Markham v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 20 June 2018
• Docket Number: 1:18-cv-00303-LJO-JLT
• Parties: BRENDA MARKHAM, Plaintiff, v. TEHACHAPI UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

BRENDA MARKHAM, Plaintiff, v. TEHACHAPI UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

1:18-cv-00303-LJO-JLT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

June 20, 2018

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT TO PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Judges in the Eastern District of California carry the heaviest caseloads in the nation, and this Court is unable to devote inordinate time and resources to individual cases and matters. Given the shortage of district judges and staff, this Court addresses only the arguments, evidence, and matters necessary to reach the decision in this order. The parties and counsel are encouraged to contact the offices of United States Senators Feinstein and Harris to address this Court's inability to accommodate the parties and this action. The parties are required to reconsider consent to conduct all further proceedings before a Magistrate Judge, whose schedules are far more realistic and accommodating to parties than that of U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill, who must prioritize criminal and older civil cases.

Civil trials set before Judge O'Neill trail until he becomes available and are subject to suspension mid-trial to accommodate criminal matters. Civil trials are no longer reset to a later date if Judge O'Neill is unavailable on the original date set for trial. Moreover, this Court's Fresno Division randomly and without advance notice reassigns civil actions to U.S. District Judges throughout the nation to serve as visiting judges. In the absence of Magistrate Judge consent, this action is subject to reassignment to a U.S. District Judge from inside or outside the Eastern District of California.

II. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns a request for attorney's fees stemming from administrative due process hearing under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. On March 4, 2018, Plaintiff Brenda Markham filed a complaint seeking attorney's fees and costs related to a due process hearing before California's Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH"). ECF No. 1. On April 4, 2018, Defendant Tehachapi Unified School District filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6), ECF No. 5, and an associated request for judicial notice, ECF No. 6. Plaintiff filed an opposition on April 16, 2018, ECF No. 8, and Defendant filed a reply on April 23, 2018, ECF No. 9. The Court concluded that this matter was suitable for decision on the papers pursuant to Eastern District of California Local Rule 230(g), and deemed the matter submitted on April 23, 2018. ECF No. 10.

III. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the pleadings and filings in K.M. v. Tehachapi Unified School District ("K.M."), Case No. 1:17-cv-01431-LJO-JLT. ECF No. 6 at 1-2. Plaintiff does not appear to oppose the request for judicial notice. See ECF No. 8. "[A] court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases" under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). As the case Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of is assigned to this Court, and Plaintiff does not object to such notice, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to take judicial notice.

IV. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the following facts, which are accepted as true only for the purposes of the instant motion to dismiss. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff sought and received an administrative due process hearing pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §1415(b)(6)(A) regarding the denial by Defendant of a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE") for her child K.M. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10. Plaintiff retained the law firm of Andrea Marcus in connection with the due process proceedings, and Ms. Marcus represented Plaintiff at the due process hearing. Id. at ¶ 12. Following the due process hearing conducted from March 7-9, 2017, the OAH issued a decision on April 24, 2016. Id. at ¶ 11. The OAH determined that Plaintiff was the prevailing party, finding that Defendant "denied [K.M.] a FAPE by significantly impeding [Plaintiff's] right to participate in the IEP process." Id. Because Plaintiff was the prevailing party at in the due process proceedings, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Marcus is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs, amounting to $97,345.50, plus interest. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff also alleges that Ms. Marcus is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees of an undetermined amount in connection with the instant action. Id. at ¶ 14.

V. STANDARD OF DECISION

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party's pleadings. Dismissal of an action under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the pleading party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). The inquiry is generally limited to the allegations made in the complaint. Lazy Y Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).

To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plausible claim is one which provides more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A claim which is possible, but which is not supported by enough facts to"nudge [it] across the line from conceivable to plausible . . . must be dismissed." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

A complaint facing a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge "does not need detailed factual allegations [but] a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the element of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (internal citations omitted). In essence, "a complaint . . . must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Id. at 562. To the extent that any defect in the pleadings can be cured by the allegation of additional facts, the plaintiff should be afforded leave to amend, unless the pleading "could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990).

VI. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that K.M., initiated by Plaintiff on behalf of her child K.M. on October 23, 2017, arises out of the same core facts as this case, and that the general prohibition of "claim-splitting" operates as a bar to Plaintiff's maintenance of this separate action for attorney's fees and costs. ECF No. 5 at 7-8. Plaintiff contends that the OAH's decision on the IDEA claims became final when Defendant failed to appeal it within the statutory timeframe, and that this claim for attorney's fees is entirely separate from the ADA and § 504 claims asserted in K.M. ECF No. 8 at 4-5. Plaintiff asserts that the relief she seeks in this case is not the same as in K.M., that the resolution of this case will have no bearing on the earlier filed action, and vice versa, and that this claim does not turn on the facts alleged in K.M. Id. at 6-8.

The claim-splitting doctrine bars a party from bringing separate actions for claims arising from the same facts. The Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. 118, 125 (1894). The doctrine serves "to 'protect the Defendant from being harassed by repetitive actions based on the same claim' and to promote judicial economy and convenience." Bojorquez v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Co., No. CV 15-9651 JGB (AGRx),2016 WL 3693798, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2016) (quoting Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe Cnty., 69 F.3d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1995)). Claim-splitting is an aspect of the res judicata principle of claim preclusion and a similar test is applied for both. Adams v. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). The doctrine of claim preclusion "[t]reats a judgment, once rendered, as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the parties on the same 'claim' or 'cause of action.'" Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng. & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1978). "Thus, in assessing whether the second action is duplicative of the first, we examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same." Adams, 487 F.3d at 689. Both elements (identity of cause of action and relief, and identity or privity of parties) must be the same in both actions for the claim-splitting doctrine to apply.¹

The Ninth Circuit applies a "transaction" test to determine whether the causes of action in successive suits are identical. Adams, 487 F.3d at 690. Four criteria are weighed in the transaction test:

(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.

Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982). The last criteria, "whether the two suits arise out of the same...