Mario Mercado E Hijos v. Benson
| Decision Date | 22 March 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 12747.,12747. |
| Citation | 231 F.2d 251,97 US App. DC 298 |
| Parties | MARIO MERCADO E HIJOS (Central Rufina), Appellant, v. Ezra Taft BENSON, Secretary of Agriculture, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Darwin Charles Brown, Washington, D. C., of the bar of the Supreme Court of California, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court, with whom Mr. Harold Leventhal, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant. Mr. David Ginsburg, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellant.
Mr. Neil Brooks, Asst. Gen. Counsel, United States Dept. of Agriculture, with whom Messrs. Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., Paul A. Sweeney, Atty., Dept. of Justice, and Donald A. Campbell, Atty., U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, were on the brief, for appellees. Mr. Lewis Carroll, Asst. U. S. Atty., also entered an appearance for appellees.
Before EDGERTON, Chief Judge, and WILBUR K. MILLER and FAHY, Circuit Judges.
Appellant, a producer-processor of sugar in Puerto Rico, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against action of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Sugar Act of 1948, 61 Stat. 922, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1100 ff. The Act authorizes the Secretary to make certain payments, from funds appropriated by Congress, to producer-processors who comply with certain conditions, one of which is that they pay, for beets or cane grown by other producers, not less than rates "that may be determined by the Secretary to be fair and reasonable after investigation and due notice and opportunity for public hearing." 61 Stat. 929, 930, § 301(c) (2), 7 U.S.C.A. § 1131(c) (2). Finding that appellant failed to comply with this condition for 1947-1948, the crop year here in issue, the Secretary made no payment to appellant for that year. Appellant says the Secretary held a constitutionally inadequate hearing and fixed a confiscatory rate which deprives appellant of property without due process of law.
The Sugar Act expressly subjects allotments of marketing quotas to judicial review. 61 Stat. 926, 927, § 205 (b-e), 7 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b-e); Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 609-610, 70 S. Ct. 403, 94 L.Ed. 381. But the Act provides for no review of the sort of action involved in this case. This contrast goes far to show that Congress did not intend this sort of action to be reviewable. Section 306 of the Act confirms this conclusion. Section 306 provides that "The facts constituting the basis for any payment, or the amount thereof authorized to be made under this title, officially determined in conformity with rules and regulations...
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Garvey v. Freeman
...like ours. Heavy reliance is placed on Caulfield v. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, 293 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.), and Mario Mercado E Hijos v. Benson, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 298, 231 F.2d 251. We find no implication of congressional intent to preclude review in either the finality provision or the failure ......
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U.S. v. Batson
...of limited factual review), and Boyd v. Secretary of Agriculture, 459 F.Supp. 418, 424 (D.S.C.1978) (same), with Mario Mercado E. Hijos v. Benson, 231 F.2d 251 (D.C.Cir.1956) (no review). The distinction may, in any event, prove to be immaterial. The government does not contend that issues ......
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Gross v. United States, 443-73.
...AAA Sec. 385 (7 U.S.C. § 1385), and ordered the defendant to return all moneys paid to her. The case of Mario Mercado E. Hijos v. Benson, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 298, 231 F.2d 251 (1956) was concerned with Section 306 of the Sugar Act. This section provided that "the facts constituting the basis fo......
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Litton Industries of Maryland, Inc. v. Renegotiation Bd.
...however mistaken its exercise. See United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 39 S.Ct. 464, 63 L.Ed. 1011." See also Hijos v. Benson, (C.A. D.C.) 231 F.2d 251. These decisions chart the course to be followed in this case. That which Litton seeks is the enforcement of the right granted by Secti......