Markham v. Tibbetts

Decision Date04 February 1947
Citation79 F. Supp. 47
PartiesMARKHAM v. TIBBETTS et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John F. X. McGohey, U. S. Atty. and David McKibbin, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of New York City, John S. Sonnett, Asst. U. S. Atty. Gen., Harry LeRoy Jones and Albert Parker, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., and Elmer J. Kelsey, of New York City, for plaintiff.

Tibbetts, Lewis, Lazo & Welch, of New York City (Murray D. Welch and George A. Dickinson, both of New York City, of counsel), for defendants Tibbetts and Lewis.

Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Atty. Gen. of New York, and Corning G. McKennee, Asst. Atty Gen., as the statutory representative of the unknown beneficiaries of gifts and trusts for educational, religious, charitable and benevolent uses and purposes.

CAFFEY, District Judge.

This is an action by the Alien Property Custodian for a declaratory judgment declaring and defining his rights as successor in interest to Martha Sakrausky and her issue, found by him to be enemy nationals, in the estates of Mary Martha Taylor and Harland B. Tibbetts, and impressing a constructive trust thereon, subject to such deductions as may be allowed by the Surrogate's Court. Plaintiff moves for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S. C.A. following section 723c. All the essential facts are admitted; defendants set up only legal defenses.

Mary Martha Taylor died, a resident of Westchester County, New York, on June 2, 1943. She left two children, Martha Sakrausky and Aimee (Morecroft) Mishou. Her will, executed on June 2, 1941, was admitted to probate in the Surrogate's Court of Westchester County on November 15, 1943. She nominated as her executors, Harland B. Tibbetts and the New York Trust Company, and, in the event that Tibbetts should fail to qualify, George F. Lewis, and, in the event that Lewis should fail to qualify, Murray D. Welch. The Trust Company renounced and Tibbetts died before the will was probated, so that Letters Testamentary were issued to George F. Lewis, as sole executor.

Harland B. Tibbetts died, a resident of Kings County, New York, on July 6, 1943. His will was admitted to probate in the Surrogate's Court of Kings County on July 20, 1943, and Letters Testamentary thereunder issued to his widow, Florence G. Tibbetts.

In her will Mrs. Taylor made three separate devises and bequests in the same language, viz., "absolutely to Harland B. Tibbetts, if he shall survive me; or if he shall predecease me, then to George F. Lewis, if he shall survive me; or if he shall predecease me, then to Murray D. Welch." With respect to one of these devises and bequests, Robert C. Rand was added as a fourth legatee, if Welch should predecease her. The property so devised and bequeathed was, first, one-half, after certain cash legacies, of the capital of a trust fund created by a deed of trust between Richard T. Parker and Eben Bacon, over which she had the power of appointment (Article Four), second, two separate devises and bequests, of one-third each, of all property, etc. coming to her under the wills of her grandfather, James Parker, and her father, Richard T. Parker, over which she also had the power of appointment (Article Five), and, third, one-half of her residuary estate (Article Six). Other property was also devised and bequeathed to them in certain contingencies in the same language.

Tibbetts, Lewis, Welch and Rand were members of the firm of lawyers who had acted as her legal advisers for many years.

On January 14, 1932, they had entered into a written agreement, which will be hereafter referred to as the "1932 Agreement," with Mrs. Taylor which recited that they were members of the firm of Tibbetts, Lewis & Rand, that she had executed her last will on the same day, whereby she had bequeathed, devised and/or appointed to one of them all the property aforesaid. All this property, with the exception of one-third of the James Parker Fund, which was disposed of under another agreement executed in December, 1931, was described as the "Additional Property". The agreement further recited that she had made such dispositions of such "Additional Property" upon the understanding that they would be disposed of by the person who should receive them in such manner as to carry out her wishes as expressed in the agreement. Her 1941 will took the place of this will, as was permitted by the agreement.

The agreement then provided that it was her wish and intent, which they agreed to respect and carry out, that the "Additional Property", so devised and bequeathed, should "be used for the benefit of Martha Sakrausky and/or her children, in the manner, to the extent and upon the conditions hereinafter expressed." The agreement explicitly bound the parties, their heirs, next of kin, executors, administrators and assigns. Mrs. Sakrausky was not a party to this agreement. The conditions contained therein were as follows:

"First: * * * Whether the said property shall be paid over outright in whole or in part, in one or more instalments, unto said Martha Sakrausky and/or her children or shall be used in whole or in part for the creation of a trust fund or funds for her and/or their benefit, upon such terms and conditions and under the laws of such state or country as may be deemed advisable, or shall be otherwise used for the purpose above stated, shall be determined in his absolute discretion by the party of the second part who receives the same. Such discretion shall be exercised after such investigation as he may deem proper to ascertain the circumstances and needs of the said Martha Sakrausky and/or her children. The necessary and proper expenses incident to such investigation, including reasonable compensation to such party of the second part for any time or effort which he may personally devote thereto, shall be payable out of the principal of the fund, together with any other expenses involved in the administration thereof, and commissions at the rate then allowed to a testamentary trustee under the laws of the State of New York, which shall be payable to such party of the second part.

"In the event that a trust fund or funds shall be created, the instrument or instruments so creating the same may, in the discretion of the maker thereof, provide that in the event of the death, before the termination of such trust or trusts, of Martha Sakrausky, leaving no issue, or of all her children, leaving no issue, then in either of such events the principal of the trust fund or funds shall be paid over by the trustee or trustees to such educational, religious or charitable institution or institutions as shall be selected (a) by the individual trustee of said fund or funds, if there be such, or (b) if there be no individual trustee thereof, then by the corporate trustee thereof, to be used for the purposes for which such educational, religious or charitable institution or institutions shall have been organized.

"If practicable, any trust fund or funds created as aforesaid shall be administered by two trustees, consisting of one of the parties hereto of the second part, and a trust company or other banking institution selected by him.

"Second: The dispositions hereinabove provided for the benefit of the said Martha Sakrausky and/or her children are predicated upon the following conditions: That neither the said Martha Sakrausky or any person claiming through her or acting on her behalf or at her instigation or with her connivance, shall in any manner whatsoever oppose or contest the probate of the will of the party of the first part, or challenge the validity or effectiveness of any of its provisions, or make or assert, whether by legal action or proceeding in any court in any jurisdiction, or otherwise, any claim or demand which is based upon any alleged blood relationship between the said Martha Sakrausky and the party of the first part. In the event of any violation of the aforesaid conditions by the said Martha Sakrausky or by any other person or persons so claiming or acting, then she and/or they shall forfeit all rights that might otherwise enure to her and/or them hereunder, and the party of the second part so receiving said property under the will of the party of the first part may refrain from disposing of the same, either outright or in trust, for the use or benefit of her and/or them, as hereinabove provided, or revoke any trust or trusts already created, and pay over the proceeds of the said property to such educational, religious or charitable institution or institutions as he may select, to be used for the purposes for which the same shall have been organized.

"Third: The party of the first part may, at any time and from time to time, at her election, alter the provisions of her said will and testament by the execution of a new will or wills or codicil or codicils; but the obligations herein assumed by the parties of the second part shall, unless abrogated or modified by written agreement between the party of the first part and one or more of the parties of the second part, continue in full force and effect as to any and all property (exclusive of one-third of the James Parker Fund) which they or any of them may receive as devisees, legatees and/or appointees under such new will or wills, or codicil or codicils, provided that they receive due notice of the terms thereof.

"Fourth: Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to confer any irrevocable or vested right, interest or estate upon the said Martha Sakrausky or her issue or assigns, and the party of the first part may at any time or times, at her election, revoke any and all provisions heretofore, herein or hereafter made for the benefit of the said Martha Sakrausky and/or her issue.

"Fifth: In the event that any bequest, devise and/or appointment to one of the parties hereto to the second part under any will of the party of the first part should be rendered illegal, invalid or void by reason of...

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2 cases
  • Brownell v. Union & New Haven Trust Co.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 24, 1956
    ...246, 41 S.Ct. 293, 65 L.Ed. 604; Central Union Trust Co. of New York v. Garvan, supra, 254 U.S. 567, 41 S.Ct. 214; see Markham v. Tibbetts, D.C., 79 F.Supp. 47, 54. These remedies are exclusive. Sturchler v. Sutherland, D.C., 19 F.2d 999, 1008; Josephberg v. Markham, 2 Cir., 152 F.2d 644, 6......
  • Clark v. Continental Nat. Bank of Lincoln, Neb., Civ. No. 3-49.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska
    • November 26, 1949
    ...to be compelling as judicial precedent. Interesting and instructive in principle, although not precisely in point, are Markham v. Tibbetts, D.C.N.Y., 79 F.Supp. 47, modified Clark v. Tibbetts, D.C.N.Y., 79 F.Supp. 60, and Koehler v. Clark, 9 Cir., 170 F.2d 779. Neither was an action under T......

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