Markham v. American Motors Corp.

Decision Date03 March 1964
Citation22 Wis.2d 680,126 N.W.2d 753
Parties, 55 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2757, 49 Lab.Cas. P 18,853 Thomas MARKHAM et al., Appellants, v. AMERICAN MOTORS CORP., a foreign corporation, et al., Respondents.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

Brach, Wheeler & Hoffman, Racine, for appellants.

La France, Thompson, Greenquist, Evans & Dye, Racine, Alfred E. LaFrance and Adrian P. Schoone, Racine, of counsel, Zubrensky & Padden, Milwaukee, Herbert S. Bratt, Milwaukee, of counsel, for respondents.

CURRIE, Chief Justice.

The gravamen of the amended complaint is that defendants have denied to plaintiffs seniority rights to which they are entitled. Attached to the amended complaint, as Exhibit 1, is a list of 37 persons, together with their addresses, who comprise the named plaintiffs and the persons alleged to be similarly situated and in whose behalf the action is brought. 1 It is alleged that all 37 are now employees of American Motors at Kenosha and are members of Local 72, and of Local 75 (the union at the Milwaukee American Motors plant). 2 The amended complaint further alleges as follows: That American Motors was formed by the merger of two parent corporations, Nash Automobile Company and Hudson Motor Company (hereinafter 'Hudson'); that plaintiffs acquired seniority under prior collective bargaining contracts entered into by Hudson; that all of the plaintiffs have seniority of 18 to 35 years; that after the merger plaintiffs were employed by the Hudson Motor Division of American Motors at Detroit and some time after January 31, 1955, were transferred from Detroit to Wisconsin; that certain agreements were entered into between American Motors and Local 72 or other locals of the same international union relative to the transfer of the company's employees from the Detroit area to Kenosha and Milwaukee, and copies of four of such agreements are attached as exhibits to the amended complaint as Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5; that these four agreements violate plaintiffs' seniority rights under the present collective bargaining agreement existing between the parties; that, among other seniority rights, plaintiffs have been denied three weeks of vacation to which they are entitled; that plaintiffs have petitioned Local 72 to enlist the latter's assistance in an effort to secure their seniority rights but to no avail; and that any further attempt to obtain redress through Local 72 would be futile.

As to American Motors' first ground for demurrer, it is significant to note that the amended complaint alleges in effect that American Motors and Local 72, by entering into the four agreements, conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their seniority rights and were guilty of unfair labor practices. Since American Motors is engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, it is at least arguable that these allegations charge American Motors with conduct which is in violation of sec. 8 of this Act (29 USCA, sec. 158). Therefore, the circuit court properly concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject of the action because of federal preemption. See Local 248, U. A. A. & A. I. W. of America v. Wisconsin E. R. Board (1960), 11 Wis.2d 277, 105 N.W.2d 271, certiorari denied (1961), 365 U.S. 878, 81 S.Ct. 1028, 6 L.Ed.2d 190. However, on the oral argument of this appeal counsel for plaintiffs expressly disclaimed any reliance on any allegations of the complaint which charge defendants with any act of unfair labor practice and stated that plaintiffs rely solely on a cause of action for breach of contract. We accept this disclaimer and consider its effect is to strike from the complaint the allegations which charge defendants with any unfair labor practice apart from breach of contract. As a result any issue of federal preemption has been eliminated. Sec. 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C.A. § 185) 3 which confers on federal district courts jurisdiction over actions for breach of collective bargaining contracts, does not divest state courts of jurisdiction over such suits. Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney (1962), 368 U.S. 502, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483. See also Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp. (1959), 8 Wis.2d 264, 269, 99 N.W.2d 132, 100 N.W.2d 317, certiorari denied, Local 1377 of International Association of Machinists, A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. Hein-Werner Corp., 362 U.S. 962, 80 S.Ct. 878, 4 L.Ed.2d 877.

The circuit court found that there was a defect of parties defendant because of the allegation in the amended complaint that some of plaintiffs are members of Local 75, the collective bargaining agent at the Milwaukee plant of American Motors. We determine, however, that the failure to have made Local 75 a party defendant does not render the complaint demurrable because of a defect in parties plaintiff. If the amended complaint states a good cause of action for breach of contract with respect to those plaintiffs who are members of Local 72, then there is no defect of parties defendant as to such plaintiffs. The fact that the court may not be able to adjudicate the seniority rights of those plaintiffs who are members of Local 75 and not of Local 72, because of the absence of Local 75 as a party defendant, does not require that the plaintiffs who are members of Local 72 be thrown out of court.

The crucial issue raised by both demurrers is whether the amended complaint states a cause of action for breach of contract. The particular clause in the present labor agreement between Local 72 and American Motors, which plaintiffs allege has been breached, reads:

'The term 'seniority,' shall be defined as that status of the employee based upon the employee's established unbroken length of service with the Company from the date of acquiring seniority with the Company or its predecessors, and is measured by years, months and fractions thereof.' 4

Plaintiffs place great reliance upon the allegation of the amended complaint that all of plaintiffs have length of service from 18 to 35 years with American Motors and its parent organization, Hudson. However, under the above quoted seniority definition clause of the present labor contract, an 'unbroken length of service' is necessary to establish the seniority status claimed by plaintiffs. If a break occurred between plaintiffs' long prior service with Hudson and their service with American Motors, then plaintiffs are not entitled to have their seniority with American Motors determined on a basis of 18 to 35 years, but only on the basis of their comparatively short period of service with American Motors. The same would be true if a break occurred between plaintiffs' employment with Hudson Motors Division (sometimes referred to as Hudson Special Products Division) of American Motors at Detroit and the transfer to the Kenosha plant.

The agreement between American Motors and Local 72, and the International Union, with which Local 72 is affiliated, dated January 31, 1955, and attached to the amended complaint as Exhibit 2, provides that those employees who were on the active payroll of Hudson on October 29, 1954, are on the Kenosha payroll prior to March 15, 1955, and had seniority under a former Hudson contract dated August 9, 1950, will not be considered as 'new hires' but their seniority will date from their hire at the Kenosha plant, but that as to other individuals hired, their Hudson seniority dates will be controlling.

Local 72 is not a direct party to the agreement dated April 27, 1955, which is attached to the amended complaint as Exhibit 3, but the parties thereto are American Motors, Local 154 (the Detroit local which was the collective bargaining agent for the Hudson employees), and the international union with which both Locals 72 and 154 are affiliated. It provided that any persons hired by American Motors in Wisconsin, by reason of any stamping activities transferred from Hudson Special Products Division to Wisconsin by the company, shall enjoy the same seniority rights they had at the...

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    ...Wis.2d 277, 105 N.W.2d 271, certiorari denied (1961), 365 U.S. 878, 81 S.Ct. 1028, 6 L.Ed.2d 190, and Markham v. American Motors Corp. (1964), 22 Wis.2d 680, 685, 126 N.W.2d 753, at 755.8 Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake Steamship Co., supra, 370 U.S. p. 177, footnote 3, 82 S.......
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    ...Title 11. Seniority rights do not exist at common law. 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 14 at 587 (1967); Markham v. American Motors Corp., 22 Wis.2d 680, 126 N.W.2d 753, 758 (Sup.Ct.1964). An employee has no inherent right to seniority in service, and can have only such rights as may be based o......
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