the Utah State Bar and to make a living.He explains, "because the [New York] judges will never lift their suspension . . ., I must have an order . . . that says plainly that the [New York] rulings are not entitled to full faith and credit and are considered void, so I can apply here for admission after the other matters are satisfied like taking the Utah Bar Exam and character & fitness."^[8]

ANALYSIS

¶10 A person may petition this court for extraordinary relief "[w]hen no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy is available."Utah R. App. P. 19(a).We have "broad discretion to grant or deny extraordinary relief," and in exercising our discretion, "we consider a variety of factors including the nature of the relief sought, the circumstances alleged in the petition, and the purpose of the type of writ sought."Durbano v. Utah State Bar(In re Durbano), 2019 UT 34, ¶ 28, 449 P.3d 24(cleaned up).In practice, "the more extraordinary the relief the petitioner seeks, the more compelling the showing of an entitlement to that relief should be."Lyman v. Cox, 2024 UT 35, ¶ 3, 556 P.3d 49(per curiam)(cleaned up).And, ordinarily, we will not grant relief unless the request is based on uncontroverted facts.Id.¶11 Marin makes two requests for extraordinary relief.First, he collaterally attacks the New York court's 1998 order suspending him from the practice of law in that jurisdiction, asking us not to give the order full faith and credit.In the alternative, if we deny his primary request, Marin asks that we waive certain admission rules for attorney applicants to the Utah State Bar.His two requests are before us in the first instance, and in turn we reject both.

I.We Deny Marin's Request to Disregard the New York Disciplinary Order

¶12 Marin collaterally attacks the 1998 New York disciplinary order, asserting it is frustrating his ability to seek admission to the Utah State Bar.He invites us to deny full faith and credit to the New York order on one of several bases.We decline.

¶13 The United States Constitution requires that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.And the United States Supreme Court has stated that "to fulfill this constitutional mandate, the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court of the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced."Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. N. Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 704(1982)(cleaned up).

¶14 Yet there are limits to this mandate, "[c]hief among the[m] . . . is the caveat . . . that a judgment of a court in one State is conclusive upon the merits in a court in another State only if the court in the first State had power to pass on the merits-had jurisdiction, that is, to render the judgment."Id.(cleaned up).Thus, "before a court is bound by the judgment rendered in another State, it may inquire into the jurisdictional basis of the foreign court's decree."Id. at 705.If the court determines that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, "full faith and credit need not be given."Id.;see alsoVan Kleeck Creamery, Inc. v. W. Frozen Prods. Co., 465 P.2d 544, 546(Utah1970)(explaining that despite the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, "if it is determined that the court of the first state did not have jurisdiction, the courts of the second state are under no obligation to enforce the judgment").

¶15 Marin invokes this limitation and invites us to disregard the New York disciplinary order on the basis that it is void for "lack of jurisdiction."Specifically, Marin contends that because he had removed the disciplinary complaint to federal court, the New York court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute when it entered the order in 1998 suspending his law license.

¶16We reject Marin's invitation because we are not persuaded that his temporary removal of the disciplinary complaint against him to federal court deprived the New York court of subject matter jurisdiction.Although Marin removed the state disciplinary dispute to federal court, his removal was immediately rejected, and the federal court remanded the case back to state court, where it proceeded to a final judgment.Supra¶¶ 4-5.Thus, there is no basis in the record for us to question the jurisdiction of the New York court, and we accordingly afford full faith and credit to the 1998 disciplinary order.^[9]

¶17 Marin next contends that we should decline to afford full faith and credit to the New York court's disciplinary order on the grounds that it is unconscionable, fraudulent or violative of due process or public policy.Once again, we are unpersuaded.Marin has not cited any pertinent authority to support the proposition that we could disregard the New York order on these grounds...