Marine Holdings, LLC v. N.Y.C. Comm'n on Human Rights

• Decision Date: 08 May 2018
• Docket Number: No. 45,45
• Citation: 76 N.Y.S.3d 510,31 N.Y.3d 1045,100 N.E.3d 849
• Parties: In the Matter of MARINE HOLDINGS, LLC, LLC, Doing Business as Marine Terrace Associates, LLC, et al., Respondents, v. NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Appellant, et al., Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

31 N.Y.3d 1045

100 N.E.3d 849

76 N.Y.S.3d 510

In the Matter of MARINE HOLDINGS, LLC, LLC, Doing Business as Marine Terrace Associates, LLC, et al., Respondents,

v.NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Appellant, et al., Respondent.

No. 45

Court of Appeals of New York.

Decided May 8, 2018

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York City (MacKenzie Fillow, Richard Dearing and Devin Slack of counsel), for appellant.

Herrick Feinstein LLP, New York City (Avery S. Mehlman, Jonathan L. Adler and Scott C. Ross of counsel), for respondents.

Jeanette Zelhof, Mobilization for Justice, Inc., New York City (Leah Goodridge of counsel), for Mobilization for Justice, Inc., and others, amici curiae.

Disability Rights New York, Albany (Simeon Goldman and Sara Liss of counsel), for Disability Rights New York, amicus curiae.

Cuti Hecker Wang LLP, New York City (Mariann Meier Wang of counsel), for Cuti Hecker Wang LLP and others, amici curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURTMEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the judgment of Supreme Court reinstated.

In this proceeding pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8–123 and CPLR article 78, petitioners challenge a determination of the New York City Commission on Human Rights ordering them to install a wheelchair-accessible entrance to an apartment by converting a window into a doorway and installing a ramp (see Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8–107[15][a] ). The issue we must resolve is whether the Commission's conclusion that petitioners failed to meet their burden of proving undue hardship is "supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole" (Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8–123[e]; see also CPLR 7803[4] [article 78 proceeding may raise the question "whether a determination made as a result of a hearing held, and at which evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law is, on the entire record, supported by substantial evidence"] ).

Petitioners claim that the requested accommodation would cause undue hardship in the conduct of their business (see NYC Administrative Code § 8–102[18] ) because it would be structurally infeasible. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the question before the Court is not whether "there is substantial evidence ... that the requested accommodation is structurally infeasible." Rather, it is the Commission's determination to which we must apply the "substantial evidence" standard of review. In light of the Commission's ruling in favor of respondents and because petitioners have the burden of demonstrating undue hardship (see id. ), the issue is whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's conclusion that petitioners failed to carry that burden.

"Quite often there is substantial evidence on both sides" of an issue disputed before an administrative agency ( Matter of Ridge Rd. Fire Dist. v. Schiano, 16 N.Y.3d 494, 500, 922 N.Y.S.2d 249, 947 N.E.2d 140 [2011] ), and the substantial evidence test "demands only that a given inference is reasonable and plausible, not necessarily the most probable" ( id. at 499, 922 N.Y.S.2d 249, 947 N.E.2d 140 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). Applying this standard, "[c]ourts may not weigh the evidence or reject [a] determination where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists" ( Matter of State Div. of Human Rights (Granelle), 70 N.Y.2d 100, 106, 517 N.Y.S.2d 715, 510 N.E.2d 799 [1987] ). Instead, "when a rational basis for the conclusion adopted by the [agency] is found, the judicial function is exhausted. The question, thus, is not whether [the reviewing court] find[s] the proof ... convincing, but whether the [agency] could do so" ( id. [citations omitted] ).

The Commission considered evidence presented at the hearing that petitioners had carried out a window-to-door conversion elsewhere in petitioners' residential complex, similar to that proposed as a feasible reasonable accommodation by an architect retained by petitioners and by an architect who testified for respondents. No evidence was presented that this prior window-to-door conversion had imposed any hardship on petitioners, and substantial evidence supports the determination that petitioners did not prove that the proposed conversion would require alterations significantly different from the previous one. The Commission could rationally conclude that petitioners failed to carry their burden of proving that the proposed accommodation would cause undue hardship in the conduct of their business.

To the extent reviewable, we conclude that the Commission's determination should not otherwise be disturbed.

GARCIA, J. (dissenting).

Petitioners proved that the requested accommodation—converting a window to a door and installing a ramp—would create an undue hardship. Nothing in the record—certainly no "substantial evidence"—supports the New York City Commission on Human Rights' conclusion to the contrary. Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the order of the Appellate Division.

Petitioners' tenant is unable to enter or leave her apartment without being carried. She asked petitioners to install a wheelchair-accessible entrance to her unit, and contacted the Commission. Two Commission employees—not engineers—visited the property and, after seeing a window-to-door conversion at petitioners' management office, located in a separate building in the same apartment complex, suggested that a similar accommodation could be made for the tenant. The Commission informed petitioners after this visit that the tenant was entitled to a disability accommodation under the City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8–101 et seq. ).

Petitioners then hired an architect, who performed a feasibility study that concluded that the construction required to implement this solution would be "quite involved" but "technically feasible." After the tenant filed a formal complaint, petitioners hired a structural engineer to examine the Commission's proposed accommodation. The structural engineer found that the accommodation would cause a "slew of structural issues" and that the building might need to be evacuated.

The Commission then issued a probable cause determination that petitioners had discriminated against the tenant by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability. A hearing was held before an ALJ, at which petitioners and the Commission presented witnesses and exhibits. Petitioners' structural engineer testified, explaining the complex installation process for the proposed ramp and the issues that would result. He also described how the ramp in the neighboring building differed from that proposed for the tenant's apartment because the other building had a crawl space instead of a basement, because the distance between the proposed door and sidewalk was shorter, and because there were gas lines below the tenant's apartment. The Commission relied on the opinion of its architect, on the feasibility study conducted by petitioners' architect, and on the fact of the prior accommodation at the management office building. The Commission's architect submitted a letter stating that a "preliminary visual analysis" demonstrated that the modification appeared feasible and that the structural engineer's report on behalf of petitioners was "slightly alarmist." He drafted this opinion before visiting the site, but did not alter it after an inspection. Evidence at the hearing showed that the Commission's investigator¹ was involved in the drafting of the architect's opinion and required him to insert the sentence stating that the accommodation "appear[ed] feasible at this time based on our preliminary visual analysis."

Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a report and recommendation finding that petitioners "did not discriminate against [the tenant] by their failure to provide the [proposed accommodation], because it would create an undue hardship to do so." In the ALJ's thorough opinion, she reviewed the qualifications of the experts, the time they spent on examining the accommodation, and the materials they relied on in coming to their determinations. She fully credited the structural engineer's report and testimony on petitioners' behalf and noted that the Commission did not present the testimony of a structural engineer. She found that only petitioners' expert was qualified to assess the structural feasibility and that the Commission's inspection was cursory. With respect to the prior accommodation at the management office, she noted that there was an "utter absence of evidence on how that modification was performed," and that "[t]he supposition and speculation offered by the Commission are not evidence." Accordingly, she found that petitioners had met their burden of showing that the accommodation would pose an undue hardship.

The Commission, now in the role of decision-making authority, issued a decision and order rejecting the ALJ's report and recommendation and finding that petitioners did not prove undue hardship. The Commission held that the ALJ, "[d]espite her explicit recognition of [petitioners'] burden under the Code, and despite acknowledging [the appropriate] binding precedent, ... clearly applied a burden-shifting analysis" and improperly held that the Commission's evidence "did not effectively contradict" petitioners' expert. After using this basis to reject the ALJ's findings, the Commission found that "the expert witnesses, including [petitioners'] expert, and the architect that [petitioners] hired specifically to provide [a] feasibility report agreed that the window-to-door conversion and ramp installation could be done " (emphasis added).² Next, the Commission found that petitioners "failed to rebut the inference that [the tenant's] building could be modified in the same manner as the management building." Although petitioners' structural engineer had presented evidence of significant differences...